Hmotné fikce: Pohyb mezi obrazy současného umění by Purkrábková, Noemi
Univerzita Karlova
Filozofická fakulta
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This master’s thesis engages moving images of contemporary art in order to sketch out certain 
ontological qualities of the digital image and imaginary, as they increasingly spill out of all 
fixed frames and fill the spaces between screens, contexts, and human and non-human agents. 
Following Steven Shaviro’s observation that digital media brought about a completely “new 
regime” of mutable technical imaging often independent of any preceding “real” space, but 
instead able to produce its own space-time, this text treats moving images as performative 
world-shaping  fictions  with  tangible  traction  on  reality.  Instead  of  understanding  their 
growing proliferation  in  terms  of  the  often-mourned disappeared  correspondence  to  some 
previous reality, depth or truth, it suggests taking their fluidity as an opportunity to rethink the 
very  divide  placed  between  reality  and  fiction,  as  it  continues  to  blur  throughout  our 
interactions with digital media, and to treat images not as mere representations but as material  
forces intensively active in the physical matter of the world, as well as in our own cognition. 
To articulate this irreducible materiality of digital image-fictions, the thesis weaves together 
on one hand respective philosophical concepts of François Laruelle and Gillese Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari – seeking to reshape the very relationship between image, fiction and the “real” 
world – and on the other hand, the understanding of technical (digital) objects not as mere 
tools  but  as  beings  who  co-evolve  with  humans  in  a  transductive  process  of  mutual 
ontogenesis,  as  theorized  in  the  interlinked  thinking  of  Gilbert  Simondon,  Yuk  Hui  and 
Bernard Stiegler. By approaching digital images through the concept of the digital object, the 
text underlines their often invisible but heavily material existence, which grows in importance 
as they become increasingly autonomous and operational, and treats fictions of digital moving 
images of contemporary art not as individual artworks, but as constituting a much needed 
experimental grey zone of intense encounter between human and machine fictioning.
Keywords
fiction, digital image, digital media, moving image art, contemporary art, operational images, 
ontogenesis, fluid ontology, digital object, technical object, artificial intelligence, feeling
 
Abstrakt
Tato magisterská diplomová práce vstupuje do toku pohyblivých obrazů současného umění s 
cílem nastínit některé obecnější ontologické kvality digitální vizuality a imaginace, jež stále 
výrazněji  uniká  ze  všech  pevných  rám(c)ů  a  rozlévá  se  do  prostoru  mezi  obrazovkami, 
kontexty a lidskými i nelidskými aktéry. V návaznosti na postřeh Stevena Shavira, že digitální 
média přinesla zcela  nový režim tvárného technického obrazu, který již nutně nezávisí  na 
žádném  předcházejícím  „reálném“  prostoru,  ale  spíše  produkuje  svůj  vlastní  prostoročas, 
chápe  tento  text  pohyblivé  obrazy  jako  performativní  světo-tvorné  fikce  s  hmatatelným 
dopadem na  skutečnost.  Místo častého oplakávání  ztracené  vazby na  jakoukoli  předchozí 
realitu,  hloubku  či  pravdu,  vnímá  přítomná  práce  bujení  obrazů  jako  příležitost  k 
přehodnocení samotné dělící čáry mezi realitou a fikcí, jež se nepřestává rozpíjet v našich 
interakcích  s  digitálními  médii.  A  také  přistoupit  k  obrazům  nikoli  jako  k  pouhým 
reprezentacím, ale jako k materiálním silám aktivně působícím jak na fyzickou hmotu světa, 
tak  na  naše  vlastní  kognitivní  procesy.  Aby  popsal  tuto  neredukovatelnou  materialitu 
digitálních  obrazů-fikcí,  propojuje  text  na  jedné  straně  Françoise  Laruella  s  Gillesem 
Deleuzem a Félixem Guattarim – jejichž vybrané filozofické koncepty jí pomáhají redefinovat 
vztah  mezi  obrazem,  fikcí  a  „skutečným“ světem – a  na  straně  druhé pojetí  technických 
(digitálních)  objektů  nikoli  jako  pouhých  nástrojů,  nýbrž  bytostí,  jež  se  vyvíjejí  spolu  s 
člověkem ve vzájemném procesu oboustranné ontogeneze, jak je chápou Gilbert Simondon, 
Yuk Hui a Bernard Stiegler. Práce nahlíží digitální obrazy skrze koncept digitálního objektu, 
aby zdůraznila jejich mnohdy neviditelnou,  ale těžce materiální  existenci,  jejíž rozpoznání 
nabývá na důležitosti spolu s tím, jak se obrazy stávají stále více autonomními a operativními. 
Přistupuje tak i k digitálním pohyblivým obrazům současného umění ne jako k jednotlivým 
uměleckým dílům, ale jako k velmi potřebné experimentální šedé zóně, v níž se na poli fikce 
uskutečňují intenzivní setkání mezi lidskou a strojovou imaginací.
Klíčová slova
fikce, digitální obraz, digitální média, umění pohyblivého obrazu, současné umění, operativní 
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Because  the  first  chapter  of  this  text  plays  itself  the role  of  an introduction,  in  terms  of 
establishing certain necessary contexts and explaining the aims of the thesis, I will keep the 
formal introduction short. 
I would first like to address why I chose to write the text in English. As much as I am 
aware of the importance of developing new Czech vocabulary capable of (cor)responding to 
the fast-evolving world, the task of translating a completely English-based discourse of both 
the  latest  digital  technologies  and  contemporary  art,  in  a  way  which  would  not  create 
contrasting  disruptions  in  the  text  and which  would  allow me to  connect  the  words  and 
concepts in the way I wanted, seemed presently unattainable.  Moreover, writing in Czech 
about  images  of  contemporary  art,  which  are usually  more  influenced by,  created  in  and 
disseminated through the global internet-grown community, than shaped by any respective 
local or national context,  simply did not feel appropriate.  On top of that, this text largely 
works with theoretical background which has in most part never been translated to Czech, 
many of the ideas containing entire strings of new vocabulary and neologisms whose proper 
translation would demand the work of one far more specialized in the respective approaches, 
which  this  thesis  alludes  to  just  in  passing.  How I  hope to  possibly  atone  for  betraying 
situated knowledge and a responsibility toward local academic discourse, is by bringing in 
some select works of the Czech artists most apt for the themes intimated in this text.
Being relieved to have avoided translating François Laruelle to Czech, I must also 
remark  that  it  is  in  itself  a  precarious  decision  to  partly  incorporate  his  thinking  into 
something as formal as a thesis. This text thus dares to place some of his concepts (albeit 
accessed primarily through more condensed secondary literature) alongside other thinkers he 
himself would probably not associate his thought or overall project with (if indeed there is 
anything in the formal world of philosophy he would find himself akin to in the first place). 
But it could be said to allow itself this possible contradiction in the same manner in which 
Laruelle is contradictory and expressly defers contradiction – refusing all philosophy while at 
the same time claiming no philosophies  are  opposed.  Moreover,  this  whole thesis  in  fact 
intentionally follows his deeper logic of not pinning concepts against each other, but bringing 
them  in.  The same can be said about  the  very idea  of “non-philosophy,” which this  text 
doesn’t at all claim either as its method nor hopes to fulfill its mandate, but which influences 
and brings certain poetic or sensual qualities to many of the other thoughts outlined. 
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Finally,  as much as the bulk of the ideas underpinning this thesis were formulated 
gradually over time, the moment I embarked on actively writing was the point at which most 
of the public spaces in Czech Republic  started to re-open after a tough lockdown. In my 
personal prolonged quarantine, I often reflected on how, in the last year and a half of COVID-
19 reality, when most of the exhibitions were closed and crossing borders was often hard or 
impossible,  the  flat  screens  became  the  only  place  where  we  could  encounter  not  only 
artworks  but  even whole art  shows – some of  them inventing  new formats  or happening 
literally only in order to be posted online. This is one of the reasons why this thesis does not 
mention virtual reality. Not because it would be unimportant (I wouldn’t have written most of 
my bachelor thesis about it if I thought it was), but because this text focuses on the materiality 
of exactly those images that we otherwise see as “flat.”
But these flat screens recently became unprecedented, vital nodes of connection not 
only with texts, information, or art, but with other human beings as well – turning humans 
into images and animations. We could thus say that all of us have, to a certain extent, become 
at least partially more digital. This text is not intended to judge this development, nor does it 
want to celebrate any shift into some techno-utopian direction. We have all felt that physical 
and digital existence are not at all fully exchangeable. But we have also felt how the digital 
influences  our  physical  body,  perception,  attention  and cognition.  The platforms we have 
been using have corporate owners with their own financial interests. One of the motivations 
for this text was the need to realize that we must nurture our attitudes toward technical beings 
outside of these interests and try “searching for a new structure of care”1 between both human 
and non-human agents. But to be able to do that, we first need to acknowledge the force of 
images we encounter and reconsider our own role within their sticky webs.
1 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2016, p. 248. 
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1. FLUID ONTOLOGY 
1.1. “Nothing is Real, Everything is Permitted”
Synthetic realities inhabit almost every sphere of the global social spectrum, 
yet humans continue to call them fictions.
– Delphi Carstens, Mer Roberts, Things that Knowledge Cannot Eat
Guns, masks, military camouflage, furry cloaks, a horned head covered in hide, a ferret snout 
falling over crazed eyes, several spires cutting through dense air, a wooden staff, a police riot 
shield... The swarming mob climbs up the high walls, rushing across the Oscar-red carpet, 
seizing memorial objects, busts and sculptures standing on both sides of the corridor adorned 
with famous canvases. The main chamber falls into chaos as the gatecrashers break in, taking 
over desks and seats. Someone picks up a lectern, carrying it quickly away. The sound of 
shattered glass resonates through the room, echoing back and forth between the relief portraits 
of famous lawgivers engraved in the walls, their  regal faces looking down at plastic bags 
shielding the heads of congress(wo)men from the tear gas swirling heavily on the floor…
These lines refer neither to a remixed, centuries old battle report, nor a trailer sequence 
from the last contribution to the now much-favored genre of catastrophic film (in this case, 
featuring special  Viking time-out-of-joint  elements).  It  is  a description  of an actual  event 
which, quite symptomatically, opened the very year in which this thesis is being written: On 
Wednesday the 6th of January 2021, slightly after lunch, a posse of (now former) President 
Trump supporters stormed one of the most iconic buildings of the United States – the Capitol.  
Congress was just about to certify the presidential election results, when part of the raging 
rally  stormed the building – resembling by acts  and costumes more of a  peculiar  LARP2 
group’s battle reenactment than a political demonstration – a scene that could very well have 
come from the pen of the Game of Thrones author George R. R. Martin, if he spiced up the 
medieval  and  fairytale  inspirational  sources  with  a  touch  of  contemporary  apocalyptic 
imagery.
2 Live Action Role Playing (LARP) is a form of RPG where the participants physically portray the characters to 
pursue goals within a fictional setting represented by real world environments. 
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This  is  not a  mere personal  impression of the writer  of this  thesis,  but  something 
widely articulated by TV reporters and journalists covering this ultra-mediated event,3 many 
of whom have referred to the images and videos appearing in all major media as well as in 
personal  tweets  and  Instagram  posts  as  looking  like  a  moment  out  of  a  Hollywood 
blockbuster.  Whereas some mentioned that “it  felt  like an American action movie,”4 BBC 
went so far as to compare the riot to “a zombie movie”5 and Vox even directly commented on 
the strongly fiction-like atmosphere of the whole event, stating that the insurrectionists gave 
everybody “the feeling they all thought they were in a movie,” which they “wrote, directed, 
and starred  in  […],  scaling  walls,  bellowing  from  podiums,  mugging  for  their  buddies’ 
glamour shots.“6 
But the scene of the storming of the Capitol is but one manifestation of a broader all-
permeating feeling of a strongly fictionalized and mediated reality from which we cannot step 
out – a single drop in the stormy sea of performative (and sometimes also performed) fictions 
proliferating in form of static or moving images across the screens: the flaming arrows, DIY 
catapults, hair-knitted face masks and giant slingshots that shocked the (online) world last 
year during the Hong Kong protests. The American National Security Agency releases an 
official  document  advocating  for  the  need to  further  research  the so called  “Unidentified 
Aerial Phenomena”7 – or colloquially, the UFOs. And while theorists such as Steven Shaviro, 
Suhail Malik or Armen Avanessian have been continuously underlining the fictitious nature 
of the whole contemporary global economy,8 highly built  on volatile financial  speculation 
3 By using „ultra-mediated” we would like to avoid connotations with the concept of “hypermediation” 
articulated by Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin. (Jay David Bolter, Richard Grusin, Remediation: 
understanding new media. Cambridge: MIT Press 1999). However useful the concept is for describing specific 
relations between the means of particular media, it doesn’t serve us well in trying to express the fluidity and 
elusiveness with which fictions and facts move across screens, influencing us oftentimes exactly by their 
seamless transformation. 
4 WION, Gravitas: The storming of Capitol Hill. WION news Youtube channel. Accessible at WWW: 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UeLfSuc6ytU&ab_channel=WION> [uploaded 7. 1. 2021, accessed 8. 6. 
2021]
5 BBC, US Capitol riot: 'It was like a zombie movie'. Accessible at WWW: 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-55581269> [uploaded 8.1.2021, accessed 8. 6. 2021].
6 Alissa Wilkinson: The chaos at the Capitol wasn’t a movie, Vox. Accessible at WWW: 
<https://www.vox.com/culture/22218583/trump-movie-hollywood-capitol-insurrection-biden-hawley> 
[published 7. 1. 2021, accessed 7. 5. 2021].
7 Office Of The Director Of National Intelligence: Preliminary Assessment: Unidentified Aerial Phenomena. 
Accessible at WWW: <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/Prelimary-Assessment-UAP-
20210625.pdf> [published 25. 6. 2021, accessed 30. 6. 2021]
8 See for example: Suhail Malik, The Ontology of Finance: Price, Power, and the Arkhéderivative, In: Robin 
MacKay (ed.): Collapse Vol. VIII: Casino Real. Falmouth: Urbanomic, pp. 629-811; Steven Shaviro: 
Unpredicting the Future. Alienocene. Dostupný na WWW: 




with “futures” and derivative contracts,9 this year the art world nervously buzzed with fiery 
discussions  about  the  quick  rise  of  “NFTs”  (non-fungible  tokens),  through  which  crypto 
currencies  and  digital  ownership  fully  entered  even  traditional  auction  houses  like 
Christie’s…10 
But the “digital” reality itself also seems to be evolving with accelerating velocity, 
updating every second while at  the same time becoming more and more accessible.  From 
diverse forms of “deep fakes” using machine learning to produce fictional moving images of 
actual people’s acts,11 to extreme steps regarding the possibilities of creating fully digitally 
generated characters, as demonstrated for example in MetaHuman Creator by Unreal Engine, 
promising “high-fidelity digital humans in minutes” without need of an extraordinarily strong 
computer, as the rendering itself happens somewhere else; that is, on the cloud.12 The extent 
of these possibilities is also apparent in the constant betterment and growing credibility of 
digitally produced objects, landscapes or even AI generated speech13 that are making digital 
creations harder and harder to distinguish from “real” images; but such images oftentimes 
don’t even precede them, or do so only in the form of one of many marginal inputs in the  
complex machine learning process. While scrolling down the feed, pictures of our friends’ 
lives naturally merge with fictional 3D-sculpted Instagram influencers looking good (and very 
real and very happy) in the newest model of luxury brand shoes or expensive underwear, 
posing in  selfies with friends  (figure 1),  writing emotional  captions  about  their  lives and 
simply “living their dream” – if they don’t have one of these rare bad days when they post 
about crying on the toilet (figure 2).14 
Today, maybe more than ever, it is obvious that fiction does not belong to the realm of 
the “unreal” (if it indeed ever did) but grows around, from and into the myths that constitute 
what we make sense of as “reality.” As such, it is not opposed to any (pre-)given truth, but 
9 As Investopedia explains: “Futures are derivative financial contracts that obligate the parties to transact an asset 
at a predetermined future date and price. The buyer must purchase or the seller must sell the underlying asset at 
the set price, regardless of the current market price at the expiration date.” Accessible at WWW: 
<https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/futures.asp> [publication date unknown, updated 9. 9. 2021, accessed 3. 
5. 2021]
10 By Jacob Kastrenakes: Beeple sold an NFT for $69 million. Accessible at WWW: 
<https://www.theverge.com/2021/3/11/22325054/beeple-christies-nft-sale-cost-everydays-69-million> 
[published 11. 3. 2021, accessed 12. 6. 2021]
11 It’s Getting Harder to Spot a Deep Fake Video, Bloomberg Quicktake Youtube channel. Accessible at WWW: 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gLoI9hAX9dw&ab_channel=BloombergQuicktake> [uploaded
12 MetaHuman Creator web page. Accessible at WWW: < https://www.unrealengine.com/en-US/digital-
humans> 
13 See for example the 15 AI project.




directly  “productive  of [it]”15 – “[s]cience  fiction and science  fact  cohabit  happily in  this 
tale.”16  Furthermore, the many fictions co-created and disseminated through digital media, 
function as (ever more accessible) tools for (oftentimes very selfish) reshaping of the world 
that feels ever more pliant and formless, escaping attempts to grasp it, name it or think it.
The medieval/science-fiction clothing worn by some of the key “protagonists” of the 
“story” of the Capitol storming which was unfolding on and after 6th January across various 
TV sets, computer screen,  YouTube windows, Instagram stories, Tweets,  and also Twitch 
videos or Discord threads, thus can be said to nicely express something important about the 
everyday world we live in. For it is a world of fast-evolving, ever-changing and relatively 
recent data-fueled, multi-directional, global, digital exchange in which the line that was once 
potentially drawable between the real and the fictional is being radically and indisputably 
washed away. The disappearance of this boundary is of course nothing new, being among 
others  famously proclaimed a mere “optical  illusion”17 by Donna Haraway already in the 
1980s and the proximity and entanglement of fact and fiction – as well as their theoretical 
embodiments – only continued to grow throughout the 1990s interest in theory-fiction, only to 
re-appear  later  at  the  center  of  attention  with  the  rise  of  speculative  tendencies  in  both 
philosophy and art.18 Also French philosopher Bernard Stiegler, to whom this text is heavily 
indebted, observes, going back all the way to Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s concept of cultural 
industry, that with the advent of mechanically reproduced images, it becomes progressively 
harder to “distinguish between perception and imagination, reality and fiction.”19
But it is of high importance to emphasize at the very beginning of this text, that this 
hardly fully refutable observation about a certain shift in the way we perceive and make sense 
of what is “real” and what is (un)easily frameable as fiction, doesn’t serve this thesis as any 
reason for nostalgia, apathy, or doomsday rhetoric. Instead of enclosing itself in the worn-out 
endless mourning of the “loss of the real,” articulated most famously by Jean Baudrillard,20 it 
15 David Burrows, Simon O‘Sullivan, Fictioning, The Myth-Functions of Contemporary Art and Philosophy. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2019, p. 5.
16 Donna Haraway, Staying with the trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene, London/Durham: Duke University 
Press 2016, p. 7.
17 Donna Haraway, A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth 
Century. In: Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. New York, New York: Routledge, 1991, 
p. 149.
18 In philosophy, we of course mean the whole speculative turn expressed most famously by “speculative 
realism.” In art we can mention the important and influential triptych of exhibitions Speculation on Anonymous 
Materials (2013-2014), Nature After Nature (2014) and Inhuman (2015) curated by Susanne Pfeffer in 
Friedericianum in Kassel.
19 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 3: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press 2011, p. 38.
20 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1994. 
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wishes to underline the entanglement  of fiction and fact in their  medially  and technically 
specific inseparability and understand it as a (potentially positive) productive force. 
Media  and  film theorist  Steven  Shaviro  similarly  notes,  that  “the  very  opposition 
between  reality-based  and  image-based  modes  of  presentation  breaks  down  in  the 
contemporary world of electronic media and global capital,”21 and that today, “the most vivid 
and intense reality is precisely the reality of images.”22 This text is based upon the belief that 
technical digital images and the fictions/realities they (help to) produce are not generative of a 
simply  washed-out  reality  of  pure  surfaceness,  as  was  and  sometimes  still  is  very  often 
claimed, but that digital objects have lives, are part of (evolutionary) processes, and thrive 
with  “intensities”23 that  are  materially  productive  of  the  very  world  we share  with  them. 
Dismissing them as “fake” or “fiction” is therefore not only oversimplifying and backward-
thinking, as it discloses binary logic which prevents us from grasping or making use of the 
extreme mutability of our surroundings, but – as will be shown later on – an actual mental and 
physical threat for the future of human species as such (however questionable and question-
worth is, whether or not it deserves to be “saved” in the first place).24 
The aim of this opening chapter therefore is to briefly pick up and connect several 
strings, at a specific point and from a specific angle, which run through the context this thesis 
is stepping into, sometimes without ambitions to discuss them in detail or to develop them 
fully (for logical limitations of space, as well as to stay focused on the knot being tightened 
up). What will hopefully emerge is a sketch of what we might call an ontological framework, 
which could allow us to grasp and ground certain qualities of structure, velocity, temporality, 
and materiality at play in an entangled, digitally-mediated world, where causality doesn’t flow 
unidirectionally, and where many borders – be it between reality and fiction, object and its 
representation, or distinct categories of space and time – continue to (re)dissolve. Following 
lines will thus situate this thesis in terms of contextual standpoints, as the format desires, as 
well as explain its view of and approach to moving image art appearing along the way. Last 
but not least, it also hopes to affect a certain atmosphere, a set of textures and feelings for the 
lines to come after.
21 Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect. Winchester: Zero Books 2009, p. 38.
22 Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, p. 38.
23 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press 1987, p. 4.
24 Some scholars, such as Patricia MacCormack, nowadays argue, following of course Jean François Lyotard but 
also some of Deleuze‘s and Guattari’s observations, that not only living with the truth of extinction (as many 
speculative philosophers suggest), but also literally going extinct is the only way to actually save the world. 




1.2. A New Media Regime 
[M]oving images, like water, always find a way to spread.
– Malte Hagener, Vinzenz Hediger and Alena Strohmaier, 
The State of Post-Cinema. Tracing the Moving Image in the Age of Digital Dissemination
There is one more important layer to the scene of the Capitol storming – the ways it 
was mediated, which is simultaneously a reason for it unfolding in the particular form it did. 
As journalist Michelle Lhooq, who on her blog jokingly but pointedly analyzed the most eye-
catching costumes “on the set,” remarked on account of not only this but any other highly 
saturated  societal  act  nowadays  in  general:  “Cataclysmic  news  events  unfold  like  data 
tsunamis, with the real action happening in a memer-commentariat metaverse far far away 
from the Boomer traditional news chatter.”25 What she sweepingly summarizes here is the 
way  in  which  the  media  sphere  is  being  increasingly  shaped  out  of  sight  and  reach  of 
traditional  information  channels,  happening  through  the  dissemination  of  (not  only  but 
largely) images beyond individual control. In this sense, “traditional” means not only printed 
press  or  television,  but  also  official  news  websites  and  even  their  Facebook  or  Twitter 
accounts. The narratives (once perhaps identifiable as either real or made-up) constituting the 
contemporary world are being increasingly produced and spread by both human and non-
human individuals, groups, and trolls; swelling unevenly in often unexpected corners of social 
media bubbles and transversally shifting across different scopes, amplified by unpredictable 
(and  manipulatable  –  a  quality  often  taken  advantage  of)  ever-changing  power  grids  of 
algorithms.  And,  as  Lhooq  implies,  it  was  first  and  foremost  these  networks  the  action 
costumes shone for. 
Already more than ten years ago, Shaviro claimed in his book Post-Cinematic Affect, 
that  digitalization  generated  ongoing  changes  “massive  enough”  for  us  to  confidently 
pronounce that,  “we are now witnessing the emergence  of  a  different  media  regime,  and 
indeed  of  a  different  mode  of  production,  than  those  which  dominated  the  twentieth 
century.”26 This condition of “post-cinema” was itself of course largely theorized from the 
25 Michelle Lhooq, DC WAS MAGA BURNING MAN. Accessible at WWW: 
<https://ravenewworld.substack.com/p/dc-was-maga-burning-man> [published 8. 1. 2021, accessed 10. 1. 2021].
26 Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect. Winchester: Zero Books 2009, p. 2.
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specific perspective of film studies,27 but our aim here is not to trace what happened to any 
formerly stable “cinematic” image, as much as to understand the digital moving images of 
contemporary  art  in  their  media  complexity,  growing  often  out  of  something  completely 
different than any previous experience or context of the medium of classical film.
Shaviro further adds that digital  technologies have in fact given birth to altogether 
novel “ways of manufacturing and articulating lived experience” itself.28 Similar observation 
was made also by artist and theorist Hito Steyerl, who in her symptomatically named text Too 
Much World: Is the Internet Dead?, writes that today’s (digital) images “acquired an uncanny 
ability to proliferate, transform, and activate,” allowing them to walk “through screens, right 
into reality,” pouring out into the “off-screen space.”29 We will analyze this unsettled and 
unsettling life of images in more detail in following chapters, what is important to note now is 
that this free-floating agency of digital  images makes it  in fact impossible to “understand 
reality without understanding cinema, photography, 3-D modeling, animation, or other forms 
of moving or still image.”30 
Consequently, images not only cannot be left out, but they also cannot be reduced to 
mere “tracings,”31 bearing an indexical imprint of the pre-existing reality (which so many did 
and some still  do mourn in the reference to moving image’s  historical  phase of analogue 
photography  and  celluloid  film  material)32 but  they  are,  as  Shaviro  points  out,  directly 
“expressive of” and “productive” of certain pre-individual digital sensibility permeating all 
surfaces and filling what (in a cartesian mindset) might otherwise be taken for empty space.33 
If we pick up the mention we made of speculative finance, it can be similarly said to embody 
the very logic images operate through: being “not representational, but performative,”34 they 
27 See for example: Malte Hagener, Vinzenz Hediger, Alena Strohmaier (Eds). The State of Post-Cinema. 
Tracing the Moving Image in the Age of Digital Dissemination. London: Palgrave Macmillan 2016. or Malte 
Hagener, Where Is Cinema (Today)? The Cinema in the Age of Media Immanence. in: Cinéma & Cie, no. 11, 
2008.
28 Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, p. 2.
29 Hito Steyerl, Too Much World: Is the Internet Dead?. In: E-flux Journal: The Internet Does Not Exist. Berlin: 
Sternberg Press 2015, pp. 11-12.
30 Hito Steyerl, Too Much World…, p. 18.
31 In Deleuze and Guattari’s understandning. Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1987, pp. 3-26.
32 We shall return to the operational rather than representation nature of digital images in the third chapter of this 
text.
33 Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, p. 2.
34 Steven Shaviro: Unpredicting the Future. Alienocene. Dostupný na WWW: 




don’t “measure, register, or predict future happenings in the world,” but “actively produce[…] 
those happenings.” 35 
 The  “excessive,  overgrown  post-cinematic  mediasphere”36 is  thus  a  space-time 
beyond mere representation,  comprising of constant  flows that cannot  be reduced to their 
content – they are in a sense media without a message,37 signifiers without attachments to any 
signifieds. In a recent podcast for a multi-layered online platform/community  New Models, 
architect  and design  theorist  Keller  Easterling  spoke of  a  certain  self-actualizing  magical 
function  of  lies  in  today’s  world,  where  sentences  often  work  against  or  across  their 
supposedly attached meaning.38 As if the main forces driving contemporary (geo)politics seem 
to not even speak our language. In one aspect, it is without doubt because so many of these 
forces  elude  any  human-perceptible  speed  or  scale,  as  well  as  any  stable  expression  of 
meaning.  But  the  means  of  usage  of  language  itself  seem to have  changed  as  well.  The 
fictions,  whether  they  are  conscious  lies  or  “innocent”  fantasies  (and  how  to  tell  the 
difference?), don’t represent anything anymore. They seem to have become weaponized tools 
actualizing the desired reality of those who wield them, if not completely of their own. 
Shaviro  similarly  writes,  that  “ubiquitous  digital  technologies”  are  organized  as  a 
“space of flows” of images no longer “tied to any indexical referents.”39 An ultra-mediated 
world produced by what Stiegler calls  “hypervideo technologies,”40 thus cannot be simply 
captured or “represented, in any ordinary sense.”41 To illustrate this, Hito Steyerl goes back to 
Baudrillard’s all-too-famous example of Borge‘s fable about the map of the empire covering 
the whole of its territory, reformulating that the map in fact is not equal to it (whether the 
reality is still hidden underneath its thin surface or if it supposedly completely vanished), but 
“exceeds it,”42 and we might add, spills itself into it while being simultaneously sucked in 
from  the  opposite  direction.  The  consequence  of  global  digitalization  is  therefore  the 
inescapable unification of all phenomena, that “are all woven together in one and the same 
fabric,”43 allowing “for anything to be exchanged with anything else.”44 Meaning is not gone 
or defrauded, it’s just extremely fluid, changeable and volatile, as the “[i]mage and the world 
35 Steven Shaviro: Unpredicting the Future… Emphasis in the original.
36 Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, p. 67.
37 Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, p. 132.
38 New Models podcast, episode 36: Happy Medium (Keller Easterlink). Accessible at WWW: < 
https://soundcloud.com/newmodels/ep-36-keller-easterling> [publication date unknown, accessed 20. 7. 2020]
39 Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, p. 30.
40 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 3… p. 2.
41 Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, p. 131.
42 Hito Steyerl, Too Much World…, p. 19.
43 Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, p. 7. 
44 Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, p. 132.
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are in many cases just versions of each other.”45 This consequently makes digital video not a 
mere set of moving images, but a specific form of “articulation and composition of forces,”46 
flowing through everywhere while remaining inherently unlocalizable to a single place.
It is in this sense that Stiegler writes about “the irreducible materiality of the image,”47 
which cannot be split between the image-object and a mental image, because both are part of 
the same phenomenon in which “it  is no longer possible to separate the signified and the 
signifier that in the past would have defined the two faces of the linguistic sign.”48 This even 
leads him to a controversial proclamation that “[t]he image in general does not exist.”49 That 
of  course  doesn’t  mean  that  in  a  world  ever-more  permeated  by  images,  the  images 
themselves would be actually disappearing or in any way “fake”; on the contrary, they are not 
(anymore)  separable  and  frameable  as  mere  flat  derivative  images  of the  world.  Being 
materially entangled in our mental but also bodily processes, they in a sense even tend to be 
“haptic rather than merely optical.”50 
The italics which you might have noticed gently emphasizing the nouns and verbs 
connected to “feeling” in the beginning of the text thus aimed to underline another string 
stretched across this thesis – the materially affective and visceral qualities of digital images. 
Because the pervasive “feeling” of unreality cannot be understood in a metaphorical sense of 
some semblant hallucination of the abstract(ed) mind, but as an actual force of flow exchange 
happening even between digital signals and human skin cells. When Shaviro thus asks at the 
beginning  of  Post-Cinematic  Affect:  “What  it  feels  like to  live  in  the  early  twenty-first 
century?,”51 it is a question directed partly at rapid changes in human perception and cognition 
under  the  constant  digital  mediation,  but  it  necessarily  also  comes  with  the  broader 
understanding and scrutiny of the multi-directional, ever-shifting flows constituting the very 
“sphere of liquidity”52 humans inhabit, but which is not limited to their movements or wishes.
45 Hito Steyerl, Too Much World…, p. 18.
46 Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, p. 17.
47 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 3…, p. 36.
48 S Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 3…, p. 36.
49 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 3…, p. 36. Emphasis in the original.
50 Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, p. 38.
51 Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, p. 2. Emphasis in the original.
52 Hito Steyerl, Too Much World…, p. 17.
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1.3. Everything Flows: Ontology for the World in Flux
Everything flows, objects are springs. […]
 The perceptual space is dense with waves. All things are transmitters, without interruption and in 
every direction; our senses ceaselessly receive. We are plunged into the space of communication. 
We bathe in an interlacing of channels. […] The space of signals is physical space itself.
– Michel Serres, The Birth of Physics
“I realised quickly that she started to feel like an oil spill.” 
– Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect
If we return to Steyerl’s text one more time, she seems to be observing something important 
not only about the quantity and movements of contemporary digital images, but also about 
their material qualities: “In this fluid media space, images and sounds morph across different 
bodies and carriers, acquiring more and more glitches and bruises along the way.”53 As many 
others, she thus ascribes to digital media a certain “watery” texture in order to express the fast 
and free-floating exchanges operating in (and producing) the global world. There have been 
numerous attempts to conceptualize this volatility by thinking through the materiality of fluid 
– it is an important motif within certain works of Michel Serres concerning “fluid dynamics,” 
and even more famously in the sociology of Zygmunt Bauman, who even directly named 
present  era “liquid  modernity.”54 In the end, even the aforementioned problematization of 
borders made by Haraway already identified the viscous drops produced by what she termed 
“leaky distinction[s]” between human and animal,  organic and machinic,  and physical and 
non-physical.55  And the leaking hasn’t stopped ever since. 
Connecting the water imaginary with digital technologies also seems sort of natural – 
both are usually comprehended as fluid, translucent and elusive. Consequently, the flows of 
the contemporary “open, immanent, and ever-becoming”56 world are often also recognized as 
necessarily ungraspable with fixed concepts and stable hierarchies. In an attempt to ride the 
53 Hito Steyerl, Too Much World…, p. 17.
54 Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press 2000.
55 Donna Haraway, A Cyborg Manifesto…, pp. 151–153.
56 Philip Steinberg, Kimberley Peters, Wet Ontologies, Fluid Spaces: Giving Depth to Volume through Oceanic 
Thinking. In: Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, n. 33, 2015, pp. 247–264. Accessible at WWW: 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273895732_Wet_Ontologies_Fluid_Spaces_Giving_Depth_to_Volu
me_through_Oceanic_Thinking> [published 2015, accessed 26.3. 2021], p. 1. [the page numbers correspond to 
the online accessible document].
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rising tide of constant (ex)changes, we have thus already seen number of variants of “flat 
ontologies,” emphasizing the interconnectedness and inseparability of networks of unsteady 
actors  and  invisible-to-the-human-eye  factors  and  processes  constituting  the  ever-shifting 
present.57 But networks are all but flat.58 And water is hardly ever completely transparent. In 
their text Wet Ontologies, Fluid Spaces: Giving Depth to Volume through Oceanic Thinking, 
geographer  Philip  Steinberg  and biologist  Kimberley  Peters  challenge  the  often-criticized 
horizontalism of flat ontologies with the concept of “wet ontology,” which they claim could 
express the nature of constant interaction at play while at the same time demonstrate that what 
at first sight appears to be seamless flow is actually thick, deep and voluminous. 
Their  idea  of  “wet  ontology”  thus  offers  to  help  us  move  beyond  conceptually 
depleted notions of space and time, which stopped (again, if they ever did) corresponding to 
the shifting streams of (media) landscape,  showing also how the classical  Euclidean view 
ultimately lends itself to the separation of “spaces from the matter and meanings that occur 
within” them.59 The authors thus turn specifically to the ocean as the point of departure for 
reconsidering matter not as a “static substance” but to instead trace its flows “as it moves 
through, and simultaneously constructs, both space and time.”60 It is thus a view of matter as 
“mutable and leaky” while at the same time expressive and constitutive of “non-linear and 
fluctuating” time of the contemporary in its “on-going re-formation.”61 
The feeling of living in the 21st century Shaviro asks to name could thus, based on this 
idea,  be perhaps  best  compared to being thrown into water.  Because “those who actually 
engage the ocean, like sailors and, perhaps even more profoundly, surfers and swimmers, 
become one with the waves as the waves become one with them.”62 We could therefore say 
that, while having no separate island to watch our sinking boat from, we cannot observe the 
world otherwise than swimming as one with – or against – it, but always submerged in the 
diverse oceanic currents. Without a fixed position but rather subject to constant flows, we 
float in the borderless waters of the digital-material reality we aim to describe. As Deleuze 
wrote in his late years: “Everywhere surfing has already replaced the older sports.”63
57 See for example: Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2005.
58 Here I am of course deliberately simplifying the “flatness” of flat ontologies, as they of course also try to deal 
with agents in the networks in quite complex ways.
59 Philip Steinberg, Kimberley Peters, Wet Ontologies…, p. 3.
60 Philip Steinberg, Kimberley Peters, Wet Ontologies…, p. 9.
61 Philip Steinberg, Kimberley Peters, Wet Ontologies…, p. 16.
62 Philip Steinberg, Kimberley Peters, Wet Ontologies…, p. 7.
63 Gilles Deleuze, Postscript on the Societies of Control. In: October, vol. 59, 1992, p. 6.
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But the endless horizon of water could seem overwhelming and scary, especially when 
we can’t frame and stabilize it, or at least not without admitting our own body’s presence 
amidst  the  crushing  waves.  Steinberg  and  Peters  also  note  that  many  theorists  used  to 
condemn the oceanic space as “unknowable, uninscribable, and uncontrollable,”64 criticizing 
exactly its endless surface where “on the waves there is nothing but waves,” quoting among 
others Roland Barthes who called the sea a “non-signifying field [that] bears no message”65 – 
in other words a space we can’t really make any sense of. This inescapability of the ocean 
surface thus could perhaps be correlated with postmodern feelings of a loss of volume and 
depth, as expressed in late 20th century attempts to describe what was happening with the 
world under the proliferation of new media. The idea of a highly mediated reality becoming 
just an endless interplay of surfaces even gave birth to the concept of “depthlessness” coined 
by probably the most famous critic of the postmodern condition, Fredric Jameson. For him, 
the popular culture as well  as art  of the late 20 th century simply mirrored the fragmented 
reality of repetition and pastiche, flattening the metaphorical transcendental “beyond” with 
pure superficiality pointing nowhere else than to itself.66 The repetitive waves seemed to have 
always been bringing only the “End of History,” nothing on the horizon – all the same, all 
shallow, and all over again.
But  as  we  have  already  mentioned  here,  the  medium-message  (or  form-matter) 
distinction has leaked to the point of a massive rupture which forces us to reconsider how we 
think about digital  media in general.  Steinberg and Peters very importantly  underline that 
“water  is  simultaneously  encountered”  not  only  as  a  surface  but  also  “as  a  depth,”67 
advocating for its volume to be recognized. Quoting Michel Serres, they oppose the idea of 
waves’ fruitless repetition, stating that the “nautical murmur” they fill our ears with “is not a 
matter of phenomenology [but] a matter of being itself.”68 It could thus be similarly said that 
reflections on the waves of contemporary liquidity are not reducible to a flat never-ending 
mirror of the same, showing us the ultimate loss of meaning, but comprise a realm of dynamic 
and  lively  “intra-action”  (a  word  theoretical  physicist  Karen  Barad  suggests  to  replace 
interaction  with,  to  underline  the  inseparability  and  mutual  constitution  of  all  involved 
64 Philip Steinberg, Kimberley Peters, Wet Ontologies…, p. 4.
65 Roland Barthes, Mythologies. London: Paladin 1972, quoted in: Philip Steinberg, Kimberley Peters, Wet 
Ontologies…, p. 4.
66 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Durham: Duke university Press 
1997.
67 Philip Steinberg, Kimberley Peters, Wet Ontologies…, p. 10.
68 Michel Serres, Genesis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1996, quoted in: Philip Steinberg, 
Kimberley Peters, Wet Ontologies…, p. 5.
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agencies)69 of  “human and non-human (including molecular) elements and affects” that are 
“not merely passively consumed but imagined, encountered, and produced.”70 
But apart from the above-mentioned problem of seeing only the surface of the water, 
there is also the risk of reducing everything to an all-too-seamless unitary flow (as well as 
limiting it too easily to either networks or objects) and thus ignoring the individual beings, 
agents and particles that are drawn into and/or responsible for the very fluidity  we try to 
formulate. By speaking of “liquid ontology,” this text thus means to always emphasize what 
Yuk Hui calls “granularity,”71 Jane Bennett declares as the “vibrancy” of matter,72 and what 
could perhaps be also heard in Serres’ “nautical murmur” – the irreducible heterogeneous 
buzzing of different particles constituting any respective flow, including the digital ones.
Shaviro  similarly  underlines  the  “dense  materiality”  at  play  even  “within  the 
weightless  realm  of  digital,  electronic  images,”73 pointing  out  their  physical 
interconnectedness with our sensual, cognitive and bodily processes. As theorist McKenzie 
Wark  also  observes,  electronic  media  and information  itself  have  unignorable  materiality 
“prior  to  any  discussion  of  ‘real’  reporting  or  ‘fake’  news.”74  But  the  self-promoted 
seamlessness and translucence of Silicon Valley-advertised media image of smart products 
and digital  gadgets  feeds the still  very popular idea of the digital  as “the virtual,”  which 
effervescently  teleports  itself  across  the  globe  without  any  physical  trace,  ironically 
embodying the disembodied floating futurity  and light-speed pace of digital  technologies’ 
(promoted) development. Such conception is highly untrue and ecologically problematic, as 
not only the cars and heavy machinery, but also every bit of data, each Instagram like and sent 
e-mail  leave traces  of CO2  pollution in the atmosphere – there is  nothing “air”-like for a 
MacBook air except concerning the pollution it creates there. It is thus crucial to remember 
that (digital) images are not immaterially radiating somewhere behind the “real” world, and 
that in some sense neither them nor the screens we engage are as flat, “airy” or clean as they  
first appear.
69 As she explains: “The neologism ‘intra-action’ signifies the mutual constitution of entangled agencies. That is, 
in contrast to the usual ‘interaction,’ which assumes that there are separate individual agencies that precede their 
interaction, the notion of intra-action recognizes that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, 
their intra-action.” Karen Barad, Meeting The Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of 
Matter and Meaning. Durham: Duke Universtiy Press 2007, p. 33. 
70 Philip Steinberg, Kimberley Peters, Wet Ontologies…, p. 17.
71 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2016, p. 30.
72 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: Political Ecology of Things. Durham: Duke Universtiy Press 2009.
73 Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, p. 13.
74 McKenzie Wark, Sensoria: Thinkers for the Twentieth-First Century. London: Verso 2020, p. 211.
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As American  artist  Trevor  Paglen  shows in  his  photographs  of  the  North  Pacific 
Ocean floor (figure 3), we often tend to forget that even in the era of smart cities, Bluetooth 
headphones,  free  wi-fi  and  unlimited  mobile  data,  the  internet  in  fact  has  NSA-tapped 
fiberoptic veins running deep under the sea and wrapping across the globe in voluminous 
clusters. Conveniently enough, media theorist Jussi Parikka thus literally suggests we must 
“submerge”75 ourselves into oceans to understand digital media in their actual materiality – a 
suggestion we gladly follow, albeit not in a literal sense. In his book  A Geology of Media, 
Parikka also points to the very physical data centers, located usually in the cold of North, 
where the “online” cloud memory is being stored: “The cloud is a building,”76 and “[d]ata 
need air.”77 
Furthermore,  Parikka  also  reminds  us that  the touch screens  and motherboards  of 
smartphones and personal computers, as well as most contemporary electronic devices, are 
made of chemical  elements,  such as silicone  and germanium,78 as  well  as diverse metals, 
whose extraction and/or production often is directly harmful not only to the environment, but 
also  to  many  other  human  (as  well  as  non-human)  beings.  Not  only  because  of  these 
geological exigencies, but also because of where the volatile trash of retired “digital” objects 
gathers in huge piles – filling the landscape and poisoning the soil and bodies growing out 
from or traversing it – it is necessary to trace the paths of digital technologies cruising through 
and across the (nation state) borders (as they without any doubt do, whether through signals or 
physically),  and  to  understand  their  localized  fragility  and  physical  embeddedness.  This 
situation portends material and even bodily impacts of seemingly untouchable and immaterial 
digital objects on their surroundings – not only that images can get bruised, but their pixels 
have sharp edges that often cut deep into human, as well as animal and floral tissue. 
This text will avoid losing itself in the underwater caverns of media geology and many 
other diverse materialist approaches, including the rich branch of German “Kittlerian” media 
theory,  but their  understanding of physicality  of digital  technologies and of the mediation 
process itself remains important for us, as it formulates key ethical and ecological frameworks 
for  conceptualizing  literally  anything  in  our  hyper-networked  world  where,  as  Benjamin 
Bratton says, anybody with a smartphone carries a small piece of Africa in his or her pocket.79 
75 Jussi Parikka, A Geology of Media. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2015, p. 30.
76 Andrew Blum, Tubes: A Journey to the Center of the Internet. New York: 
HarperCollins 2012, p. 258, quoted in: Jussi Parikka, A Geology of Media…, p. 23.
77 Jussi Parikka, A Geology of Media…, p. 24
78 Jussi Parikka, A Geology of Media…, p. 36
79 Benjamin Bratton, The Stack. On Software and Sovereignty. Cambridge: MIT Press 2016, quoted in Jussi 
Parikka, A Geology of Media…, p. 46.
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Similarly, as much as this thesis keeps in mind that no flows are straight, regular, or unitary,  
but always made of streams of different scales and dynamics while at the same time being 
formed  by  particles  of  non-homogenous  sizes  and  types,  it  also  is  not  our  aim  here  to 
investigate their inner structures any further. By pointing out the “volume” and the heavy 
liquid  materiality  of  the  physical-digital  webs,  this  thesis  understands  them  primarily  as 
specific ontological qualities from which our experience of the world exudes and by which it 
is  being  (trans)formed,  and  while  it  is  an  extremely  important  task  to  acknowledge  the 
hierarchies of this voluminosity, we will in this specific vector leave consciously aside any 
attempts to cut it into layers. This texts rather treats  the present matter more as a stickily 
immanent productive material, however “wiggly,”80 thick, or “granular,” touching it more in 
terms of modeling, performative molding or, as we shall see, rendering.
80 A word used by theoretical physicist John Wheeler to describe the qualities of matter. John Wheeler: Quantum 
ideas. Quantum foam. Max Planck and Karl Popper. Accessible at WWW: <https://www. 
webofstories.com/play/john.wheel-107 er/77;jsessionid=E2EED64F0D4B0F06D- 9CEAF168EDCACFB> 
[uploaded 24. 1. 2008, accessed 25.10. 2020].
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1.4. “Just Because It’s Fake Doesn’t Mean I Don’t Feel It:” Methodology 
between the “Posts” 
1.4.1. The Post- and the Pre- 
If we are post-contemporary, or post- postmodern, post-internet, or post-whatever – if we are now 
post-everything – it is because historically-given semantics don’t quite work anymore.
– Armen Avanessian Suhail Malik, Speculative Time-Complex
The extreme fluidity produced by the “new media regime” introduced above is often also 
considered characteristic of a certain “post-postmodern” era, expressed predominantly in the 
concept of “metamodernity” coined by Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin van den Akker, but 
also by other notions, such as that of the “post-contemporary” of Suhail Malik and Armen 
Avanessian. Even if the fluidity itself isn’t that new, what – according to them – seems to be 
increasingly  present  in  theory  as  well  as  art  is  the  departure  from perceiving  fluidity  as 
surfaceness and instead to affirm the all-permeating volatility as a specific ontological quality, 
which doesn’t make reality impossible but on the contrary mutable, shapable and thus perhaps 
in some way also potentially changeable. 
In their text  Speculative Time-Complex, published in a “post-contemporary” themed 
issue of art and fashion-related DIS Magazine, Armen Avanessian and Suhail Malik observe 
that the impact of volatility produced by the media as well as technologically driven financial 
instruments drastically reshape our perception of time as well: “Time is changing. Human 
agency and experience lose their primacy in the complexity and scale of social organization 
today. The leading actors are instead complex systems, infrastructures and networks in which 
the future replaces the present as the structuring condition of time.”81 As if the time wasn’t 
“flowing away like the water in the river” anymore but started to make whirls and reversed 
upstream. 
81 Armen Avanessian, Suhail Malik: The Time-Complex. Postcontemporary. DIS Magazine. Accessible at 
WWW: < http://dismagazine.com/discussion/82090/introduction-to-the-time-complex-postcontemporary/> 
[publication date unknown, accessed 5. 4. 2019].
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What  Malik  and Avanessian  posit  is  that  most  of  technology and media,  whether 
falling under the category of social,  military,  surveillance,  financial  or otherwise, are now 
driven by what they call  “relations  of prehension.”82 In these infrastructures,  systems and 
networks  governing  the  more-than-human  societies,  individual  human  agents  and  their 
cognitive  capacities  increasingly  cease  to  be  the  measure  of  the  architecture.  Moreover, 
human phenomenology loses the ability to articulate “meaning, politics, culture and society 
itself,”83 resulting  into  an  insistent  feeling,  that  “[e]verything  now  seems  to  be  ‘post-’ 
something else.”84
What they thus call “speculative time-complex”85 manifests itself through the diverse 
preemptive operations, such as the phenomenon of preemptive strikes that create an enemy 
non-existent at the time of launching the weapons, in practices of preemptive policing able to 
apprehend people before they even commit any crime,86 or simply in everyday life through 
processes such as preemptive personalization, offering us goods we ourselves don’t yet know 
we would want. And this direction of causality seems to be at play also in the media, with the 
strong  “tendency  towards  premediation.”87 We  are  less  interested  here  in  the  left-
accelerationist angle of the post-contemporary concept, focused on the future preceding the 
present, than in the volatility and mutability of our perception and conception of time itself 
which it introduces – a time that is “more meteorological in its movements than classically 
historicist.”88 Because  the  speculative  relationship  to  reality  these  processes  disclose  is 
incipient in a specific way that could be perhaps fittingly expressed in the words of one of the 
greatest  warriors  against  linear  time,  American  novelist  William  S.  Burroughs  –  when 
“[n]othing is real, everything is permitted.”89 
This quote can be said to be expressive of the aforementioned “feeling of unreality” 
produced by what is routinely called communicative or cognitive capitalism, which seems to 
82 Armen Avanessian, Suhail Malik: Introduction to The Time Complex. Postcontemporary. DIS Magazine. 
Accessible at WWW: < http://dismagazine.com/discussion/82090/introduction-to-the-time-complex-
postcontemporary/> [publication date unknown, accessed 5. 4. 2019].
83 Armen Avanessian, Suhail Malik: Introduction to The Time Complex. Postcontemporary…
84 Armen Avanessian, Suhail Malik: The Time-Complex. Postcontemporary…
85 The notion of time-complex comes from Bernard Stiegler’s Technics and Time 2: Disorientation, but is used 
by the authors to slightly different ends.
86 China?
87 Armen Avanessian, Suhail Malik: The Time-Complex. Postcontemporary…
88 Laura Salisbury, Michel Serres: Science: Fiction, and the Shape of Relation. In: Science Fiction Studies, Vol. 
33, 2006, No. 1, p. 31.
89 William Burroughs, Cities of the Red Night (1981. The discovery of this quote is fully owed to David Burrows 
and Simon O’Sullivan, who mention that the quote actually origially comes from the 1938 novel Alamut by 
Vladimir Bartol. David Burrows, Simon O‘Sullivan, Fictioning, The Myth-Functions of Contemporary Art and 
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be producing “a mutation in the relation between the virtual and the actual.”90 But this melting 
of boundaries seems to have stopped having only negative connotations in the metamodern, 
post-contemporary  or  other  recent  frameworks.  In  the  introduction  to  the  anthology 
Metamodernism: Historicity, Affect and Depth after Postmodernism, the authors specifically 
write  they  want  to  avoid  any  teleological  approach  or  offering  a  new dominant  regime, 
claiming that metamodernism is situated “with or among,”91 or even “between”92 other older 
as well as newer tendencies. The metamodern regime is also said to be characterized by “an 
oscillating  in-betweenness,”93 in  which  it  becomes  possible  to  connect  different  or  even 
contradictory layers of realities and beliefs without them having to be necessarily opposed. 
Such approach seems only natural for a world in which linear history collapsed, all narratives 
were proclaimed to have ended, where the recursive logic reigns and “speculation,” as Malik 
and Avanessian explain, is the dominant form of influence and orientation.94
In their book  Fictioning: The Myth-functions of Contemporary Art and Philosophy, 
which brought  to  my attention  also Burroughs’  aforementioned  quote,  the  authors  Simon 
O’Sullivan  and  David  Burrows  also  notice  that  contemporary  capitalism  produces 
proliferation of “information environments and products in which continuity of narrative is 
not  maintained”  and they  importantly  add that  in  such a  context  “affect  rather  than  any 
meaning or overcoded reality is consumed.”95 Rather than a doctrine or a program, which 
would necessarily fail by their very definition, metamodernism thus seems to be proclaiming 
itself  as,  echoing  Raymond  Williams,  “a  structure  of  feeling”  –  “a  sentiment  that  is  so 
pervasive as to call it structural,” or even “a sensibility that everyone shares, that everyone is 
aware  of,  but  which  cannot  easily,  if  at  all,  be  pinned  down.”96 This  slippery  yet  all-
permeating quality seems to be explainable exactly by Shaviro’s theorization of the digital 
affect  –  not  located  just  within  ourselves  but  leaking  everywhere  around,  filling  the 
“between.”
Philosophy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2019, p. 29, p. 48.
90 Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, p. 44.
91 me Robin Van Den Akker, Alison Gibbons, Timotheus Vermeulen, (eds.), Metamodernism. Historicity, Affect, 
and Depth After Postmodernism. New York: Rowman & Littlefield International 2017, p. 8.
92 Robin Van Den Akker, Alison Gibbons, Timotheus Vermeulen, (eds.), Metamodernism…, p. 10.  
93 Robin Van Den Akker, Alison Gibbons, Timotheus Vermeulen, (eds.), Metamodernism…, p. 10.
94 Armen Avanessian, Suhail Malik: The Time-Complex. Postcontemporary…
95 David Burrows, Simon O‘Sullivan, Fictioning…, p. 46.
96 Met Robin Van Den Akker, Alison Gibbons, Timotheus Vermeulen, (eds.), Metamodernism…, p. 7.
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1.4.2. Putting Head Under the Water
 “When I was growing up, in the mid-nineties and the early 2000s, I listened to Radiohead. 
On “There, There,” they sang, “Just because you feel it, doesn't mean it’s there.” A year or so ago, 
while watching the television show Girls (episode 3 from the third season), I was struck by a sentence 
that was at once reminiscent and completely different from that line from the early 2000s. 
“Just because it’s fake, doesn’t mean I don’t feel it.”
– Timotheus Vermeulen, The New Depthiness
In 2015, Timotheus Vermeulen wrote for E-flux Journal a text titled The New Depthiness. As 
the name suggests, it attempts to deal exactly with Jameson’s aforementioned “understanding 
of  depthlessness  as  the  last  stage  in  a  particular  history  of  a  particular  flattening”97 and 
advocates  for  a  different  approach,  that  would  include  certain  “kind  of  deepening”98 
observable in 21st century art and culture. To illustrate the change, he refers to the formerly 
omnipresent feeling of the “world as a hall of mirrors,”99 as expressed in the above-mentioned 
Radiohead song, and proposes to change our relation to the shiny surfaces. And interestingly 
enough, he also turns to the ocean to illustrate it. 
Vermeulen recalls the many attempts to conceive the rise of digital media as the “final 
stage in a history of depthlessness,” which aimed to demonstrate that “there was no reality, no 
truth, no authenticity outside of the image or the model—and no humanity inside it.” This was 
particularly  being  pronounced  in  connection  to  the  digital  code  itself,  which  was  often 
understood as flattening language and meaning into an endless repetitive sea of zeros and 
ones that didn’t refer to any “realities outside of them.” But it should be clear by now that the  
relationship between (digital) objects, digital images and “reality” is neither that simple, nor 
dualistic. Just because it’s not indexical or representational doesn’t mean there are no other 
options  for relations  of mutual  interference and entanglement.  (If  we thus should be past 
something, it is not depth, reality or truth, but the simplified binary of “us and them.”)
It  is  in  this  sense that  Vermeulen  suggests  the concept  of  “depthiness,”  which  he 
believes  to  be  capturing  certain  tendencies  perceptible  in  contemporary  art  and  culture. 
Through metaphors of different modes of interaction with the water surface, he refutes diving 
deep under the sea, which would require searching for problematic transcendental meaning 
97 Timotheus Vermeulen: The New “Depthiness.” E-flux Journal, issue 61, 2015. Accessible at WWW: < 
https://www.e-flux.com/journal/61/61000/the-new-depthiness/> [published january 2015, accessed 3. 5. 2021].




hidden somewhere “beneath” the realm of observable things, but also surfing – which might 
at first look like the most fitting orientation in a world made of waves. Even Deleuze and 
Guattari mention “dynamic features that enter a thought that ‘slides’ with new substances of 
being” and “turn the thinker into ‘a sort of surfer’,”100 but Vermeulen describes, that the surfer 
is a “horizontal man”101 who looks for meaning “on the surface, more precisely in the series of 
waves that form the surface—one after the other after the other, now left, now right, higher 
and lower.”102 If we elaborate  on what we showed earlier,  we might perhaps say that for 
Vermeulen, the figure of the surfer is aware of the fluidity, catching always the next wave 
coming, but still believes in the relative referential stability of the board beneath her or his 
feet. 
What Vermeulen suggests is yet a different way of dealing with the fluid world, one 
articulated with a figure of the “snorkeler.” Such “modality” doesn’t attempt to rescue lost 
depths resting somewhere on the sea floor, but encourages us to “jump from [the] surfboards 
into the water, a snorkeling mask in hand.”103 If we put our head underneath, we might still 
not have unlimited access to the ocean depths, but we necessarily will stop mistaking the 
surface  waves  for  the  ocean itself.  According to  the text,  this  move entails  an important 
speculative dimension as well: “[w]hereas the diver moves towards a shipwreck or a coral reef 
in the depths of the ocean, and the surfer  moves with  the flow of the waves, the snorkeler 
swims toward a school of fish whilst drifting with the surface currents.”104 Importantly, the 
snorkeler thus imagines depth without experiencing it. “Where might that fish be swimming 
to?”  [s/]he  wonders.  Or perhaps  [s/]he  thinks,  “What  might  be below that  rock?”105 This 
underlines the crucial role of intuition and imagination that allows us to practically relate to 
the inaccessible depth, to “perceive[e] it without encountering it.”106 
Vermeulen avers this register to be expressive of an overall change in the conception 
of depth and meaning in the 21st century. Saying that in “philosophy and art alike, notions of 
the  behind and the  beyond,  the  beneath  and the  inside,  have  reemerged,”107 he  points  to 
speculative realism’s attempts “to think beyond the surface of the epistemological”108 as well 
100 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?. London: Verso 2009, p. 71.
101 Alessandro Barrico, The Barbarians: An Essay on the Mutation of Culture, New York: Rizzoli International 
Publications 2014), p. 111, quoted in: Timotheus Vermeulen: The New “Depthiness”…









as  contemporary  art’s  tendency  to  not  only  critically  reflect  on  but  explore  and  enter 
“(hyper)realities:  hereditary deficiencies in digital  DNA, intertextual  features that come to 
light  through another focus, immaterial  realities  as blueprints  for material  possibilities.”109 
And we might also add the many already mentioned speculative, new materialist tendencies in 
the world of contemporary art, alongside the even recent trends of new sensitivity or the so 
called “emo-romantic turn.”110
The  depth  Vermeulen  speaks  of  is  thus  performative,  both  in  way  of  its  self-
actualizing speculative qualities and in the sense of its needing to be performed, imagined or 
we could perhaps say, “fictioned.”111 Moreover, he adds that it is a depth that cannot be seen 
but “perceived,” or perhaps “felt,” helping us to move through a world where meaning cannot 
always  be  constructed  from what  we  directly  see,  where  words  and  images  often  don’t 
disclose any core “reality” and where contradiction or interference is the dominant relation. 
Navigating this highly saturated saline solution – in which our minds and bodies cannot but 
float – can be a difficult task. So how do we find a heading when the depths are not only 
beneath us, but all around, within and at once without? Is there an anchor point in this ever-
changing unknown sea? The anthology Fiction as Method opens itself with an image of the 
Null Island, based on which all GPS navigation calculates the earth’s coordinates. Null Island 
is not real in the classical  sense.  It is made (up) into existence,  marking the point on the 
Earth's  surface  where  the Prime  Meridian and  the Equator intersect, solely  to  allow  the 
computation  of  coordinates  themselves,  navigating  us  or  tagging our  photos  “to  map our 
memories and images onto the material world.”112 Null Island is thus a fiction, but in the end, 
it  does  really help us make it  home. Perhaps in the volatile world where all  methods are 
already fictions, fiction itself can thus be deployed as a legitimate method.
109 Timotheus Vermeulen: The New “Depthiness”…
110 Michal Novotný: The Emo-Romantic Turn. Mousse Magazine. Accessible at WWW: 
http://moussemagazine.it/emo-romantic-turn-michal-novotny-2018/ [published 25. 9. 2018, accessed 16. 12. 
2020].
111 In Burrows’ and O’Sullivan’s understanding. David Burrows, Simon O‘Sullivan, Fictioning…, p. 1–5.
112 Jon K Shaw, Theo Reeves-Evison (eds.), Fiction as Method. Berlin: Sternberg Press 2017, p. 6–7.
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1.4.3. Moving (between) Images of Contemporary Art
In her fittingly titled text  Gallery Fiction, art theorist and co-founder of one of the biggest 
online  art  sharing  platforms Tzvetnik  (meaning “a garden full  of  flowers” in  Russian),113 
Natalya Serkova, poses an interesting quandary about reality and believability in the specific 
context of the art world. She asks: “[A]re you sure that the exhibitions, the documentation of 
which you can daily observe on websites-aggregators dedicated to art, do exist in reality?” 
This is of course by no means an attempt to disqualify the validity or importance of images of  
contemporary art circulating on the web. Quite contrarily, what she wants to point out is the 
obsolescence of any such question in general, rendering the search for an original physical art 
piece, as well as an original “space” of the gallery useless. 
Because this distinction, as well as the notion of a single “original” truth are obsolete 
in the world where art objects, created in whatever artistic medium, always already enter into 
dialogue with digital images. In this sense, it is irrelevant to ponder whether there even was 
perhaps  an  analogue  photograph,  huge  room-size  metal  object  or  organic  tissue  at  the 
beginning of an art object’s story, for it was interwoven into the fabric of the digital code and 
disseminated throughout online platforms. Contemporary art objects “are present somewhere 
in their material form but are also ubiquitously present online”114 – they have become digital 
image-objects installed in an entangled, borderless “gallery fiction.”
Without an attempt to build stable categorization, which would necessarily go against 
the fluid ontological qualities we describe and encounter, this thesis can nevertheless be said 
to  employ  a  framework wherein  such digital(ized)  objects  of  contemporary  art  could  be, 
according  to  the  previous  explanation,  characterized  as  post-postmodern,  “post-
contemporary,” in many ways post-media (as to the loss of importance of media specificity in 
art,  expressed already in Rosalind  Krauss’  notion  of  the “post-medium condition”)115 and 
post-(post-)internet. The last demanding to be understood in a similar “post-” relata of which 
metamodernism also speaks: In both our everyday experience and in art we are post-internet 
not because we would be in any sense  past or  after  internet,  but because the internet has 
spilled out of the frame, into the between. This made artist Jesse Darling famously remark 
113 Accessible at WWW: <https://tzvetnik.online/>
114 Natalya Serkova: Gallery Fiction. Towards The New Technology Of Art Dissemination.  OFluxo. Accessible 
at WWW: < https://www.ofluxo.net/gallery-fiction-by-natalya-serkova/> [publication date unknown, accessed 
24. 7. 2021].




that “[e]very artist working today is a postinternet artist,”116 and we can add in similar manner, 
that every image being interacted with today is a digital image. As Hito Steyerl has it: “[t]he 
internet is not dead. It is undead and it's everywhere.”117 
The moving images of contemporary art accompanying this thesis are thus created in, 
for and sometimes (but not necessarily) about our aforementioned post-internet or post-digital 
material,  ontological and (environ)mental  condition.  As such, they are irreducible  to mere 
“images” in sense of flat representations or cut-outs of preexisting reality, but by the tools that 
helped to bring them into this world as well as by the way they exist for and on the web, they 
can perhaps be best understood as what Yuk Hui calls “digital objects.” The definition will be 
developed throughout the third chapter of this text, but for now it could be said to concern 
digital moving images produced inside of the digital milieu of contemporary art,118 which are 
interested in, co-produced with or disseminated through operations of digital tools, or as we 
will see later, digital beings. As such, they actively participate in the process of what we could 
call “post-digital intra-active fictioning,” or perhaps also “storymorphing.”
There is a quite popular theoretical tendency, among left accelerationists as well as 
others, to follow Frederic Jameson’s concept of cognitive mapping, claiming that art can help 
us navigate and at least partially understand the stormy seas of the shifting world, often driven 
by forces, temporalities and “hyperobjects” beyond human comprehension. This seems to be 
one of the few hopes we can rationally believe in. It is not my intention to deny usefulness to 
this important approach, but this text itself tries to relate to digital objects of moving image art 
in yet a different way. It does so partly because its fascination for fiction doesn’t want to let it  
be “explained away,”119 however convenient it might sometimes be, but mainly because it 
understands digital objects (of moving image art) as being always already co-constitutive of 
the very consciousness we approach the images with. Its primary interest  therefore lies in 
following the  streams,  instead of exploring  the ways in  which  art  can make things  more 
understandable – digital images  don’t serve this thesis as visual or thematic “representations” 
or even “diagrams” of problems, as much as possibilities to enter their flow.
While  maintaining that what we speak about is nothing less than one of the main 
dynamics at play in today’s world, this text doesn’t aim to and could never be all-explaining 
116 Jesse Darling, Post-Whatever #usermilitia. In: Omar Kholeif (ed.), You Are Here Art After the Internet. 
Manchester: Cornerhouse, London: SPACE 2014, p. 137.
117 Hito Steyerl, Too Much World…, p. 16.
118 The concept of milieu comes from Gilbert Simondon and will be elaborated on in the third chapter.
119 Delphi Carstens, Mer Roberts, Things That Knowledge Cannot Eat. In: Jon K Shaw, Theo Reeves-Evison 
(eds.), Fiction as Method. Berlin: Sternberg Press 2017, p. 216.
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in all areas it touches upon, many of them being fluid and shifting themselves.120 It could thus 
be said to try to loose an arrow, or, if we stick to our script vocabulary, to submerge its head 
into the water and drift into a specific current, hoping to sketch a non-linear axis possibly able 
to,  as  Deleuze  and Guttari  had it,  “follow the witch’s  flight.”121 This  form of  transversal 
movement seems to be a fitting way to get in touch with the unsettled flows of digital images. 
Because,  as  Serkova also observes,  contemporary  art  objects  “refuse final  answers to  the 
questions about themselves,” as on today’s networks in general, “any answer stabilized and 
verified through a lengthy experiment can be destroyed at any moment by a sudden attack of 
apple pies”122 posted by a different profile.
The present thesis therefore aims to follow digitally produced and disseminated fiction 
understood as a specific kind of “digital object” produced between human and non-human 
animate bodies, electronic devices, inorganic and organic agents and what we usually see as 
purely mental processes, treating it not as a second or third order of (once intact) reality, but 
as an actual and material world-shaping force which changes reality whether we want it or not 
and even physically transforms and affects the bodies and minds it traverses. This text is thus 
about  what  could  be called  a  productive  potential  of  such digital  fiction;  not  despite  but 
exactly  because of the extreme effectivity it lends to oftentimes toxic and very dangerous 
narratives and power flows draining time-spaces of imagination, potentialities and spaces of 
resistance. It believes that if financial derivatives and other technologically driven actors work 
to  mine,  “capture and shut down”123 the future,  we need to seek out  the digital  technical 
beings they work with and try to create new connections,  that  could rend fissures in this 
ungraspable but yet palpable closure. Floating with multiple streams along its way, this text is 
in a way simply about this encounter: it is about them, us and about what I believe to be one 
possible meeting place. 
120 As might have been noticed in sources of some of the quoted texts, the same as traditional media channels are 
not quite enough to grasp the news anymore, also the theorization of this fluidity seems to be sometimes 
happening somewhat “outside of academia,” on online, and often art-related platforms. This is addressed for 
example by Armen Avanessian in: Armen Avanessian, Accelerating Academia: On Hyperstition in Theory. In: 
Dustin Breitling, Vít Bohal, Václav Janoščík, (eds.), Reinventing Horizons. Praha: Display 2016. s. 77–98. 
121 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?..., p. 41.
122 Natalya Serkova: Gallery Fiction… 
123 Steven Shaviro, No Speed Limit: Three Essays on Accelerationism (e-book). Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press 2015, p. 24.
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2. PRODUCTIVE POETICS OF FICTION
2.1. The Darkening of Thought
Everything has become fluid, and much darker.
– Ccru, Skin-Crawlers
Science-fiction writer Bruce Sterling once described “cultural temperament” of the early 21 st 
century  as  a  “dark  euphoria  feeling,”  relaying  in  many  ways  the  overall  atmosphere  of 
unbelievability and volatility already described above: “Things are just falling apart, you can't 
believe the possibilities, it's like anything is possible, but you never realized you're going to 
have to dread it so much. It's like a leap into the unknown. You're falling toward earth at nine  
hundred kilometers an hour and then you realize there's no earth there.”124 In a quite popular 
book New Dark Age: Technology and the End of the Future, artist James Bridle (also known 
for trapping self-driving cars with magic salt circles)125 similarly connects our present moment 
with  certain  darkening.  While  digital  technologies  are  usually  seen  as  bringing  more 
knowledge  and  understanding  to  the  world,  making  tasks  easier  and  information  more 
available, according to Bridle, “the opposite is true: that which was intended to enlighten the 
world in practice darkens it.”126
In what he calls a new “dark age” despite the extreme abundance of information, “our 
sources of data are slipping away, and with them the structures by which we have structured 
the  world,”127 melting  both  our  environmental  and  cognitive  infrastructure  into  shapeless 
chaos of “contradictions and uncertainties.”128 Bridle thus concludes that continuously and 
124 Bruce Sterling: Transcript of Reboot 11 speech by Bruce Sterling, 25-6-2009, Wired. Accessible at WWW: 
<https://www.wired.com/2011/02/transcript-of-reboot-11-speech-by-bruce-sterling-25-6-2009/> [published 25. 
2. 2011, accessed 9. 5. 2021].
125 James Bridle’s web Accessible at WWW: <https://jamesbridle.com/works/autonomous-trap-001> 
[publication date unknown, accessed 13. 7. 2021].
126 James Bridle, New Dark Age. Technology and the End of the Future. London: Verso 2019, p. 10.
127 James Bridle, New Dark Age…, p. 58.
128 James Bridle, New Dark Age…, p. 76.
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deliberately  changing  networks  produce  certain  “practical  unknowing,”129 a  dim  all-
encompassing  cloud  which  eventually  makes  all  traditional  conceptualizations  and 
organizations of thought break down. The “darkening reality” thus in fact expresses a string 
of  interconnected  “failures  to  think  and  speak”130 about  the  always-too-fast  mutations  of 
digitally driven world, which demands, as Bridle argues, “more liquid forms of knowing than 
can be derived from the libraries of the past alone.”131
This  observation echoes  numerous remarks  of other thinkers,  who also notice that 
philosophy or theory in general, which usually “promises ways to understand the world and 
ways to live in it” somehow “fails in this endeavour,“132  revealing thus the crucial limitations 
of  critical  thought,  as  well  as  of  illusory  discursive  islands  still  often  dominating 
contemporary cultural theory.133 Media theorist Rob Coley notes that scale and temporality of 
both  environmental  problems  and  computational  infrastructure  of  capitalism  pass  “into 
opacity” 134 of human cognition, as they are driven by “geomaterial and algorithmic” powers 
that “although highly active, remain largely imperceptible to humans.”135 French philosopher 
of science Anne-Françoise Schmid similarly explains that classical epistemology doesn’t have 
“means to describe” such “contemporary objects”136 – objects which are not merely complex 
but altogether  ungraspable.  As such, they demand the assertion of non-manipulability  and 
unknowability, and thus blur (and even demand crossing) the very distinctions between art, 
science and philosophy.137  
Overall,  it  seems that moving around in this  fluid “opacity” requires an altogether 
different strategy, also in the mode of thought usually referred to as philosophy. The aim of 
this  chapter  therefore  is  to  bring together  a  few thinkers,  who suggest  ways to  radically 
reformulate not only the relations of the real and the fictional on the level of epistemology, 
but by reconsidering the role of rational theoretical/philosophical reasoning itself as the only 
legitimate form of thought. By bringing to focus the very materiality of thought, they knit 
129 James Bridle, New Dark Age…, p. 76.
130 James Bridle, New Dark Age…, p. 15.
131 James Bridle, New Dark Age…, p. 58. Emphasis added.
132 Rob Coley, In Defence of ‘Noir Theory’: Laruelle, Deleuze, and Other Detectives. In: Theory, Culture & 
Society, 2019, p. 1.
133 Rob Coley, In Defence of ‘Noir Theory’…, p. 1.
134 Rob Coley, In Defence of ‘Noir Theory’…, p. 2.
135 Ibid.
136 Anne-François Schmid, On Contemporary Objects. In: Robin Mackay (ed.), Simulation, Exercise, 
Operations. Fallmouth: Urbanomic 2015, p. 64. There of course could be a reference made to Timothy 
Morthon‘s all-too-famous concept of the hyperobject. See: Timothy Morton, Hyperobjects: Philosophy and 
Ecology After the End of the World. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2013.
137 Anne-François Schmid, On Contemporary Objects…, pp. 65–68.
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together an indispensable net (or in a less watery register, we could perhaps say they lay a 
philosophical  “grounding”) serving as a possible basis for such a “liquid knowledge” that 
could  then  maintain  considerations  of  our  own  relationship  with(in)  digital  technologies 
explored  in  the  third  chapter  of  this  text,  as  well  as  further  develop  and  add  in  more 
theoretical  facets,  meanings,  and qualities  to the fluidity  outlined above.  The core of this 
chapter is mostly formed by the thinking of both Gilles Deleuze, alone and together with Félix 
Guattari  and  much  lesser-known  French  philosopher  François  Laruelle.  But  as  their 
accumulated works span multiple years and projects, we will try to avoid getting too deep, 
vast or explanatory and focus solely on what we follow – that is, on arguments for re-thinking 
fiction as a materially productive autonomous force, not subordinated to and flowing over the 
edges of theoretical “reflection” itself. 
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2.2. Everything is Black: Theorizing in the Dark
Who am I, me who is? 
I am neither this reason nor this way of thinking, 
neither this question nor this speculation. I am this night...
– François Laruelle, Biography of the Eye
Chemist and philosopher Isabelle Stengers writes in  Reclaiming Animism, that we have “an 
obscure fear of being accused of regression as soon as we give any sign of betraying hard 
truth by indulging soft, illusory beliefs.”138 But according to both her and François Laruelle, it 
is the very concept of truth as a product of knowledge which, especially under contemporary 
fluid  climate,  urgently  needs  reformulation.  Laruelle  points  out  that  the  whole  history  of 
western philosophy is in fact written from a perspective of unquestioned self-centered “auto-
positioning”139 of philosophy above other forms of knowledge which it claims to be entitled to 
observe,  name,  classify,  judge,  and  reflect  upon,  in  his  words  –  “to  philosophise  is  to 
dominate.”140 
Moreover,  as  he  explains,  it  is  also  a  history of  binarity  of  philosophers  “forever 
transiting between shadow and illumination,”141 trying to “shed light on” the dark areas of the 
unknown.  But  this  self-proclaimed  illuminating  potential,  always  promising  an  answer 
developed  on  the  base  of  rational  judgement,  is  inherently  “arrogant,”142 because  it 
presupposes that philosophy can position itself as the chosen light-bringer in the first place. 
To grant ourselves such a position would necessarily denote the ability to stand on a more or 
less stable viewpoint over and above the slimy quicksand of the real, from which we could 
see,  frame,  observe,  and qualify.  But as we already laid out in the first  chapter,  such an 
138 Isabelle Stengers: Reclaiming Animism. E-flux, n. 36, 2012. Accessible at WWW: 
<https://www.e-flux.com/journal/36/61245/reclaiming-animism/> [publication date unknown, accessed 6. 1. 
2021].
139 Simon O’Sullivan, Non-philosophy and Art Practice (Or Fiction as Method). In: Jon K Shaw, Theo Reeves-
Evison (eds.), Fiction as Method. Berlin: Sternberg Press 2017, p. 282.
140 Robin Mackay, Introduction: Laruelle Undivided. In: From Decision to Heresy. Experiments in Non-
Standard Thought. Fallmouth: Urbanomic 2012, p. 5. [The introduction to the book functions more as an 
interview, combining passages of Laruelle’s own thoughts with Mackay’s explanations.]
141 Alexander R. Galloway: The Black Universe. Accessible at WWW: 
<https://onscenes.weebly.com/philosophy/the-black-universe> [published 25. 8. 2017, accessed 24. 11. 2020].
142 Simon O’Sullivan, Non-philosophy and Art Practice (Or Fiction as Method). In: Jon K Shaw, Theo Reeves- 
Evison (eds.), Fiction as Method. Sternberg Press 2017, p. 278.
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observatory  doesn’t  exist.  Moreover,  the  very  idea  of  “bringing  to  light”  comes  with  an 
unquestioned assertion “that blackness is a case that can and must be solved.”143
But who has the right to claim for themselves this illuminating power? Who stands 
outside of opaque waters – intact, dry, and objective? We seem to have been always too sure 
in our attempts to gain mastery over the world and to preach the knowledge further. Bridle, in 
a way less theoretical manner, connects this darkening specifically to digital media, stating 
that we are often convinced “that throwing light upon the subject is the same thing as thinking 
it,  and thus having agency over it.  But  the light  of computation just  as easily  renders us 
powerless – either through information overload, or a false sense of security.”144 It thus seems 
that  especially  in  the  fast-shifting  world  of  what  we  perceive  as  present,  entangled  and 
stretched across endless flowing networks of physical-digital bodies and objects, it is perhaps 
obvious more than ever that all the surf boards are broken, and we are left staring into the 
thickening darkness of the endless sea. 
 Coley  further  notes  that  despite  increasing  embroilment  in  geological  and 
computational forces beyond our rational, cognitive and physical recognition, contemporary 
theory  (notably,  even  that  which  belongs  to  “posthumanities”)  is  in  fact  “obsessed  with 
regaining mastery over an object of knowledge.”145 But such mastery is always necessarily 
achieved  by “mutilating,  in  multiple  senses,  the  object  that  we wished to  understand.”146 
Philosopher and theologian Anthony Paul Smith similarly writes in his book on Laruelle that 
“philosophers  (and  perhaps  theorists  more  generally)  often  claim  to  make  something 
understandable  […]  by  disempowering  the  abstraction  inherent  in  the  object  they  are 
philosophizing.”147 But the highly problematic supposition of the right to reflect on the world 
and explain it away, as well as the achievability of an analytical distance that would allow us 
to  do  so  in  the  first  place,  seem  to  fundamentally  crumble  under  the  onslaught  of  the 
darkening  unknown,  which  doesn’t  crawl  only  from  some  “Outside”  but  according  to 
Laruelle,  resides in the very core of philosophical thought itself  – “the real is opaque, an 
immanent blackness that humanist philosophy has forgotten or foreclosed in its decision to 
bring to light a World.”148
In his text  On the Black Universe,  Laruelle describes the World149 as the illuminated 
space of our own construction which we so often mistake for the whole Universe, ignoring 
143 Rob Coley, In Defence of ‘Noir Theory’…, p. 11.
144 James Bridle, New Dark Age…, p. 185.
145 Rob Coley, In Defence of ‘Noir Theory’…, p. 2.
146 Anne-François Schmid, On Contemporary Objects…, p. 63.
147 Anthony Paul Smith, Laruelle, a Stranger Thought. Cambridge: Polity Press 2016, p. 121.
148 Rob Coley, In Defence of ‘Noir Theory’…, p. 10.
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thus  “the  thinking  force  before  all  thought,”150 which  exists  within  us  as  material  beings 
without the need for philosophy or ontology as such – “[t]he Universe was ‘in’ the World and 
the World did not see it.”151 Laruelle thus offers an interesting perspective on the darkening 
we face, when he invokes the equalizing power of the dark, as the unity of what he names the 
“Black Universe,” which remains always untouched by our attempts to divide it with one-
directional and limited rays of light. The figure of the Black Universe therefore is not opposed 
to any light, but more of a blackness without negation, “an opaque and solitary thought, which 
has already leapt through man's shut eyes as the space of a dream without dreaming.”152 
When speaking of the gesture of dividing, and in general when bringing Laruelle into 
any digital-related context, it is necessary to mention the work of theorist and programmer 
Alexander  R.  Galloway,  who  in  a  similar  manner  argues  that  the  relationship  between 
philosophy and the digital cannot be approached through relations “of” or “as” but rather “in” 
– not through developing a “philosophy of the digital” or “digitalization of philosophy,” but 
to rather address the “digital-in-philosophy and philosophy-in-digital.”153 But we must also 
underline  that  Galloway  works  with  a  rather  different  understanding  of  the  digital  (and 
correspondingly, the analogue). Approaching the concepts not in terms of technical or digital 
objects but based on the arithmetical terms of ratio (logos) and proportion (analogos) leads 
him to, at first,  a rather strange conclusion: that most philosophy has in fact always been 
digital, because it continuously operates through the binary principle of dividing things. He 
thus  suggests  that  trying to  avoid this  makes  Laruelle  in  a  sense non-digital,  as  what  he 
advocates  for  is  the  undivided  nonbinary  unity.  But  in  this  understanding  even analogue 
photography is, as Galloway himself mentions, paradoxically, digital.154 Our claim that the 
digital becomes increasingly real, or more in Laruellian terms, One with the Real, could thus 
perhaps  be,  from  this  perspective,  interestingly  comprehendible  as  the  digital  becoming 
analog – however contradictory it might sound – and undividable from the “real” world, all 
oozing together in a “relation that is neither dialectical nor differential.”155 
149 The capital letters are left in the quotes of Laruelle’s concepts of the “World,” the “Universe” or the “Real,” 
as he himself has them capitalized or when this text directly speaks of them. However, the quotes by other 
authors are lest in the original way.
150 John Mullarkey, Anthony Paul Smith (eds.), Laruelle and Non-Philosophy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press 2012, p. 52.
151 François Laruelle, On the Black Universe. In: Eugene Thacker, Daniel Colucciello Barber, Nicola 
Masciandaro, Alexander Galloway, Dark Nights of the Universe. NAME publications 2013, p. 105.
152 François Laruelle, On the Black Universe…, p. 103.
153 Alexander Galloway, Laruelle: Against the Digital. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2014, p. 220. 
Emphasis added.
154 Alexander Galloway, Manuel Correa: The Philosophical Origins of Digitality. Accessible at WWW: 
<https://tripleampersand.org/the-philosophical-origins-of-digitality/> [published 9. 2. 2015, accessed 5. 8. 2021].
155 Alexander Galloway, Laruelle: Against the Digital, p. 172. Original emphasis removed.
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If we return directly to Laruelle, it is exactly because of this relation that the Black 
Universe, and in the same way the whole project of what he calls “non-philosophy” (or later, 
“non-standard philosophy”) is not something to reach out to, to discover or to penetrate, but 
rather  to slide  into,  to  be merged with,  to  get  lost  in,  to  give up claims for.  Because as 
Laruelle explains, “black is entirely interior to itself and to man,”156 it is the very material we 
are made of, which surrounds us, which we think through, and which thinks through us. (As 
Eugene Thacker has it: “thinking the hair, mud, and dirt that thinks through me.”)157 But to 
come into contact we must turn off the remaining lights, forget what we thought we knew and 
shut  our  eyes.  Because  the  orientation  in  this  impenetrable,  fluid  darkness  of  the  black 
requires a different  regime of vision,  a “blind” vision for the world where “everything is 
illuminated,  but nothing is seen,”158 or in the words of the hybrid theoretical entity called 
Cybernetic Culture Research Unit (Ccru) – “a tool-kit for dabbling in the dark.”159
 But this mode of “theorizing in the dark,”160 which Laruelle calls “vision-in-black,”161 
is not an enhanced vision achievable through additional knowledge or any sort of extension, 
nor can the darkness be chased away with a stronger flashlight. On the contrary, we can start 
“seeing” in the night exactly when we shut our eyes and embrace certain “visionary vision 
that looks without looking.”162 But how do we tap into what knowledge can’t chew on and 
which we cannot directly see, hear, nor rationally comprehend? Simon O’Sullivan explains 
that Laruelle’s non-philosophy implies “a form of gnosis or even ‘spiritual’ knowledge.”163 
This spiritual is that which “haunt[s] the margins of philosophy,” letting in something which 
makes  it  “related  to  gnosticism  and  science-fiction,”164 something  that  must,  from 
philosophy’s view-point, always remain a secret, fantasy or a mystery, which it cannot reach. 
Admitting the existence of such an untouchable secret which “has never been the predicate to 
knowledge,”165 can “delimit philosophy, as a relatively narrow space of thought that must be 
156 François Laruelle, On the Black Universe…, p. 103.
157 Eugene Thacker, Remote: The Forgetting of the World. In: Eugene Thacker, Daniel Colucciello Barber, 
Nicola Masciandaro, Alexander Galloway, Dark Nights of the Universe. NAME publications 2013, p. 2.
158 James Bridle, New Dark Age…, p. 185.
159 Ccru, Review of CCRU’s Digital Hyperstition. In: CCRU, CCRU Writings 1997–2003. Fallmouth: 
Urbanomic 2017, p. 13. [Ccru was an experimental collective active in the second half of the 1990s around the 
Philosophy Department of Warwick University in England.]
160 Rob Coley, In Defence of ‘Noir Theory’…, p. 2.
161 François Laruelle, On the Black Universe…, p. 106.
162 Alexander Galloway, Laruelle: Against the Digital. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2014, p. 149. 
163 Simon O’Sullivan, Non-philosophy and Art Practice (Or Fiction as Method). In: Jon K Shaw, Theo Reeves- 
Evison (eds.), Fiction as Method. Berlin: Sternberg Press 2017, p. 280.
164 François Laruelle: A New Presentation of Non-Philosophy. Accessible at WWW: 
<https://www.onphi.org/download/pdf/32> [publication date uknown, accessed 8. 7. 2021]
165 François Laruelle, The Truth According To Hermes: Theorems on The Secret And Communication. In: 
PARRHESIA 9 (2010), p. 18–22.
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supplemented  by  something  extra-philosophical,”166 that  is,  to  necessarily  speak  in  non-
philosophical language.
This  realization  that  philosophy  –  and  as  Laruelle  immediately  reminds,  every 
discipline  –  has  ultimately  its  own  point  of  “sufficiency,”167 has  of  course  crucial 
consequences for theoretical thought itself because it discredits attempts to dominate as well 
as  to  knock together  frames which could hold reality  in any stable  place.  But  instead of 
“upgrading the discipline,”168 which would in a sense also entail reaching outside of itself and 
leaping  into  the  unknown,  Laruelle  rather  suggests  turning to  the  “non-knowledge at  the 
center of all theory, according to which all claims of knowledge are made.”169
Laruelle’s Non-philosophy, or what he later also calls “non-standard philosophy” thus 
doesn’t place itself against or after philosophy, but, in his own words, it could instead be said 
to work as “a continuation of every philosophy.”170 The “non” thus doesn’t create a relation of 
opposition, which would attempt to refute former concepts and modes of thought and replace 
them with yet another “better dictator,” but rather expresses a movement across and between – 
and  here  we retain  the  theme  initiated  in  the  first  chapter,  pertaining  to  the  function  of 
prepositions. In this manner, Anne-Françoise Schmid similarly speaks of the need to always 
think philosophies in plural, as a “multiplicity of philosophies”171 which could allow us to exit 
the vicious circle of constant negation and refutation and instead advocate for, as Laruelle 
himself  pronounced in a  conversation  with Derrida,  “the  equivalence  of  all  philosophical 
decisions, or in other words, […] democracy and peace.”172 (This can also be applied to the 
theoretical approach of this text itself, building among others, on claims from both Laruelle 
and Deleuze and Guattari, who despite the similarities in respective immanently materialist 
approaches  as  well  as  shared  interest  in  fiction  and  philosophizing  in  traditionally  non-
philosophical ways, still in many ways crucially disagree.) 
166 Robin Mackay, Introduction: Laruelle Undivided…, p. 15.
167 Robin Mackay, Introduction: Laruelle Undivided…, p. 8.
168 Rob Coley, In Defence of ‘Noir Theory’…, p. 18.
169 Ibid.
170 Robin Mackay, Introduction: Laruelle Undivided…, p. 7. 
171 Anne-Françoise Schmid, L’épistémologie entre science et philosophie, Hal archives-ouvertes.fr, 1997. 
Accessible at WWW: < https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00006573/document> [publication date 
unknown, accessed 3. 30. 2020].
172 Conversation between François Laruelle and Jacques Derrida, in which Laruelle among other issues addresses 
the differences between their work, refuting, among other things, Derrida’s claim that he „conjoin[s] ontology 
and deconstruction.” Jacques Derrida, François Laruelle, Controversy over the Possibility of a Science of 
Philosophy. La Decision Philosophique No. 5, April 1988, pp. 62-76, Translated by Robin Mackay. Accessible 




We can thus say that exactly because philosophy doesn’t claim to be “another take on 
the real,”173 explaining it away and combating oppositional concepts, while still importantly 
“proceed[ing] from the real,”174 as infrastructural and “radically immanent precondition for all 
things,”175 it might be an adequate vision for the illegibility and dense opacity of the close-knit 
and yet unknowable world – “a practice of thinking according to the real rather than about 
it.”176 Instead of following the endless expansion and seeking to illuminate some dark corners, 
non-philosophy’s non-knowledge could be thus perhaps understood in certain similarity to 
what Deleuze called “Cogito for a dissolved self”177 – a mode of volatile, fleeting, but also 
heavily entangled thought  with respect  for the unknown, which “dives right in[to]”178 the 
blackness and swims with eyes wide shut, sensing the dark depths it cannot reach. 
173 David Burrows, Simon O‘Sullivan, Fictioning…, p. 318.
174 David Burrows, Simon O‘Sullivan, Fictioning…, p. 317.
175 Rob Coley, In Defence of ‘Noir Theory’…, p. 12.
176 Rob Coley, In Defence of ‘Noir Theory’…, p. 17.
177 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. New York: Columbia University Press 1994, p. xxi.
178 Rob Coley, In Defence of ‘Noir Theory’…, p. 7.
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2.3. From the Mirror to the Sea
Between things does not designate a localizable relation going from one thing to the other and back 
again, but a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that sweeps one and the other away, 
a stream without beginning or end that undermines its banks and picks up speed in the middle.
– Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus
The shedding of light problematized in the previous subchapter is closely connected to the 
process of “reflection” and the very idea that everything is and should be reflected upon. It 
seems uneasy to throw overboard such a classical theoretical tool, so why Laruelle’s non-
philosophy “refuses to reflect on things”?179 As Stengers notes with slight irony, we might 
falter when facing the “frightening possibilities that would follow if we gave up critique, the 
only defense we have against fanaticism and the rule of illusions.”180 But if we look around 
(even with our eyes open), there just seems to be something wrong with the mirrors. As if the 
world was, as Shaviro writes, always “a few steps ahead of any possible critical reflection.”181 
A classical metaphor for critical thinking, the mirror was once seen as an image of the 
world and whoever would hold it could frame, critically analyze, and interpret this image and 
reflect the beam of light back onto the face of the World. But its dialectical and metaphorical 
power has started to wane. The harder it became to find a stable ground to stand on, “sinking 
into the pitch-black waters of a groundless world,”182 the more the mirror seemed to show 
cracks  and lose its  luster.  In  a  world where,  as  Karen  Barad  writes,  “[t]here  is  no fixed 
dividing line between ‘self’ and ‘other’, ‘past’ and ‘present’ and ‘future’, ‘here’ and ‘now’, 
[and] ‘cause’ and ‘effect’,” any attempt to frame individuals and “propertied objects” in a 
simply observable and reflect-able way seems absurd.183 To demonstrate this, she even uses 
the  highly  discussed  phenomenon  of  quantum  entanglement,  disbelievingly  nicknamed  a 
“spooky action at a distance” by Albert Einstein, in which two or more particles could be said 
to “share an existence.” Explaining that such findings of contemporary quantum mechanics 
research  defy  “commonsense  notions  of  communication  ‘between’  entities  ‘separated’  by 
179 François Laruelle, The Truth According To Hermes: Theorems on The Secret And Communication. In: 
PARRHESIA 9 (2010), p. 18–22.
180 Isabelle Stengers: Reclaiming Animism…
181 Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, p. 93.
182 François J. Bonnet, The infra-world. Fallmouth: Urbanomic 2017, p. 8.
183 Karen Barad, Quantum Entanglements and Hauntological Relations of Inheritance: Dis/continuities, 
SpaceTime Enfoldings, and Justice-to-Come, Derrida Today 3, n. 2, 2010, p. 265.
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arbitrarily large spaces and times,”184 she thus fiercely proclaims that “between will never be 
the same.”185
But the mirror-image started to morph long before (if its reflection ever really worked 
in the first  place).  Already in  A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze  and Guattari  called  for  “the 
abolition of all metaphor,”186 pointing out how late the mirror-image comes, boasting a mere 
simplified cut-out of a much more complex reality of a “world [which] has become chaos.”187 
The illusory separation of the image from the material world it should reflect preconditions 
the existence of any sort of clear mirror, making the image too-frozen, too-stable, and lifeless. 
Deleuze and Guattari, for most of their shared journey, have led a guerrilla war against such 
dualistic,  repetitive and in their  eyes impotent logic of representation and reflection.  Most 
famously  in  the  Rhizome introduction  to  A  Thousand  Plateaus,  where  they  refute  the 
traditional conceptualization of the figure of “the book,” standing in for potentially any kind 
of  (human)  creation,  as  that  which  “imitates  the  world”  and  is  driven  by  the  “law  of 
reflection”188 – further explaining that such a figure merely replicates an imprinted binary 
logic that always structures everything into tidy dualistic dichotomies. They argue rather that 
“the book is not an image of the world,”189 precisely because it grows out of and flows back 
into “outside” material conditions and as such it is inseparable from the very world it tries to 
describe, reflect, or capture. As Barad therefore already made clear, the “between” of things is 
thus not an empty gap but a flow of unstoppable intra-actions and mutations which elude any 
number of mirrors we could install – there seems to be no metaphor, only metamorphosis.  
This  “aparallel  evolution”190 is  routinely  demonstrated  with  reference  to  Deleuze’  and 
Guattari’s famed wasp and orchid, whose relation (unlike the convention asserting that the 
orchid  imitates  the  smell  of  a  solitary  wasp)  is  not  that  of  imitation,  but  of  “veritable 
becoming,”191 in which both involved elements mutually and irreversibly change. Deleuze and 
Guattari hereby criticize the prevalent notion of mimésis serving as a guiding principle in all 
human activities, including art, because it bears at its very core the dualist, mirror logic they 
aim  to  avoid  –  the  one  of  the  book  as  the  image  of  the  world.  The  mirror  reflection, 
representation  and  in  the  same  sense  the  metaphor  are  thus  to  be  taken  as  “despotic 
184 Karen Barad, Quantum Entanglements and Hauntological Relations…, p. 251.
185 Ibid.
186 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateau…, p. 69.
187 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus…, p. 6.
188 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus…, p. 5.
189 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus…, p. 11.
190 Ibid.
191 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus…, p. 10.
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agenc[ies]” of emptied signifiers substituting themselves “for asignifying proper names.”192 
As Barad points out elsewhere: reflection could work only within “an ontology exorcised of 
ghost”; rather, they keep filling the “between,” no light frightening them away.
The 90s cyberculture similarly noticed the darkening of the mirror, which could no 
longer show any stable transcendental imaginary – shrugging off “the repressive shackles of 
reflection,”193 shapes and colors “collapsed into digital codings”194 and faded into black. As 
cultural  theorist  Mark Fisher, known also for being affiliated195 with the illegible body of 
Ccru,  writes:  “we will  no longer pass through to ‘the other side’,  we encounter  the ‘flat’ 
surface of the black mirror.”196 Such a mirror cannot reflect, mimic or project, but nor does it 
replace  the  whole  surface  of  the  world  which  would  have  disappeared.  As Land puts  it: 
“reflection  is  always  very  late,  derivative,  and  even  then  really  something  else.”197 This 
disruption  is  by  no  coincidence  correlated  to  the  rise  of  digital  media,  which  evolve 
“functionally,  and  not  representationally,”198 and  whose  very  logic  makes  reflection 
impossible, as the relationship between the digital realm and the world “is not metaphorical at 
all,”199 but made of the same material. “Touching the black mirror” of early cyberculture,200 all 
we thus could have encountered was an opaque surface where the image and the world, or fact 
and fiction, conflated. 
But this surface, flattened to the very same material plane with the world, is not just an 
inhuman interface of water-cooled brains of former cyberpunk AIs. As if the hyperstitional201 
statement to be found in one of Ccru’s texts fulfilled itself only now: Black mirror’s blackness 
seems to have truly “become fluid, and much darker.”202 The opaque flatness which in the 90s 
192 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus…, p. 28.
193 Robin Mackay, Ray Brassier, Editor’s Introduction. In: Nick Land, Robin Mackay (ed.), Ray Brassier (ed.), 
Fanged Noumena: Collected Writings 1987-2007. Fallmouth: Urbanomic/Sequence Press 2011, p.18.
194 Nick Land, Circuitries. In: Nick Land, Robin Mackay (ed.), Ray Brassier (ed.), Fanged Noumena: Collected 
Writings 1987-2007. Urbanomic/Sequence Press 2011, p. 290.
195 We respect the intentional hybridity and illegibility practiced by Ccru in terms of clarity about its members 
and authorship.
196 Mark Fisher, Flatline Constructs: Gothic Materialism and Cybernetic Theory-Fiction. New York: Exmilitary 
Press New York 2018, p. 142.
197 Nick Land, Circuitries…, p. 295.
198 Ibid.
199 Mark Fisher, Flatline Constructs…, p. 143.
200 Nick Land, Cyberspace Anarchitecture as Jungle-War. In: Nick Land, Robin Mackay (ed.), Ray Brassier 
(ed.), Fanged Noumena: Collected Writings 1987-2007. Urbanomic/Sequence Press 2011, p. 403.
201 The concept of „hyperstition” has become a necessary part of the vocabulary of all forms of accelerationism 
and was used by Ccru to describe „fictions that make themselves real.” Ccru, Lemurian Time War. In: CCRU, 
CCRU Writings 1997–2003. Fallmouth: Urbanomic 2017, p. 35.
202Ccru, Skin-Crawlers, In: CCRU, CCRU Writings 1997–2003. Fallmouth: Urbanomic 2017, p. 201.
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may have still been able to “flip over”203 time and open different nonlinear time-spaces, has 
turned into a sort of liquid whirl on a Laruellian-black sea in which we always already float. 
Laruelle writes that the “Universe is not reflected in another universe, and yet the Remote is 
accessible to us at each of its points.”204 His version of the ultimate black mirror could thus be 
both  outside  and  inside,  remote  and  within,  nowhere  and  everywhere  at  the  same  time. 
Emphasizing that “[t]he forgetting of [wo]man as One(-of-)the-Universe and the Universe as 
One-through-[wo]man”  happens easily; he writes that the black (mirror) is not an object, but 
something we see in each other, in ourselves and which also sees through us. It is the darkest 
radical  immanence  that  “no  longer  differentiates  between  surfaces  and  depth  but  thinks 
according to the given identity of a non-conceptual thought and the radical indivisibility of the 
body.”205 The aim of non-philosophy thus is “not to be submitted once again to the reflexivity 
of  philosophy”206 but  to  expand imagination  and speculation  far  beyond “representational 
limits.”207
Because ours is a completely frameless ontology of a fluid dark world where, as Barad 
observes, “[b]oundaries do not sit still,”208 but pass through, beneath and behind, entangled 
across space and past-present-future, constantly changing, and making us question the known, 
the knowable as well as the knowledge itself. And in the Universe’s true blackness where 
there can be no candles lit, no shadows cast and no images reflected, all matter is dark and 
enchantedly active, flooding the “between.” 
203 Ccru, Cybergothic Hyperstition (Fast-forward to the Old ones). In: CCRU, CCRU Writings 1997–2003. 
Urbanomic 2017, p. 223.
204 François Laruelle, On the Black Universe…, p. 104.
205 John Mullarkey, Anthony Paul Smith (eds.), Laruelle and Non-Philosophy…, p. 52.
206 Robin Mackay, Introduction: Laruelle Undivided…, p. 27.
207 John Ó Maoilearca, All thoughts are equal: Laruelle and nonhuman philosophy. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press 2015, p. 78.
208 Karen Barad: Posthumanist Performativity: Toward An Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter. 
Accessible at WWW: <https://www.uio.no/studier/emner/sv/sai/SOSANT4400/v14/pensumliste/
barad_posthumanist-performativity.pdf> [publication date unknown, accessed 23. 4. 2020].
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2.4. Everything is Real: Irreducible Materiality of Thought
My problem is really that of how to treat philosophy as a material, 
and thus also as a materiality - without preoccupying oneself with the aims of philosophy, of its 
dignity, of its quasi-theological ends, of philosophical virtues, wisdom etc. None of that interests me.
– François Laruelle, From Decision to Heresy. Experiments in Non-Standard Thought
[T]heoria is always also a praxis – failing which it is nothing but chatter. 
The question of philosophy is first of all that of action.
– Bernard Stiegler, Acting Out
 So if, as we have shown, the image is always one with “the Real,” and thus is always already 
saturated  in  the  opaqueness  it  aims  to  reflect,  it  needs  also  be  viewed  as  necessarily 
influencing all flows it joins or crosses. This has of course radical implications for the role of 
images in general, as well as for any form of thought emerging from the black waters of a (not 
only) Laruellian Universe. It is in a similar sense that Deleuze and Guattari state, that “[t]here 
is no difference between what a book talks about and how it is made,”209 underlining thus the 
inseparability of any form of thinking from the material conditions it grows through as well as 
the very real physical existence of even those processes that are often considered abstract and 
immaterial.
This  line  of  thinking  could  be  traced  back  to  the  whole  problem of  the  division 
philosophy has erected between matter and spirit, famously criticized in Spinoza’s claim that 
“[w]e do not  know what  the body can do.”210 As Deleuze  explains  in  Spinoza:  Practical 
philosophy,  this  sentence  is  a  provocation  pointing  to  our  ignorance  in  speaking  “of 
consciousness and its decrees, of the will and its effects, of the thousand ways of moving the 
body, of dominating the body and the passions,”211 while the material body itself surpasses 
our knowledge. But, as he – for us, even more importantly – concludes, it also leads to a 
realization that thought itself “surpasses the consciousness that we have of it.”212 This means, 
following  Spinoza’s  criticism  of  cartesian  body-mind  dualism,  not  only  that  thinking  is 
209 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus…, p. 4.
210 Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, III, 2, quoted in: Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. San Francisco: City Light 
Books 1988, p. 17.
211 Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy…, p. 17.
212 Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy…, p. 18.
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inseparably rooted in the physicality of human body, but also that thought itself is a material  
force that potentially exceeds both our conscious understanding of it and the borders of (a 
single) human body per se. 
Laruelle  also  underlines  the  material  productivity  of  theoretical  thinking  when  he 
suggests that  we stop asking what non-philosophy  is but instead what it  “can and cannot 
do,”213 emphasizing therein the performative agency which, in a certain sense, smudges even 
the usual divide between theory and practice. Echoing this sentiment,  Shaviro paraphrases 
Deleuze and Guattari,  but in the specific context of digital moving images: “if we wish to 
grasp the operation of post-cinematic forms ‘we will never ask what a [media work] means, as 
signified or signifier’; rather, ‘we will ask what it functions with, in connection with what 
other things it does or does not transmit intensities’.”214  
In consonance with the title of Deleuze’s book on Spinoza, Laruelle thus advocates for 
directly  making  the  “practice of  thinking  itself”  sort  of  an  “object  or  material.”215 In  an 
attempt to “treat philosophy as [its own] material,” Laruelle even speaks, as Smith explains, 
of the “mutual mutating” of philosophy and other materials  into a “new practice whereby 
what is thought is practiced at the same time.”216 And this accentuation of materiality and 
practical  effectivity  comes  as  a  necessary  consequence  of  philosophy’s  descent  from its 
illusory pedestal – its lowering of a sort – and its submersion into the thick black sludge of the 
Real. Because, the moment it is acknowledged as part of the world, it must be understood as 
operational in it.217 Or in Deleuze’s and Guattari’s terms, the very inextricability of “the book” 
from other matters and processes opens a possibility for it to exist actively in these nets – 
exactly because it is (part) of the world, it has certain power to transform it.
Moreover,  Laruelle  also  states  that  non-philosophy  has  to  abandon  philosophy’s 
logocentrism; as it begins working not on or about but with(in) the Real, engaging necessarily 
with different modes of material than those connected only to language and writing, it “would 
no longer  be anthropo-logical  (a  philosophical  amalgam of  man and logos).”218 This  also 
immediately brings into question the very idea from Deleuze and Guattari  that affects are 
213 François Laruelle, From Decision to Heresy. Experiments in Non-Standard Thought. Fallmouth: Urbanomic 
2012, book annotation.
214 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus…, p. 4, quoted in: Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic 
Affect…, p. 120.
215 John Ó Maoilearca, All thoughts are equal…, p. 78. Emphasis added.
216 Anthony Paul Smith, Laruelle, a Stranger Thought…, p. 39.
217 In this sense, as Ó Maoilearca observes, there is a big difference between non-philosophy and diverse 
tendencies of new materialisms, because Laruelle’s pairing of materialism with immanence is way more radical.
218 Robin Mackay, Introduction: Laruelle Undivided…, p.12.
47
 
“nonhuman becomings of [wo]man,”219 which will grow in importance in the context of the 
second half of this thesis. As a consequence of this decentering of logos, philosophy itself 
“becomes  just  one  mode  of  thinking  alongside  a  whole  host  of  others:  artistic,  but  also 
scientific,  even,  perhaps,  the  animal.”220 (On the  other  hand,  it  is  necessary  to  note  that 
escaping language-based thinking is of course easier said than done, as this text, and for that 
matter  Laruelle’s  own  texts,  use  language  to  express  their  concerns.  But  the  attempt  at 
initiating such movement is, at least in our case, much more about affording materiality to 
thinking itself  and a form of reasoning to other-than-linguistic  modes of thought.)  But as 
O’Sullivan  and  Burrows  importantly  point  out,  non-philosophy  doesn’t  position  itself  as 
simply  “an  outside  to  philosophy,”221 because  it  “does  not  turn  away from philosophical 
materials  so  much  as  it  reuses  or,  we  might  say,  retools  or  reconfigures  them.”222 This 
retooling is crucial for us, because it renders also philosophy or in the same sense any other 
thought creating and navigating itself  through concepts,  a lively creative force capable of 
transforming itself, while also bringing into question the idea of specific methods, objects or 
materials that could initiate such a process.
This belief in creativity and material productivity of thought is of course a key motif 
also  for  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  who  repeatedly  emphasize  that  philosophy  is  the  “art  of 
forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts,” bringing thus actively into existence something 
that  hasn’t  been  there  before,  “something  different  in  and  from  the  world.”223 But  this 
performativity (because, as they have it: “[t]he map has to do with performance”)  224 is also 
conjoined with the act of speculation, through which a thought even has the power and should 
attempt to “summon forth” what Deleuze and Guattari name “a new earth.”225 Because of this 
self-actualizing  future-orientation,  “writing,”  but  in  the  same  sense,  any  other  creative 
production, “has nothing to do with signifying,” but with active “surveying, mapping, even 
realms that are yet to come.”226 And as these realms are not existing as of now, they need to be 
in  some way,  as  Smith has  it,  “made,”227 “conjured  into  existence”228 or  we might  say – 
fictioned.
219 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?...,p. 169. Original emphasis removed.
220 Simon O’Sullivan, Non-philosophy and Art Practice (Or Fiction as Method)…, p. 289
221 David Burrows, Simon O‘Sullivan, Fictioning…, p. 316.
222 Ibid.
223 David Burrows, Simon O‘Sullivan, Fictioning…, p. 26.
224 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus…, p. 12.
225 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?..., p. 99.
226 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus…, p. 5.
227 Anthony Paul Smith, Laruelle, a Stranger Thought…, p. 119.
228 David Burrows, Simon O‘Sullivan, Fictioning…, p. 23.
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2.5. Tool-kits for Dabbling in The Dark: Moving between Philosophy, Art 
And Science
There is much more possible than what philosophy can imagine. 
– John Ó Maoilearca, All thoughts are equal
Any examination of wishful thinking will show that horizons of expectation (collective protentions), 
based more or less phantasmatically on ‘magical’ beliefs, ‘pious’ wishes and the confusion of desire 
with reality, have effects on the course of things, effects that may be either positive or negative.
– Bernard Stiegler, 
The Age of Disruption. Technology and Madness in Computational Capitalism
In the foreword to  Difference  and Repetition,  Deleuze  famously stated  that  philosophical 
writing should be “in part a very particular species of detective novel, in part a kind of science 
fiction,”229 as well as that “it should be possible to recount a real book of past philosophy as if  
it were an imaginary and feigned book.”230 What he seems to be expressing here is first the 
conviction – which is strengthened throughout his later works with Guattari –  that certain 
speculation, forward-thinking or fictioning is necessary for philosophy to be creative and thus 
working against the established order (or in Laruelle’s terms, the “World”), but second, that 
theoretical  reasoning itself  is  not  fiction-like  only when it  directly  wants  to  engage with 
fiction, but can also be entangled with fictional qualities in a way less (self-)acknowledged 
and transparent manner.
Such claim of  course bears  radical  destabilization  of  traditional  self-conception  of 
philosophy  itself,  which,  as  film theorist  and philosopher  John  Ó Maoilearca  comments, 
usually  entertains  the  “self-serious  rhetoric”  and  demands  to  be  viewed  “realistically.”231 
What is once again expressed here, is that theory presupposes its objective dominance over 
the subject it talks about, and it acts the same way even when dealing with fiction. As he 
further notes, philosophy often brings “the fictional into philosophy,”232 but mostly in the way 
229 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition…, p. xx.
230 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition..., p. xxii.




of “literary fiction” which doesn’t help to create any “non” but only supports philosophy’s 
“autorealism,”233 utilizing fiction as a static inanimate object for validation of its claims. What 
Laruelle  thus  wants  is  for  fiction  to  be  treated  as  “the  Real  of  fiction  that  disturbs 
philosophy’s claim to understand fiction  philosophically.”234  Because, as Maoilearca notes, 
whether philosophy advocates for strict realism or radical anti-realism, both remain on certain 
level just “positions on the Real,”235 making their own truth-claims about fiction. 
Laruelle therefore suggests that philosophy has always been approaching fiction in an 
unproductive way. Because of its “auto-positioning” “arrogance,” it was always “tolerating” 
or including fiction “on condition of announcing itself to it and deciding on its essence,”236 
dragging  it  thereby  into  its  own  framework  and  making  absolute  statements  about 
“philosophical position of fiction in relation to the real.”237 Such remarks immediately bring 
us back to some of the notions of the supposed disappearance of the real (outlined in the 
previous chapter), which appear ever-more convincingly as being heralded from the position 
of an endangered thinker losing the last impressions of firm ground beneath his or her feet, 
being, as Laruelle notes elsewhere, simply “afraid of the dark.”238 
But exactly because fiction has “no distance from the real,”239 as they both float “in-
One,” it can no longer be considered a mere “mode of non-being, of the false”137 which 
could passively exist for philosophy to use in the first place, and neither can theory itself be 
disclosed as fictional (for example, under a premise that everything is somehow a fiction). 
Laruelle understands fiction not as a category of philosophy, nor any other discipline or genre, 
whether literally or visual,  but instead as an active force, “an effect of the real,”240 which 
philosophy  can’t  grasp,  because  it  realizes  itself  (semi-)autonomously  also  through 
philosophy itself.  What he introduces with the concept  of “philo-fiction”241 could thus be 
characterized as a crucial reconfiguration of fiction through a rebellious transversal movement 
“against  ‘philosophy’s  authority’  over  it:  fiction  must  no  longer  be  subordinated  to  the 
233 John Ó Maoilearca, All thoughts are equal…, p. 78.
234 Ibid. Emphasis in the original.
235 Ibid.
236 John Ó Maoilearca, All thoughts are equal…, p. 135.
237 Ibid.
238 François Laruelle, On the Black Universe…, p. 109.
239 John Ó Maoilearca, All thoughts are equal…, p. 135.
240 John Ó Maoilearca, All thoughts are equal…, p. 99.
241 Laruelle changes the vocabulary throughout multiple books, non-philosophy being called non-standard 
philosophy and philo-fiction being sometimes synonymous with it while other times being otherwise growing 




judgments of philosophy. Instead, philosophy will be made to ‘reenter’ through fiction and be 
conceived as a mode of the ‘radical experience’ of fabulation.”242
Maoilearca importantly notes, that philo-fiction is not even a specific category, but in 
fact  “another  name  for  non-philosophy”  itself,  albeit  “one  that  emphasizes  more  its 
association with art, and in particular the making of art from philosophical materials.”243 But 
non-philosophy or philo-fiction has to be radically distinguished from any philosophy of art 
and could perhaps be better understood, as Smith points out, as “art of thought.”244 Because 
when it “engages with art […] it cannot simply be through writing a gallery catalogue, but 
must find a way to turn itself into a kind of artistic practice by using artistic materials.245 But it 
is not only philosophy that would be borrowing material  from art; as Smith further notes, 
“Laruelle’s conception of non-philosophy assumes that the regional forms of knowing (like 
visual art,  fabulation,  and aesthetics in this case) already think” themselves.246 This makes 
them, as was already demonstrated, irreducible to objects of theoretical analysis or reflection 
and gives them certain agency of their own (as we shall see further), actively stepping into the 
field philosophy or theory usually claims exclusively for itself.
In  the  same aforementioned  foreword,  Deleuze  also  expresses  the  conviction  that 
philosophy “cannot claim the least superiority”247 over science and art. And this equalization 
of  different  modes of thought  is  perhaps  most precisely grasped in  What is  Philosophy?, 
where all  the three main domains of human activity (philosophy, science,  art) are seen as 
similarly  creative  in plunging into chaos and returning with “bloodshot  eyes,”248 bringing 
something  back.  But  however  Deleuze  and  Guattari  emphasize  that  thinking  “is  thought 
through concepts,  or  functions,  or  sensations  and no one  of  these thoughts  is  better  than 
another,”249 they still seem to insist more on distinguishing between the tools of philosophy, 
art and science (only scientists, in the end, can tell us if they are in need of philosophy).250 
242 John Ó Maoilearca, All thoughts are equal…, p. 99.
243 John Ó Maoilearca, All thoughts are equal…, p. 98.
244 Anthony Paul Smith, Laruelle, a Stranger Thought…, p. 52.
245 Anthony Paul Smith, Laruelle, a Stranger Thought…, p.  122. Emphasis added. Such thinking naturally brings 
up a question as to what this “turning into” should look like in practice. As much as it is clear that this movement 
is not about mere interdisciplinarity or cooperation, there are of course no specific guidelines for creating a 
“philo-fiction,” nor an existing set of examples, and it is not our aim here to invent one. However, we can say 
that for the needs of this text, it is perhaps better understood as a more abstract gesture – of “surrendering” and 
stepping outside of theoretical comfort zones, staying always, as Laruelle himself says “between.”
246 Anthony Paul Smith, Laruelle, a Stranger Thought…, p.
247 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition…, p. xvi.
248 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?..., p. 41.
249 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?..., p. 198.
250 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?..., p. 162.
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Laruelle’s  collaboration  with  fiction  is  comparatively  radical,  as  he  assertively 
pronounces  the  wish  to  “make  art  with  philosophy,  to  introduce  or  make  a  poetry  of 
thought,”251 which  wouldn’t  need  to  be  “made  of  concepts”  and nor  to  put  forward  any 
“philosophical thesis,” but which would help realize an act of making “something poetic with 
concepts. Thus, to create a practice that could destroy, in a certain way, the classical usage of 
philosophy.”252 There  then  seems to  be  a  certain  productive  “poetics”  at  play,  in  Armen 
Avanessian’s  understanding  of  the  word,253 that  is  inherent  to  fiction,  which  allows  it  to 
traverse discourses and disciplines with ease, flowing from one material into another, always 
changing languages, modes and expressions – a characteristic perhaps suitable of the kind of 
liquid non-knowledge we seek.
251 Robin Mackay, Introduction: Laruelle Undivided…, p. 29. 
252 Ibid.




2.6. Transformative Poetics of Fiction
Fiction is in itself a radical subjectivity and must be recognized as an autonomous experience before 
giving rise to technologically produced effects.  
– John Ó Maoilearca, All Thoughts Are Equal
Every act of writing is a sorcerous operation, a partisan action in a war.
– Ccru, Lemurian Time War
The stories we tell imply more than just their words.
 – Jussi Parikka, A Geology of Media
It is thus primarily in Laruellian terms that we understand also contemporary digital moving 
image fiction as a materially performative poetical force, not opposed to the Real but being 
“(in-)One”  with  it.  Because  such  a  fabulatory  practice,  as  was  explained,  necessarily 
withdraws from any truth claims about both reality and fiction and becomes sort of an opaque, 
fast-shifting agency instead, moving across various fields, exceeding all designated areas and 
enacting  a  truly  transversal  movement  –  becoming  thus  an  “overarching  category  for  an 
equalizing approach to science, philosophy, art, and every discourse.”254  
If we recall once more the emphasis on materiality expressed throughout the overview 
of  both  Laruelle’s  and  Deleuze’  (and  Guattari’s)  respective  approaches,  it  shouldn’t  be 
surprising that Laruelle understands philo-fiction more as “an experience” rather than a stable 
ontological position.255 Because, in the darkness of the Real, looking without sight, we can no 
longer  rely on critical  theoretical  tools or representational  categories,  but must attempt to 
sense our immediate surroundings and experiment anew with every step we take. That could 
also explain why, as Laruelle claims elsewhere, artists could often be more sensitive to non-
philosophy than philosophers themselves256– as they are usually more trained in openness and 
sensibility toward both material and experience as sources of their reasoning and navigation.
254 John Ó Maoilearca, All thoughts are equal…, p. 133.
255 John Ó Maoilearca, All thoughts are equal…, p. 99.
256 John Mullarkey, Anthony Paul Smith (eds.), Laruelle and Non-Philosophy…, p. 247.
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Smith further explains that, for Laruelle, fiction functions “as a force of insurrection 
that disempowers the world and operates without concern for its parameters.”257 The fiction, 
whether  it  is  philo-fiction  or  any other-fiction,258 thus  seems endowed with the  power of 
demolishing the walls bifurcating our rigid mental constructions, and thus is perhaps able to 
let us feel a glimpse of what Laruelle calls the “emotion of the Universe”259– something that 
cannot be seen or comprehended rationally, but which seems to be possibly “experienced” or 
felt. 
This  emphasis  on experience  takes  us  back also to the  transformative  potential  of 
fiction for our own subjectivity, which – being crucially embroiled with lives and modes of 
existence of other natural and technical beings – is thereby understood as radically open to 
fiction’s trespassings, whereby it swallows pieces and spews them across different planes, 
without respect for any borders and boundaries. Echoing Deleuze’s and Guattari’s mention of 
“people to come,”260 O’Sullivan and Burrows thus underline that fiction, through a triad of 
what  they  call  “mythopoesis,  myth-science  and  mythotechnesis,”261 actively  works  on 
construction of the “missing people” in Burrows’ and O’Sullivan’s understanding – viewers, 
spectators, readers and other human and non-human beings whose subjectivity is never fixed 
but always yet open to mutual  co-shaping toward something else.262 The very idea of the 
transformative  becoming-with  digital  images  and  technologies,  a  belief  that  “something 
happens through”263 and (with)in digitally disseminated fiction, is of high importance for this 
text, as we shall see in more detail in the course of what follows.
But before we arrive there, it must be made clear that this thesis itself is of course not 
and could not be an attempt to directly practice anything close to non-philosophy (the tight 
formal requirements of the thesis format being just one of the reasons). What it takes for its 
own  is  its  attitude  toward  fiction,  treating  it  as  real,  materially  productive  “experience” 
stretching  across  different  modes  of  expressions  and  thoughts.  Because,  as  Burrows  and 
O’Sullivan  repeatedly  mention,  such  understanding  acknowledges  fiction’s  “traction  on 
reality”264 as exceeding any singular work or object (of art) and underlines its “mythopoetic” 
257 Anthony Paul Smith, Laruelle, a Stranger Thought…, p. 120.
258 Laruelle himself brings up a whole number of other fictions, for example “photo-fiction,” “christo-fiction,” … 
259 François Laruelle, On the Black Universe…, p. 103.
260 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?..., p. 109, p. 176.
261 David Burrows, Simon O‘Sullivan, Fictioning…, p. 1.
262 David Burrows, Simon O‘Sullivan, Fictioning…, p. 17. But the idea of “missing people” is based on “people 
to come” (Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus…, p. 345, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, What Is 
Philosophy?..., p. 109, p. 176.) 
263 David Burrows, Simon O‘Sullivan, Fictioning…, p. 17. Emphasis added
264 David Burrows, Simon O‘Sullivan, Fictioning…, p. 21.
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quality  as  a  “world-making”  force  constituted  through and operating  not  only  within  art, 
philosophy or  science,  but  also  between  them,  sailing  the  fastest  streams and channeling 
together diverse agents and forces.
As Smith also explains,  for Laruelle,  “the purpose of fiction is  a kind of counter-
creation,”265 or as Burrows and O’Sullivan have it, fictioning is always “disruptive of order” – 
an “intervention in, and augmentation of, existing reality.”266 Following also Deleuze’ and 
Guattari’s proclamation that “to create is to resist,”267 we want to treat digital moving image 
fiction as crucially participating in a performative molding of world-matter, asking what it is 
doing  and  what  can  it  “do”  as  it  keeps  morphing  around  and  through  us  with  an  ever-
accelerating  pace.  As  Maoielarca  notes,  Laruelle  himself  has  described  his  work  as  a 
“rebellion-through-fiction” that can also be seen as an “invention of lived experience or of a 
life [that] takes . . . from thought’s point of view, the form of a theory-practice.”268 It is such 
“theory-practice” we see at play in the dark liquidity of the contemporary (art) world, and 
which we thus aim to articulate and deploy in attempt to at least  feel the throbbing of its 
rhythm.
The present thesis thus understands the practice of fictioning as a necessarily post-
genre and post-media materially productive poetics, not limited to either artistic or theoretical 
means,  but  necessarily  evolving  across  “arts,  sciences  and  social  struggles.”269 Because 
“contemporary” (if we recall Schmid’s usage of the word) moving images, as well as other 
digital objects, are always being born in the twilight crossover areas of different thoughts-
practices,  at the blurry confluences of concepts, aesthetics and technologies, following the 
mutant shape-shifting fictions they co-produce might be one of our few chances to keep up.
Maoilearca writes, following Laruelle, that in terms of “behaviors or postures, even 
the hallucinations or fictions of philosophy are real. They become hyperfictions in the Real 
rather than fictions or parafictions of the unreal.”270 This reversal is crucial, as it expresses that 
intense fictionality – and here we re-connect the presented understanding of fiction with its 
proliferation described in the first chapter of this text – does not equal unreality, but on the 
contrary,  a  fuller,  and we could  perhaps  argue,  more  fluid  and mutable  Real.  Moreover, 
Laruelle’s understanding of fiction as a material and as “lived experience,”271 “accessible to 
265 Anthony Paul Smith, Laruelle, a Stranger Thought…, p. 119.
266 David Burrows, Simon O‘Sullivan, Fictioning…, p. 2.
267 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?..., p. 110.
268 John Ó Maoilearca, All thoughts are equal…, p. 247.
269 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus…, p. 7. 
270 John Ó Maoilearca, All thoughts are equal…, p. 140.
271 Robin Mackay, Introduction: Laruelle Undivided…, p. 24.
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every [wo]man before its very usage under the technical conditions of literature, of art, of 
philosophy,”272 offers us an interesting opportunity to partake. For exactly because it reaches 
“beyond any philosophical realism into a quasi-fictional, para-realism,”273 (philo-)fiction can 
be understood as a crucial “element of opening or of possibility of every thought.”274 But it is 
important to note, that despite all this, fiction is not utopian, transcendental, nor in any other 
sense a “way out.” It is not able to unveil for us the impenetrable darkness of the Real, just as 
it doesn’t make it darker. Even if we engage in fiction, everything stays unrepresentable and 
opaque. But – if we paraphrase Smith – how fiction lives and how it is “performed,  does 
matter”275 – and it does so in the most material sense imaginable. 
272 François Laruelle, Philosophy and Non-Philosophy. Minneapolis: Univocal 2013, quoted in: John Ó 
Maoilearca, All thoughts are equal…, p. 133.
273 Maoilearca, All thoughts are equal…, p. 77.
274 François Laruelle, Philosophy and Non-Philosophy. Minneapolis: Univocal 2013, quoted in: John Ó 
Maoilearca, All thoughts are equal…, p. 134. Original emphasis removed.
275 Anthony Paul Smith, Laruelle, a Stranger Thought…, p. 120. [The original quote does not talk about fiction 
but about performativity of human lives in the world].
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3. CREATIVITY OF DIGITAL OBJECTS
But who can say that the vapour engine has not a kind of consciousness?
 Where does consciousness begin, and where end? Who can draw the line?
 Who can draw any line? Is not everything interwoven with everything? 
Is not machinery linked with animal life in an infinite variety of ways?
– Samuel Butler, Erewhon
Having sketched out the technical and societal (and consequently also artistic) context this 
text is being written in, as well as having outlined some more general theoretical standpoints 
it arises from, we shall now proceed to what could be considered a more “practical” part of 
the thesis. This is being pronounced with slight reluctance, as one of the aims so far was to 
underline that especially under all aforementioned conditions of the “post-contemporary,” the 
very distinction between theory and practice needs to be, for multiple reasons, repeatedly put 
into question.  The following chapter is thus  functionally more practice-oriented by utilizing 
approaches that directly refer to and grow out of “real-world” practices and technologies, as 
well as in attempting to bring on board some examples from contemporary moving image art 
practice  in  course  of  chapters  3.  2.  and 3.  3. Localizing  them wholly  on an  intersection 
converging  both  theory  and practice,  making theory  with  them,  or  even making  art  with 
theory, as Laruelle would demand, is too big of a goal for a master’s thesis. Nevertheless, I 
believe  that  the  preceding  chapters,  the  following  definition  of  contemporary  works  of 
moving image art through the concept of the “digital object,” and also the overall way this 
text interacts with such objects and places itself (as well as human beings in general) within 
their  trajectories,  will  help  to  underline  agency,  relationality  and  even  certain  autonomy, 
which  demands  breaking  away  from the  idea  of  critical  visual  analysis  which  would  be 
reducing multifaceted digital objects to mere reflective “images of the world” or individual 
“artworks” interpretable through personal or even contextual intentions of a respective artist. 
In this sense, this chapter (and the whole present thesis) is not even interested in art in terms 
of traditional art-related categories – what it seeks instead is to treat digital moving images 
traversing  contemporary  art  as  sort  of  an  exploratory  “grey  zone”  of  human-machine 
interaction,  which  allows  us  to  follow  how  digital  objects  exist  or  even  live,  and  thus 
hopefully help us to better understand how we mutually relate amidst our ever-accelerating 
co-evolution with(in) the technics.
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3.1. On the (Onto)genesis of Digital Technical Objects
Existence is not an individual affair. Individuals do not preexist their interactions;
 rather, individuals emerge through and as part of their entangled intra-relating.
 – Karen Barad, Meeting The Universe Halfway: 
Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning
We have already stated at  the end of  the first  chapter  that  this  thesis  understands 
moving images (of contemporary art) rather as “digital objects” than mere “images.” What 
will now follow is the carving out of the concept of the “digital object,” which seems to offer 
a  crucial  alternative  challenging  the  many thorny  connotations  of  “image”  already  partly 
problematized in the previous chapters – especially its pre-supposed flatness, the lingering 
idea of derivative nature of technical images as constituted through the history of analogue 




3.1.1. In Search of the Digital Object
Humans have always lived in a hybrid environment surrounded by artificial and natural objects.
 The artificial and the natural are not two separate realms, nor are artificial objects simply 
instruments with which to conquer the natural; instead, they constitute a dynamic system that 
conditions human experience and existence. 
– Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects
3.1.1.1. Defining the Technical Object
There is something alive in a technical ensemble.  
 –  Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects
Already in 1958, French philosopher Gilbert Simondon published a book called On the Mode 
of Existence of Technical Objects in which he accuses “culture” of being ignorant toward “the 
meaning of technical  objects.”276 What he primarily  criticizes  is  the narrow conception of 
human “culture”– which, as Jane Bennett  remarks, is “not our own making”277 anyways – 
constituting itself “as a defense system against technics” and presenting this defense as “a 
defense of man,” presuming that “technical objects  do not contain a human reality within 
them.”278 As he further explains, culture “behaves toward the technical object as [wo]man 
toward  a  stranger,  when  [s]he  allows  [her/him]self  to  be  carried  away  by  primitive 
xenophobia,”279 rejecting  a  reality  that  might  seem  “strange”  or  “foreign”  to  human 
understanding, but which needs to be granted the same rights for recognition we grant to 
ourselves or the attention paid to the natural world.
Because,  as  Simondon  attempts  to  explain,  the  whole  “opposition  drawn between 
culture  and  technics,  between  man  and  machine,  is  false  and  has  no  foundation,”  being 
“merely  a  sign  of  ignorance  or  resentment.”280 Long  before  any  discussions  about 
276 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects. Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing 2017, 
p. 15.
277 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: Political Ecology of Things. Durham: Duke Universtiy Press 2009, p.115. 
278 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects…, p. 15. [We follow the usage of 
“technics” instead of “technology / technologies.” There is multitude of approaches to how to distinguish these 
two, but as the translators of the book note, “the latter refers to the almost ineffably practical and particular 
application of technics to a given concrete task“ and seem therefore less suitable for our purposes.]
279 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects…, p. 16.
280 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects…, p.15.
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posthumanism emerged, he thus urges us to “to discover the foreign or strange as human”281 
and re-create the concept of culture in a way in which it would grant access also to machines 
as the strangers inside whom “something human is locked up, misunderstood, materialized, 
enslaved.”282 (Albeit  the “human” here has to be understood more in context of ascribing 
human  rights  and  values,  than  simply  anthropomorphizing  technical  beings  –  something 
Simondon  himself  avoids  carefully.)  He  doesn’t  hesitate  to  even  compare  the  task  of 
incorporating “technical  beings” into our conception of culture to “the abolition of slavery 
and the affirmation  of the value of the human person.”283 Even though Simondon mostly 
refers to artefacts of technical origin as  “objects,” the noun “beings” he uses to describe them 
in the very first paragraph of the book deserves to be strongly emphasized, as it elegantly 
points to his view of technics as having certain agency, if not directly a life of their own. 
Technical objects thus play their role far beyond the lines we have written for them. 
As the title of the book itself has it – they have a “mode of existence,” a reality that needs to 
be recognized and cannot be reduced to either objects of human knowledge, belonging thus to 
science,  or  the  role  they  play  in  human  experience,  as  for  example  traditional 
phenomenological  philosophy would treat  them. Simondon’s work in  this  sense is  almost 
taxonomical, focusing on technical objects themselves, giving attention and care to seemingly 
minor  technical  particles  and  mechanical  advancements  and  tracing  their  own 
“individualization”284 toward  the next  evolutionary  stage  – almost  as  if  they were  animal 
species.  This  aspect  is  not  accidental,  as  Simondon  shows  through  his  idea  of  technical 
objects’ concretization. As he writes, we are often making the mistake of seeing a technical 
object as “an artificial being,”285 something we have simply made and since than it is “done,” 
a  primitive  one-ended  product  “without  common ground of  existence,  without  reciprocal 
causality, without internal resonance,”286 fully dependent on a “regulative external milieu”287 
281 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects…, p. 16.
282 Ibid.
283 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects…, p.15.
284 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects…, p. 59. Simondon distinguishes between 
individuation and individualization, the former being used in broader terms of transindividuation, including the 
psychic processes, the latter more specifically in the context of technical development of objects. (This is 
something Yuk Hui comments on, asking whether we could not also discuss the “individuation” of technical, or 
in his context, digital objects. (See: Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press 2016, p. 55.) But these two processes are not at all mutually exlusive – on the contrary, they can 
be seen as “a mixture of the two.” (See: Gilbert Simondon, L’Individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et 
d’information Grenoble: Millon 2005 in Couze Venn, Individuation, relationality, affect: rethinking the human 
in relation to the living. Subjectivity 13, 60–88 (2020). Accessible at WWW: <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41286-
020-00091-z> [published 10. 4. 2020])
285 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects…, p. xv.
286 Ibid.
287 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects…, p. 50.
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of  a  laboratory  or  a  factory  it  was  born  in.  But  technical  objects  are  neither  static,  nor 
substantial or complete. And as Simondon shows, they cannot be conceived as isolated either. 
Because throughout its evolution, a technical object continually “frees itself,” “dynamically 
incorporates  the  laboratory”288 into  its  functions,  and  becomes  more  complex  and 
multifunctional – each structure existing “not only as organ, but as body, as milieu, and as 
ground  for  other  structures.”289 This  observation  has  quite  serious  consequences,  making 
Simondon state that during the process of concretization, even formerly perhaps primitively 
artificial object becomes increasingly “similar to a natural object”290 and as such deserves the 
same amount of awareness and interest we give to animals or plants. 
Simondon’s notion of the “milieu,”291 a many faceted word translatable from French as 
both “environment” and a “middle,” thus grasps nicely the scale of both the conditions under 
which the technical object evolves, and the perspective from which we must approach it if we 
are to be able to at least partially glimpse into this process. Because what allows a technical 
object to concretize itself and develop further is primarily “its relation to other technical and 
natural objects,”292 including but not limited to humans. This is also why, as he reminds, the 
re-integration of technical beings into culture could not be realized “at the level of elements or 
at the level of individuals” but necessarily “at the level of ensembles,” as the most complex 
organization of agents in the system.293 On such wider scale, the technical realm thus has a 
structure “that has the same status as a natural structure, even if it might be schematically 
different from all natural structures.”294 As Simondon explains, we unjustly tend to understand 
technical  objects  in  terms  of  “use,”  as  “pure assemblages  of  matter,”295 evaluable  simply 
through their “utility function,”296 which necessarily prevents us from paying attention to the 
complexity of the whole technical structure, its entanglement with other structures and neither 
its actual influence on the ways we ourselves constitute meaning and make sense of the world. 
What has Simondon importantly named even back then, is the radical inseparability of 
lives  and  evolutionary  processes  of  human  and  the  machine.  And  this  inescapable 
embroilment seems to have only grown ever since, making even more apparent that technics 
288 Ibid.
289 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects…, p. xv.
290 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects…, p. 50.
291 Articulated through the whole book and distingueshed into several types.
292 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects…, p. 50.
293 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects…, p. xvi. [Simondon distinguishes, from 
smaller to larger, elements, individuals and ensembles] 
294 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects…, p. 50
295 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects…, p. 17. Original emphasis removed.
296 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects…, p. 16.
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have influence  on  our  own development  whether  we want  to  acknowledge it  or  not.  By 
“banish[ing]”297 technical objects from “human” culture and ignoring the specific mode of 
existence of technical beings, we thus cease to understand not only the world of technical 
objects, but in the same manner also our very own selves (the human reality “locked up” 
within the realm of technics). The result of this is something that resonates within philosophy 
at  least  since it  started to speak of industrial  revolution,  only gaining in importance with 
accelerating automatization, and which was famously explored among others by Karl Marx or 
Martin Heidegger – the problem of alienation. Both Marx and Heidegger, on different levels, 
importantly point to the danger of the alienation of (wo)man from technics, which becomes 
one of the key characteristics of the modern world. In his famous 1954 essay The Question 
Concerning  Technology, Heidegger  observes  that  in  the  modern  world,  the  traditional 
understanding of technology as technē – linked by the Greeks to craft and the arts and thus 
seen  as  having  productively  poetic  or  revealing  qualities,  is  replaced  by  “Gestell,”298 a 
purpose-oriented “enframing,” which becomes the new essence of technology. What he thus 
calls for is for the original revealing quality of technology to be recognized, instead of it being 
reduced to mere means of exploitation of the world.299 But Simondon approaches the problem 
from a yet different, less hierarchical and more processual angle, showing that alienation is 
caused  neither  by  technics  as  such,  nor  by  their  detachment  from some  original  human 
nature,300 but by our lack of knowledge and understanding of “the nature of machines, of their 
mutual  relations  and of their  relations  with man,  and of the values implied  in these rela-
tions.”301 
And it is exactly these processual, mutually shaped relations we seek to underline also 
in  the  context  of  contemporary  moving  image  art,  following  Simondon’s  in  many  ways 
forward-thinking notion of technical object – something even nowadays often overlooked as 
mere means or medium – as being increasingly present, active and productive in almost every 
domain  of  human  life.  As  Simondon  emphasizes,  the  necessary  “broadening  and 
297 Ibid.
298 Martin Heidegger: The Question Concerning Technology, 1954. Accessible at WWW: 
<https://www2.hawaii.edu/~freeman/courses/phil394/The%20Question%20Concerning%20Technology.pdf> 
[publication date unknown, accesed 23.8. 2020].
299 Heidegger’s thesis is of course way more complicated, but not central to what we are trying to form here.
300 Susana Lindberg summarizes that Simondon criticizes Heidegger for thinking technology only in terms of 
“Zeug” (a thing or gear) and Marx for reducing it to “work.” Susana Lindberg, Being with Technique–Technique 
as being-with: The technological communities of Gilbert Simondon. Contemporary Philosophy Review 52, 299–
310 (2019). Accesible at WWW: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-019-09466-9> [published 8. 6. 2019, accessed 
16. 7. 2021]
301 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects…, p. 19.
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deepening”302 of  culture  can  actually  lead  to  changes  of  high  “political  and  social” 
importance,  but  for  such  changes  to  be  undertaken,  we  need  a  culture  (in  Simondonian 
understanding of the word as “knowledge” and “a sense of values”) that would be “adequate 
to the reality which it expresses and regulates”303– a truly contemporary culture recognizing 
technical  agents  in  their  full  autonomy,  mutability  and  importance  for  the  milieu  we 
constitute.
3.1.1.2. Defining the Digital Object
The introduction and convergence of technologies like Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and GPS allow for more 
accurate contextual and geographical detections, leading us into the REAL. 
 How can we address this digital milieu? It is another world, a strange world, one that is 
simultaneously artificial and natural. It is as complicated as what we used to refer to as the
 “real world,” and more important, it is a world we are already in.
– Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects
Simondon’s  approach  to  technical  objects  as  never  complete  and  undergoing  constant 
reshaping  of  course  by  its  very  nature  demands  actualization,  as  the  means  of  what  is 
“adequate” necessarily change. The technical milieu we live in today differs radically not only 
from that of the end of the 1950s, but even from a mere 15 years ago – it has become digital 
and omnipresent, to an extent probably unimaginable for anybody in Simondon’s time. As 
digital  technologies  become more and more integrated  into previously simply mechanical 
objects,  such  as  telephones  and TVs,  but  also  cars,  fridges,  kettles,  thermostats,  vacuum 
cleaners or even clothes,  we must conclude that today it  is almost impossible to properly 
theorize Simondonian technical objects without understanding them also as digital objects. In 
On  the  Existence  of  Digital  Objects,  referring  directly  to  Simondon’s  book,  Chinese 
philosopher of technology Yuk Hui takes Simondon’s major concepts, such as that of the 
technical object, the milieu, and the process of concretization and individuation, and reshapes 
them for contemporary digitally networked world. 
Hui offers to define “digital objects” as such that “take shape on a screen or hide in the 
back  end  of  a  computer  program,”  being  “composed  of  data  and  metadata  regulated  by 
302 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects…, p. 20.
303 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects…, p. 21.
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structures or schemas.”304 As he himself points out, in computation, metadata are also called 
“ontologies – a word that has immediate associations with philosophy.”305 Seemingly perhaps 
too easy of a double-meaning, this sentence points to something crucial about the “new form 
of  industrial  object”306 crossing  every  aspect  of  our  lives  in  the  form of  “online  videos, 
images, text files, Facebook profiles,”307 Instagram posts, Tik Toks and many others. As Hui 
explains, in similarity to the emphasis Simondon puts on other-than-scientific understanding 
of technics, engineering often “falls short” when trying to grasp such objects, because it limits 
them “to a set  of structures  for representation,”308 seeing only their  practical  applications. 
There  thus  seems  to  be  a  need  for  certain  deeper  and  less  utilitarian  “investigation”  in 
computation which, according to Hui, has itself “a reciprocal relation” with philosophy – a 
need for a different ontology able to express the “digital milieu.”309 Because since ontology is 
in general questioning “being,” it can never grasp present reality  “if  it  does not take into 
account  the  nature  of  technics”  –  “ontology  is  [thus]  necessarily  technical.”310 And  if 
philosophy wants to develop such ontology, it is not enough to “add one more branch” to 
itself but, as Hui classifies Simondon’s task, to “reestablish the metaphysical foundation of 
philosophy as a whole” 311  or as he proposes himself, to “find a new relation between object 
and mind.”312 
As  was  already  outlined  in  the  first  chapter  of  this  text,  it  might  at  first  seem 
contradictory to speak about “objects” in the context of happenings and interactions unfolding 
on  digital  screens,  consisting  of  pixels  and  to-human-eyes  invisible  signals.  As  Hui 
provocatively  asks:  “Where  is  the  digital  object?”313 Such  a  simplistic  question  becomes 
immediately more complicated, as the digital object cannot be constrained “inside” of any 
single  computer  and  neither  simply  stored  on  a  cloud,  or  even  in  several  data  storage 
buildings  somewhere  in  cold  North.  It  is  instead,  as  Steyerl  notices  about  the  internet, 
“anywhere and nowhere” at the same time. Understanding digital media in terms of digital 
objects  and their  evolution,  or “ontogenesis,”  is thus marked by a crucial  task of naming 
304 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 1.
305 Ibid.
306 Ibid.
307 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 2. 
308 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 3.
309 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 26.
310 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 105.
311 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 12.
312 Yuk Hui, What is a Digital Object? METAPHILOSOPHY, Vol. 43, No. 4, 2012, p. 390.
313 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 110.
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something that is “never fully known,”314 and that we, on epistemological level, sometimes 
even “don’t know to exist,”315 but which, as we have repeatedly shown, has in fact its own 
kind of heavy “irreducible”316 physicality. Hui thus directly writes that computation “relies on 
a  new  type  of  materiality  that  disrupts  some  of  the  concepts  that  are  fundamental  to 
philosophy,”317 challenging thus the very categories we have delineating matter or object in 
the first place. What he thereby also criticizes is repeatedly problematized immateriality of 
digital  media,  emphasizing that  information  consists  of much more than “simply bits  and 
bytes.”318 Following  Simondon,  he  underlines  that  information  is  not  an  “abstract  entity” 
existing “outside of materiality” and suggests that we should understand “the nature of data as 
objects.”319
Such objects,  active in what we can now call,  together  with Hui and Simondon, a 
“digital  milieu,”320 are  thus  necessarily  different  from how philosophy usually  understood 
them, as they are objects of neither “experience nor of intuition,”321 being often ungraspable, 
unlocalizable  or,  as  Hui  remarks  in  his  definition,  “hiding”  behind  graphic  interfaces  or 
composed of multiple layers across different spaces. But as Hui claims, they nevertheless are 
objects in terms of how we deal with them as well as being materially present outside of what 
we usually see as the “virtual  world,”322 leading us always “into the REAL.”323 Updating 
Simondon’s understanding of technical objects’ development, Hui thus observes how digital 
objects evolve, or concretize, across digital networks, stating that web ontologies are in fact 
“productive,”324 undergoing  a  constant  reciprocal  “double  movement”  consisting   of 
“objectification of data” and “dataification of objects.”325 This is why data are not abstract 
information,  and  also  why  digital  objects  cannot  be  understood  in  terms  of  substance, 
appearance  or  any other  traditional  object-related  category,326 being  always  related  to  yet 
another layer which cannot be simply seen or captured (hence the “hiding” Hui speaks of).
314 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects…, p. 39.
315 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 78.
316 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 3…, p. 36.
317 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 3.
318 Yuk Hui, What is a Digital Object?..., p. 381.
319 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 27. Emphasis added.
320 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 26.
321 Bernard Stiegler, Foreword, In: Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. xi.
322 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 48. 
323 Ibid.
324 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 34.
325 Ibid. Emphasis in the original.
326 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 2.
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By  their  very  nature,  digital  objects  are  thus  “utterly  relational,”327 taking  shape 
through “establishing material connections over a broader milieu across further platforms and 
interfaces.”328 As  Hui  explains,  contrary  to  the  hypertext  age,  when  online  objects  were 
meaningful  only  to  humans  and not  to  machines,329 contemporary  web ontologies  enable 
“machines  to  understand  and  manipulate  data,”330 making  them  increasingly  capable  to 
“reason about them.”331 This claim is not supposed to advocate for any machinic singularity 
utopia  or  dystopia,  but  explains  something  already  practically  present  in  our  everyday 
movements on the web or in mobile applications, which become ever more “AI-motivated”332 
and filled with objects, composed of either text, image or other media, “not limited to human 
understanding” and “requiring machine interpretation.”333 In the same breath we more and 
more make sense of the world through exactly such machine-driven and machine-influenced 
processes,  being  offered  content,  shown  images  or  suggested  tips  based  on  algorithmic 
evaluation  –  the  very  word  processor  I  write  in  trying  to  presume  (often  unsolicited)  
corrections as I type. As Hui thus concludes, we are “living in a digital milieu; we Facebook, 
we blog, we Flickr, we YouTube, and we Vimeo. Nouns and brands have become verbs, even 
forms of life.”334 And such a milieu must be better grasped as “collaborative imagination of 
minds  and  machines”  in  one  interconnected  ensemble,  than  in  terms  of  any  simple 
instrumentality or domination. It is a reciprocal relation operating on such a scale that, as Hui 
observes, computation is not only irreducible to the mere question of mediation of content, 
but is itself “no less philosophical than philosophy” while concurrently “philosophy is no less 
technological.”335 This  reciprocal  relation  applies  to  the  bond  between  digital  images  we 
encounter while scrolling down the feed and the “real”  world outside of the frame of the 
screen (at  least  in  a  given moment),  but is  also expressive of an ongoing ontogenesis  of 
contemporary moving image art (the fact that these two categories are rarely not overlapping 
in  terms  of  how we encounter  them speaks for  itself),  as  it  is  being increasingly  tied  to 
computational algorithmic processes in all stages of its existence: from initial research and 
influences to actual production and subsequent dissemination.  A digital  milieu is thus not 
327 Bernard Stiegler, Foreword, In: Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. ix.
328 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, pp. 69–70.
329 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 52.
330 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 68.
331 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 69.
332 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 71.
333 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 72.
334 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 47.
335 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 50.
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something we choose to enter or decide to reflect upon, but as Hui himself says – “it is a 
world we are already in.”336
336 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 48.
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3.1.3. “What Invents Who:” The Organs of Cognition 
 [Are] we their parasites? [Are] they ours?
– Sadie Plant, Zeros and Ones
Having outlined that what we understand by “digital objects” and their autonomous “mode of 
existence” (at least to the extent that ours can be also considered as such) we now need to 
make a crucial connection back to human consciousness and to name our own role within the 
ensembles of technical beings. Bernad Stiegler places Simondon’s theory of individuation at 
the very heart of his philosophy, focusing on the role of technology in the wider development 
of human perception, consciousness, and memory. Such re-centering is crucial for this text, as 
it directly addresses the transfers between what we understand as human subjects and not only 
generally technical but specifically audiovisual technologies. 
Stiegler uses Simondon’s idea of mutual coevolution of man and technics to re-think 
the relationship between humans and what is usually perceived as “their tools.”  He refuses to 
see technical “artefacts” as simply an external influence on our physical and mental processes 
and advocates for such a conception and scale of our interactions with technics, which would 
allow  to  partially  dissolve  the  very  boundary  between  “human”  and  “technical,” 
understanding them instead as interconnected “organs” in one body-system stretched across 
both  space  and  time.  Following  the  observations  of  French  anthropologist  André  Leroi-
Gourhan, Stiegler refutes the nobility of human intellect as a necessary source of invention of 
all technologies, showing that it is the very evolution of our mental abilities that was first 
enabled by the usage of technological artefacts – “the what invents the who just as much as it 
is invented by it.”337 What he therein puts into question is the very origin of technics as being 
simply born at the hands of [wo]man, understanding the technical “exteriorization” not as a 
conscious  act  of  intelligent  human beings,  but  as  actually  “constitutive  of  the  life  of  the 
[human]  spirit.”338 As  another  French  philosopher  Anne  Alombert  working  with  Stiegler 
summarizes:  “[Wo]man  and  technics  mutually  co-invent  each  other  within  the  same  co-
evolutionary processes between psycho-somatic (called natural) and artificial organs, to which 
it would be illusory to assign any origin.”339 Such observations necessarily result in a radical 
337 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time 1. California: Stanford University Press 1998, p. 177.
338 Anne Alombert: Penser la forme technique de la vie : du transhumanisme à l’organologie. Accessible at 
WWW: <https://www.academia.edu/36941531/Penser_la_forme_technique_de_la_vie_du_transhumanisme_




decentering of the human subject as the inventor of the machines, suggesting not only that 
“there was therefore no human spirit at the origin of technological inventions”340 but also that 
the emergence of human intelligence itself  could have happened beyond our intentions or 
even out of our focus. More radically put – we might be nothing more than a “secretion of 
artificial organs.”341 
Expanding  thus  on  Simondon’s  concept  of  individuation,  Stiegler  develops  the 
concept of “transindividuation” to describe the co-evolutionary process of ongoing exchange 
between human beings and technological artefacts, which in many ways surpasses even the 
physical boundaries of human body. This view is important as it contradicts the very common 
tendency in theorizing technology, seeing humans as relating to the world “through objects,” 
using technological artefacts “to stretch the spatiality of their bodies,”342 the human being seen 
as “extended”343 by the artefacts in, in a very physical sense of certain augmentation, which is 
an  often  view  of  many  post-phenomenological  or  science  and  technology  approaches  to 
technology, but plays a crucial role in the problematic idea of transhumanism. But Stieglerian 
perspective  rejects  such  an  approach  to  technical  “artefacts”  as  simple  man-made 
“prostheses.” Because neither technical nor biological organs could be though apart from their 
mutual transindividuation, there is, as Anne Alombert points out, “no human  nature which 
could be augmentable by the technical prostheses.”344 The technological artefacts therefore 
don’t  “extend” our cognitive or bodily capacities,  precisely because such never existed as 
unextended (or we could say, unmediated) in the first place – “the augmentation has always 
already begun.”345 
Such  an  “organological”  approach  thus  crucially  problematizes  what  is  usually 
considered  as  natural  and artificial,  but  first  and foremost,  it  challenges  the very idea of 
technical objects as “tools” for mere human usage. Compared for example to Heidegger’s 
often-used concept of  Zuhandenheit, describing tools as “ready-to-hand”346 objects existing 
for us as something to be used, Simondonian (and Stieglerian) perspective is less hierarchical 
and  anthropocentric.  Even  though  Yuk  Hui  is  more  positive  about  the  concept  of 
Zuhandenheit, explaining that it attempts to prove certain modes of existence of objects apart 
340 Ibid.
341 Ibid.
342 Peter-PaulVerbeek, What Things Do. Philosophical reflections on technology, agency, and design. 
Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press 2005, p. 124.
343 Peter-PaulVerbeek, What Things Do…, p. 125.
344 Anne Alombert: Penser la forme technique de la vie…
345 Ibid.
346 Martin Heidegger: The Question Concerning Technology…
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from  our  conscious  signification  (we  don’t  need  “a  representation  of  the  hammer  as  a 
collection of attributes when it uses it to hit the nail”),347 it must thus still be noted that it 
establishes and replicates a quite one-sided relationship of humans  to technics and thereby 
presents the existence of technical objects as human-made and human-related.
Oppositely, Stiegler’s concept of technological artefact is very distant from the idea of 
a  tool.  Viewed as organs,  technical  objects  are,  as was already presented,  themselves  co-
constitutive of the world and of ourselves and their status could never simply be that of a tool 
at our hand, precisely because we can’t be sure whether it’s (wo)man who invented the tool or 
the tool who invented (wo)man: “the relation between human organism and its prostheses is a 
transductive  relation.”348 This  uncertainty  about  the  actual  direction  of  interconnected 
evolutions of humans and technics is mentioned already in Simondon, when he writes that it 
is perhaps not the machines that are increasingly taking over formerly human manual labour, 
but it might have been humans who took over theirs, while they, for a certain period of time, 
“provisionally replaced the machine[s] before truly technical  individuals could emerge.”349 
This possibility is taken to a certain extreme in a Victorian novel Erewhon by Samuel Butler, 
which,  under  the  influence  of  Darwinian  evolutionary  theory,  includes  a  story  about 
autonomous locomotives that use symbiosis with humans only to evolve themselves350 – a 
situation which would make humans a kind of artefacts of machines. 
347 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 99.
348 Anne Alombert: Penser la forme technique de la vie…
349 Gilbert Simonon, On The Mode of Existence of Technical Objects…, p. 81.
350 Samuel Butler, Erewhon, Dover Publications , Inc. 2002 (1872).
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 3.1.3. Mutual Ontogenesis
[O]ne doesn’t construct oneself a network.
 – Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects
Nothing makes itself. 
– Donna Haraway, Staying with the Trouble. Making Kin in the Chthulucene
Stiegler also directly applies the above-explained reasoning to new media, from early auditive 
ones, through cinema and television to contemporary digital networks, showing how human 
cognition itself is not only changed but in fact constituted through sounds and images. He 
expands Husserl’s idea of primary and secondary retention, which explain how we remember 
and recall  past  moments  with  a  third  category  of  “tertiary  retention.”  While  the  primary 
retention allows us to keep in memory the just-passed previous moments and thus to perceive 
objects in time (to, for example, even make sense of a melody as a whole), and the secondary 
serves to recall things from memory, tertiary retentions are “hypomnesic sedimentations that 
have  accumulated  over  generations  by  spatializating  and  materializing  themselves  in  the 
world of artefacts.”351
It is because of these tertiary retentions that nothing as unmediated experience (or non-
augmented  human nature)  could exist  – because the experience and the mental  capacities 
themselves are being layered and (trans)formed not only in our physical brains, but also in 
sounds and images of the media. The whole transindividuation could thus be also explained as 
sort of a “long-circuit” of flowing exchange between different bodies and organs – a kind of 
entangled massive “collective memory”352 processually constituted across both “natural” and 
“artificial” beings-organs.
Such open and unstable arrangement is of course always undergoing transformation, 
in which, as Stiegler notes, the “I” and “Other” themselves are in fact just “two faces of the 
same process  of  individuation,  at  the  core  of  which  develops  their  tendency  to  become-
indivisible.”353 Or as theorist Patricia MacCormack has it: “the space between the I / Other is 
one of inevitable  connection and we are always and already othered /  otherable.”354 Such 
underlining of the incompleteness as well as of the importance of mutual co-constitution in 
the space “between,” in many ways breaks down the conception of individual agents acting in 
351 Anne Alombert: Penser la forme technique de la vie…
352 Ibid.
353 Bernard Stiegler, Acting Out. Stanford: Stanford University Press 2009, p. 4, Original emphasis removed.
354 Patricia MacCormack, Posthuman Ethics, p. 6.
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the  world,  supporting  Donna  Haraway’s  sympoetical  claim  that  “to  be  one  is  always  to 
become with many.”355 Because from this perspective,  our own making is always already 
enmeshed in other making-withs, machinic and natural, whether we consciously admit or not. 
Similarly,  the  “intra”  in  Karen  Barad’s  aforementioned  concept  of  “intra-action”  aims  to 
emphasize,  in  contrast  to  the  concept  of  “interaction”  between  two  separate  individual 
agencies, exactly this entanglement and mutual inseparability, in which agents are definable 
only in and through the processes they engage in: “they don’t exist as individual elements.”356 
This of course echoes also Spinoza’s much earlier understanding of the body as a composition 
of relations,357 which seem to have only gain on truthfulness as we become more and more 
literally pierced with microplastic particles and signal waves. 
In  our  inherently  bio-mechanical  existence  in  such  “posthuman  digital 
universe,”358 there is thus no clear differentiating line between the “master” and the “tool,” 
everything being irrevocably subjected to a “widespread practice of mutual  contamination 
between organic matter — anthropomorphic or not — and electronic circuitry.”359 This has of 
course radical implications for the role digital media plays in reshaping of human subjectivity, 
supplementing,  as  Hui  explains,  “the  finitude  of  the  first  two kinds  of  retention  with an 
infinite  repertoire  of  memories,  made  possible  by  digitization.”360 But  contemporary 
algorithmic  processes  go  way  farther  beyond  capturing  “our”  memories  or  even  simply 
“memories” in terms of what already has been. And if we want to tap into these non-linear 
and  ungraspable  flows  that  nevertheless  necessarily  reshape  our  very  cognition  and 
consciousness, we must stop approaching them from a position of domination, reducing them 
to tools-instruments and limiting thereby the meaning and scale of their operations to our self-
centered anthropocentric projections – not only because we perhaps haven’t really invented 
them, but because even if we did, nowadays they have without any doubt become too “alive” 
for their “mode of existence” to be overlooked. 
As both Simondon and Hui express, if  technical  beings are often unacknowledged 
from  those  in  positions  of  either  practical  users  or  engineers,  we  perhaps  need  to  look 
elsewhere “to discover a new sensibility for being with objects enabled by technologies,”361 
355 Donna Haraway, When Species Meet. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2008, p. 4. Original 
emphasis removed.
356 Karen Barad, Meeting The Universe Halfway, p. 33. Original emphasis removed.
357 Baruch Spinoza, Ethics. Ware: Wordsworth Editions 2001.
358 Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman. Oxford – Malden: Polity Press 2013, p. 113.
359 Ibid.
360 Yuk Hui, What is a Digital Object? METAPHILOSOPHY, Vol. 43, No. 4, July 2012, p. 392.
361 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 38.
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which could help us introduce contemporary digital objects into our culture and thus mitigate 
the  “alienation  within  the  digital  milieu,”362 tangible  through  the  widespread  feelings  of 
unreality,  misunderstanding and information and sensory overload so ubiquitous in digital 
globalized world.
The  moving  image  works  referenced  in  following  two  sub-chapters  can  thus  be 
understood as attempts to nurture such sensibility, salving the “circuits” of mutual interaction, 
and giving either by their content or in the course of their creative process, space to digital 
beings as inseparable agents living with us in one shared milieu. There are of course more 
possibilities  for creation of such moments of mutuality,  but because of its dependence on 
digital technologies, certain areas of contemporary moving image art seem to be a good space 
for  exercising  such  dialogue.  A  dialogue  in  which  it  would  be  possible  to  reshape  the 
problematic idea of a tool to more reality-corresponding ends (especially in the context of 
contemporary digital  images),  finding thereby an exit from notions of tools-instruments to 
something  we  might  perhaps  call  tools-collaborators,  tools-co-creators  or  maybe  even 
tools-“companions” (in Haraway’s understanding).363 Let us say it is an unsure experiment in 
what we might call, following Burrow’s and O’Sullivan’s reading of Laruelle, a “retooling”– 
an attempt to look for other-than-possessive and necessary more-than-human configurations 
of human-machine interaction in shifting flows of material fictions crossing through moving 
images of contemporary art.
362 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 53.
363 A word Haraway uses across different books. See for example: Donna Haraway, Staying with the trouble: 
Making Kin in the Chthulucene. London/Durham: Duke University Press 2016.
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3.2. Digital Objects in Contemporary Moving Image Art
The very possibility of “culture,” and thus of “spirit,” relies on technics.
– Bernard Stiegler,  
Technics and Time 3, Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise
Now might be the right time for a little summary. After submerging ourselves into fiction as a 
real fluid force operating ubiquitously in the contemporary global digital network-world, we 
have consecutively laid out, from a more philosophical viewpoint,  an understanding of its 
materially productive performativity. Last, we have roughly sculpted a figuration of technical 
agents co-producing the digital milieu as partially autonomous digital objects, or even digital 
beings, who are in themselves generative and directly co-constitutive of our everyday world 
and the many fictions at play within it, challenging thus also many older conceptualizations of 
both space and time.  As was repeatedly expressed,  they therefore don’t  function as mere 
passive  containers  for  our  own  memories  or  projections,  but  directly  influence  human 
cognitive and affective capacities on a very physical level, shaping not only human–human 
mediated  interaction,  but  increasingly  adding  more  layers  of  human–machine,  machine–
human and importantly machine–machine communication into the process. 
It  was  thus  hopefully  made  clear  why  digital  images  cannot  be  treated  in  a 
representational  manner,  with  respect  to  how they  carry,  transform and  create  meanings 
(which we can access), but also, and perhaps even more importantly, because they are in fact 
material objects with physical “traction on reality”364– highly active agents in a shared digital-
material milieu. The rest of this chapter will focus on the above-mentioned retooling (both in 
the more abstract and the literal meaning of the word) observable in some of the fluid digital 
images thriving in contemporary moving image art practice. But it is also important to note 
that even when focusing specifically on moving images, we must always bear in mind the 
“post-” context  of contemporary art,  which without hesitation crosses the frame of media 
specificity and – when presented in an exhibition format – floods the room with other objects 
or  on  the  other  hand,  uses  the  moving  image  only  as  one  part  of  the  larger  process  or 
installation.
364 David Burrows, Simon O‘Sullivan, Fictioning…, p. 21.
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The examples365 to follow are not connected by much more than their existence in the 
contemporary art world and by the fact that they are “digital images” in terms of the creative 
tools they couple with. The videos are thus not understood simply as a collection of artworks 
awaiting interpretation, which would uncover the intentions of individual artists or specific 
formal features or methods (in which case they vary greatly). Instead, they are woven into the 
fabric  of  the  text  through diverse  images,  matters  and themes,  in  order  to  help  us  show 
something broader  about  contemporary  digital  ontology,  whose materiality  and affectivity 
they can be said to channel, but which radically overruns any singular (digital) object, specific 
aesthetic tendency or even human intention in general. This broadening elseways allows for a 
productive narrowing, calling our attention specifically to the range of possibilities of digital 
fictioning – in Burrouws’ and O’Sullivan’s understanding of it as of “production of a different 
mode  of  being”366 –  following  the  imagery  and  imaginary  of  their  image-streams. 
Approaching  images  which  are  distinguished  by  elusiveness,  diffraction,  mutation,  and 
changeability with this intent seems to be the right step, as it allows us to treat the “artworks” 
in the same way they treat their images – cutting stable units into pieces and morphing them 
into something that is always different and irreducible to any recombination of previous parts, 
or  even  sculpting  them out  of  nowhere,  eluding  any  stable  categorization  or  preexisting 
certainty. In this sense, we seem to be beyond Simondonian taxonomy, leaving the herbarium 
at home and turning into bloodshot-eyed storm-chasers. And dealing with such image-whirls, 
we can never be sure who is the hunter and who is the hunted.
365 Ranging from already iconic works, sometimes presented at the most important Biennales, to way lesser-
known projects, it is thus by no mistake an all-encompassing or carefully enclosed selection, being treated more 
as (partly necessarily subjective) group of cases in point (and at the same time sources of inspiration) or 
enactings of the main theoretical strings we have stretch(ed).
366 David Burrows, Simon O‘Sullivan, Fictioning…, p. 18.
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 3.2.1. Liquid Opacity of Digital Fiction
We thought it was a plumbing system, so how did this tsunami creep up in my sink?
– Hito Steyerl, Too Much World: Is the Internet Dead?
"It's 21st century… It's the fucking 21st century" 
– Hyperlinks or It didn’t Happen (2014)
There is an eerie-feeling and somewhat surprisingly melancholic scene367 in Ryan Trecartin’s 
and Lizzie Fitch’s Mark Trade (2016), in which the protagonist Mark, played by porn actor 
Murphy Maxwell, and a female-dressed figure with gray-painted face performed by Trecartin 
himself,  sit on an inflatable circle floating on a completely black borderless water, whose 
horizon is swallowed by thick darkness of the surrounding night (Figure 4). Everybody seems 
to have been heavily drinking for hours (as well as throughout the whole movie) spiraling 
more and more into hallucinatory drunkenness, falling in and crawling fumblingly back from 
the  water  (–  and  isn’t,  as  Deleuze  and  Guattari  note,  "[d]runkenness  […]  a  triumphant 
irruption of the plant in us"?). The unheroic atmosphere of lostness strengthened by weirdly 
saddening tones reminiscent of lost summer days, the scene is in many ways expressive of 
what we have so far described about the qualities inherent to contemporary digital ontology, 
as well as of the whole cinematic style of the films of Trecartin and Fitch. All protagonists 
seem to ramble without any legible meaning and continuity, the lines often losing sense in the 
middle of the sentence, mixing two or more statements that sometimes sound as if they were 
cut out of completely different scripts.  Mark Trade along with other videos created by the 
two – most notably Centre Jenny (2013) – features weirdly costumed protagonists with face 
paints and contact  lenses,  evoking a  disjointedly  (un)human origin,  chaotically  acting out 
roles,  genders  and  situations  while  tirelessly  shooting  their  surroundings  with  multiple 
cameras. The text will come back to some specific cinematic strategies they employ in the 
next chapter (3.3), but we have opened the present part with this image, because it captures a 
specific impression of volatile disorientation of vision that is perhaps more of a non-vision or, 
in Trecartin’s style, a “night vision.”368 While watching, we seem to be losing track of any 
367 As hard a s it is to even select distinguished “scenes” in Trecartin’s and Fitch’s movies, the part where they 
come to the lake starts around the 41st minute. The video is accessible online on Trecartin’s Vimeo. Accessible 
at WWW: <https://vimeo.com/200299829>
368 The mention of “night vision” plays a quite central role also for example in Centre Jenny and Comma Boat. 
There was even a limited number of “Witness Night Vision 360” sweatshirts sold through Dis magazine website. 
Accessible at WWW: <https://disown.dismagazine.com/products/witness-night-vision-360>
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logic and navigation somewhere in between of thick layers of merged and collaged images 
(shot often – and in case of some other Trecartin’s movies, exclusively – at night or with a 
green-light  night  vision  mode)  continually  put  on  top  of  another,  next  to  each  other,  or 
inserted  into  each  other,  while  being  at  the  same  time  slowed  down  or  sped  up  and 
accompanied by stretched tones and autotuned voices, echoing the biggest trend in pop and 
rap music of the past decade. 
These heavily post-produced alien images and sounds make tangible the intensity and 
confusion so typical of today’s ultra-mediated sensory overload amidst which we become, as 
Steyerl has it, “floaters in a fleeting world of images, interns in dark net soap lands.”369 (And 
as we might have noticed, not only Instagram or Facebook Messenger, but even Microsoft 
Word  processor  now  has  a  “dark”  mode.)  Shaviro  explains  that  such  fluidity  and 
disorientation is typical of “post-cinematic” media regime, because mutable and highly affect-
saturated digital images bring altogether different relations to both time and space. While the 
classical cinema was always presupposing some real physical space preceding it (as much as 
it could have been a semi-fictional space created by a sum of different places), presenting us 
with  certain  “continuity  in  space  and  movement,”  digital  cinema,  as  Shaviro  writes, 
“continually alters its curvature and its dimensions; it does not persist as a stable, enduring 
container for objects that would be situated solidly within it.”370 In this sense, the space, or 
rather  space-time,  of digital  images  is  not  “analogical  and indexical”  but “processual  and 
combinatorial,”371 sucking us into the middle of processes that “do not occur  in  space but 
define their own spatial frame.”372 Shaviro thus offers a different understanding of what film 
theorist David Rodowick, together with many others, lamented as the loss of the capacity of 
the image to “communicate duration”373 or to capture the “curious sentiment that things absent 
in time can be present in space.”374 Suggesting that we should approach this change in a more 
“affirmative sense,” he claims that having lost “a certain humanist pathos of lived duration,  in 
return  we  have  gained  the  sheer  profusion  and  density  of  'real-time'  innovation  and 
invention.”375 Extrapolating Deleuze, he thus argues that “[j]ust as the movement-image gave 
369 Hito Steyerl, Too Much World…, p. 18.
370 Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, p. 16.
371 Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, p. 17.
372 Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, p. 16.
373 David Rodowick, The Virtual Life of Film. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2007, p. 163, quoted in: 
Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, p. 87.
374 David Rodowick, The Virtual Life of Film..., p. 63, p. 67, quoted in: Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, 
p. 17.
375 Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, p. 87.
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way to the time-image, so now the time-image gives way to a new sort of audiovisual or 
multimedia image.”376
The  mention  of  the  reticent  “humanism”  of  such  nostalgic  longing  has  to  be 
underlined here, and can perhaps be also linked to Laruelle’s idea about philosophers being 
afraid  of  the  dark  –  because  the  sticky  matter  of  digital  images  contains  something 
machinically alien to us, which we can’t comprehend but which circulates through our very 
bodies nevertheless. But as Shaviro points out and as it is nowadays widely affirmed, the 
“analogical  world”377 is  not  coming  back  and  instead  of  mourning  the  “existential  and 
aesthetic loss”378 and turning into the blind streets of rejection, we must try to “to understand 
the political implications of the situation” and “explore the new possibilities that it offers.”379 
Contemporary digital images (whether in art video or a Hollywood blockbuster) are 
thus radically different from traditional cinema, as they cease to be about “duration of bodies 
and images”  but  become performatively  productive  “articulation[s]  and composition[s]  of 
forces,”380 which are often not indexically connected to a former physical space and time but 
are no less part of the world, reshaping everything in “real time.”381 As Mark asks in the 
aforementioned scene by the lake: “I don't know... How are we measuring time, first of all?,” 
Trecartin replies: “They don't measure it... Occupy it,” we thus cannot shed off the feeling of 
dissolving into one big swirl of digitally infused mix of perceptions and impressions where 
former stabilized categories of space or linearity don’t make no sense anymore. Because if 
Shaviro  observes  that  the  digital  image  “generates  its  own  space,  in  the  course  of  its 
modulations,”382 we might  add that  in contemporary fluid ontology, this  space necessarily 
pours out into all “other” spaces. By consequence, “our” own lived space also becomes “a 
sphere of liquidity, of looming rainstorms and unstable climates, [a] realm of complexity gone 
haywire, spinning strange feedback loops,”383 growing, as Steyerl adds, into a dark mutable 
“fog  which  may  at  any  second  transform  both  into  an  immersive  art  installation  and  a 
demonstration doused in cutting-edge tear gas.”384
376 Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, p. 87.
377 David Rodowick, The Virtual Life of Film..., p. 174, quoted in: Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, p. 
112.
378 Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, p. 113.
379 Ibid.
380 Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, p. 17.
381 Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, p. 16.
382 Ibid.
383 Hito Steyerl, Too Much World…, pp. 17–18.
384 Hito Steyerl, Too Much World…, p. 18.
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Steyerl  also directly talks about the so-called death of cinema, claiming that it  has 
“exploded into the world to become partly real” and underlining that to be able to act upon 
anything, we first and foremost have to acknowledge this explosion (as well as its effects on 
“reality”). But the fact that cinema “probably didn’t make it through” has to be understood in 
already  outlined  terms  by which  whatever  was/is  happening now should  not  be  taken  as 
“post” or simply “after.” Echoing Steven Shaviro’s depiction of post-cinematic qualities, we 
could thus say that cinema hasn’t exactly died but turned into a ghostly liquid figure passing 
sneakily through the screens. Works of Ryan Trecartin and Lizzie Fitch, Hito Steyerl and 
others yet to be mentioned can be seen as open points of confluence trying to embody or enter 
how  cinema  has  mutated  into  these  other  image-forms,  intensively  active  while  being 
inseparably  tied  to  both  organic  and  inorganic  particles.  Because  if  cinematic  images 
evaporated  from  the  analogue  projection  screen,  it  was  only  to  start  condensing  and 
precipitating on other surfaces that perhaps don’t cast shadow when we touch them, but which 
haven’t  lost any significance in terms of how they influence our perception and thinking. 
Moreover, we could say that after its “death,” the foggy ghost of cinema is now in some sense 
perhaps  more  alive  than  ever  before,  as  it  has  invaded  all  spaces  of  communication  and 
thought in the 21st century. It is thus not a question of asking whether a Tik Tok video can be 
considered  a  direct  descendant  of  cinema  or  not  and why (which  would  definitely  bring 
numerous oppositional and highly unimportant arguments), but of simply acknowledging that 
moving images are filling not only screens but also the spaces between them to an extent 
which cannot be ignored or simply nostalgically refused – “night vision” is upon us whether 
we decide to switch to the dark mode or not.
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3.2.2. Night Vision: Seeing (in) the Invisible World
“It's just lighting design, so hard to get it right sometimes.”
– Mark Trade (2016)
“Rough pixels hide in the cracks of old standards of resolution. They throw off the cloak of 
representation." 
– How Not to be Seen. A Fucking Didactic Educational .MOV File (2013)
The above expressed liquidity of the digital is in a sense approached very literally in the work 
of British artist Joey Holder, who often combines mythology and network culture with motifs 
of oceanic depths.  Using material  objects  as well  as 3D sculpting,  she creates  immersive 
environments consisting of physical objects, digital prints as well as moving image works, in 
which strange fictional beings deriving from sea creatures or insect (parts) merge with layers 
of  symbols  and  signs.  Having  at  one  time  been  a  diving  instructor,  Holder  remained 
fascinated  by  the  unknowability  of  those  impassable  oceanic  depths.  She  often  models 
mutating fictional agents inhabiting them (and here we can recall Vermeulen’s idea of the 
performative “imagining” of the invisible performed by the snorkeler), while at the same time 
sometimes collaborating with scientists on research in such fields like computational biology, 
speculating on the reciprocal relation between the digital and the biological. Her installation 
Ophiux (2016), for example, revolves around a speculative pharmaceutical company of the 
same name, and includes a video consisting of many layers of underwater footage and science 
imaging technologies and models (figure 5), to show how in genetic sequencing process, the 
biological  tissue  becomes  data,  allowing  for  living  entities  to  be  synthetically  fictioned 
through digital programming. In most of her projects, oceanic liquidity is treated as sort of a 
dense, scary, futuristic clay, as she keeps shifting shapes, mixing layers and letting them grow 
into  yet  unnamed  registers  and  categories,  demonstrating  how  nowadays  everything, 
including human bodies is being modeled and digitally processed.
Her recent video project The Abyssal Seeker was installed in a different setting in three 
exhibition spaces distinguished by subtitles corresponding to oceanic zones – one of them,385 
385 The two others being: previous “Demersal Zone” at Seventeen London and following “Pelagic Zone” at 
the British Art Show at Aberdeen Art Gallery.
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the “Benethic Zone,”  was presented also in Centre for Contemporary Art FUTURA in 
Prague. Holder describes the project as  a “journey to a deep sea brine lake, which remains 
undiscovered by science,” explaining that “the film installation depicts the strange creatures 
that live there, which are able to shape-shift, metamorphosize and swap genetic material.”386 
This mutability – or what the curator of the Prague exhibition Boris Ondreička calls: “the 
data-genesis of mineral-vegetable-animal-machine complexity“387– is crucial for us, as it 
is expressive of both the ungraspable changeability of (subject) matter and of the radically 
transmorphing tendency (and potential) of digital technologies and images themselves. Holder 
further refers to the project as speaking of the “remote,” “unexplored” existing at the “limit of 
human knowledge,” and directly connects this unknowability with the human inability to keep 
up with  computation,  suggesting  we perhaps  need to  “become ‘less  human’  to  confound 
datafication.”388 
But there seem to be a yet different form of invisibility at play within the realm of 
digital images – one not clothed in black but perhaps, as suggests Hito Steyerl’s How Not to 
be  Seen:  A  Fucking  Didactic  Educational  .MOV File (2013),  “fitted  with  an  invisibility 
cloak.” The video also deals with the ubiquitous fluidity of digital images but emphasizes the 
apparent translucence we usually ascribe to them (as laid out in the first chapter). The idea of 
inseparability from the digital network is here demonstrated ironically by way of a performed 
“manual,” in which Steyerl herself enacts the “tips” for how to hide from the sight of digital 
technologies (many of whom evoke certain unreality or reference other societal  problems, 
listing for example “being female and over fifty” among “surfing the dark web” or “being a 
wi-fi signal moving through human body”); pointing to the omnipresence of digital recording 
and post-production in our daily life as well as in business, governance, or warfare. 
Created in 2013, the imagery already bears marks of aging in terms of the visuality of 
the 3D graphics and the early meme aesthetics references  (figure 6), ensuring us only how 
fast  the  digital  technologies’  evolution  spin.  But  in  its  understanding  of  inescapable 
materiality of digital mediation, it hasn’t lost any of its relevance.389 The video as such is an 
overlapping combination of diverse images, the most recurrent being an old, marked square of 
386 Vitaly Bezpalov, Natalya Serkova: Joey Holder: ‘I hope that art can continue to question the dominant 
structures’. Tzvetnik. Accessible at WWW: < https://tzvetnik.online/article/joey-holder-i-hope-that-art-can-
continue-to-question-the-dominant-structures> [publication date unknown, accessed 28. 7. 2021].
387 Boris Ondreička, curatorial text to Joey Holder: The Abyssal Seeker, [Benethic Zone], Centre for 
Contemporary Art FUTURA, Prague, 2021.
388 Vitaly Bezpalov, Natalya Serkova: Joey Holder: ‘I hope that art…
389 I have first encountered the video as it popped up in my Facebook feed, not even aware it once could have 
been screened in a gallery. Being accessible online also today, while appropriating the Youtube tutorial “how to” 
format, it is also indirectly referring to the immense stream of moving images on Youtube itself, speaking thus 
about them, through them.
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cracked concrete  situated  somewhere  in  the California  desert  –  a  resolution  target  whose 
pattern has been “decommissioned in 2006 as analogue photography lost its importance” (– a 
cruel and indiscriminate answer to those nostalgically praising its qualities). The central motif 
of  visibility  is  thus  directly  tied with the problem of resolution,  showing how drastically 
technologies as aerial photography progressed with the advent of digital media. 
How Not  to  be  Seen shows  us  the  extreme  scope  and  variability  of  this  endless 
automated image-coverage by stretching literally from an image of the whole planet Earth all 
the way down to a single calibration pixel  (figure 7). Showing us how easily we can now 
visualize the whole planet while at the same time reminding us, that to be invisible today, one 
would need “to become smaller or equal to one pixel;” the video makes clear the at the same 
time micro and macro qualities of technological imaging and reasoning – in the 21st century, 
we are literally “calib[rating] the world as a picture.” In his book  How to See the World, 
visual  theorist  Nicholas  Mirzoeff  nicely  grasps  this  upswing  of  imaging  technologies  by 
explaining the difference between the “Blue Marble,” an analogue photograph of our planet 
taken from the space in 1972, and the more recent 2012 version NASA assembled in post-
production from diverse satellite images, demonstrating by its “tiled rendering [the] standard 
means  of  constructing  digital  imagery.”390 But  as  Mirzoeff  also  notices,  better  resolution 
doesn’t always mean better visibility – “We assemble a world from pieces,  assuming that 
what we see is both coherent and equivalent to reality. Until we discover it is not.”391
 As in resonance with this observation about the often discretely modulated status of 
reality, Steyerl’s video dramatizes all major post-production techniques and tricks at play in 
contemporary world of digital media, demonstrating the elasticity with which the image can 
be  enlarged,  downsized,  multiplied,  or  cut  out,  swiping her  fingers  before  the  camera  to 
demonstrate the easy flow of interaction with images on touch screens, but also to show how 
easily objects and images can disappear or (re)enter the scene, whether they are keyed-out 
shapes of real footage or modeled digitally.  The resulting video thus comprises of camera 
footage,  graphic onscreen text,  3D animations  of both objects,  figures and 3D renders of 
idealized architectural spaces or airport halls  (figure 8), all blending together with graphic 
marks and resolution targets, leaving us with the impression of watching one borderless pixel-
liquid leaking through frames, green screen backgrounds or computer desktops  (figure 9), 
spiraling  out  of  iPhone  displays  (figure  10) into  the  open air  and  dripping  back  on  the 
“material” ground, staining it with irreversible imprints.
390 Nicholas Mirzoeff, How to See the World. London: Pelican Books 2014. pp. 7–8.
391 Nicholas Mirzoeff, How to See the World…, pp. 8–9.
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The video therefore expresses what Shaviro claims about the time-space of digital 
images, freely crossing scales and types of materials, the action unfolding in a space that is 
more of a non-space (as it largely consists of special effects tools which we normally should 
not even be able to see) of radical transformation in which the very border between the “real” 
and the “virtual” space becomes arbitrary. The main theme of the impossibility to withdraw 
from the world of images, is of course first to be understood on the level of actual visibility 
for CCTV cameras, drones, Google Street View cars or simply recording devices of other 
people, pointing to the growing omnipresence of digital mediation. But this wouldn’t be of 
that much significance if such images were simply derivative ones representing something 
more “real” out there in the world. But the world itself became an image. Not because there 
would  simply  be  too  much visualization,  but  exactly  because  images  are  nowadays  both 
frameless,  borderless,  and  materially  effective.  Far  from  any  metaphorical  reading,  the 
question  of  visibility  and  invisibility  is  thus  often  a  matter  of  life  and  death  –  a  cruel 
productive poetics of combat drones seeing without the need for human eyes or decisions 
(which  we  shall  return  to  in  the  next  chapter)  and leaked  images  spreading  through  the 
internet with unstoppable speed.
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3.2.3. Phantoms in the Shadows: The Hidden Lives of Digital Beings
“When he passed there was a flood.”
– Hyperlinks or It Didn’t Happen (2014)
[T]he technical object is never fully known
– Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects
“I'm not magic. Please don't call me uncanny, I'm just a bad copy, made too perfectly, too 
soon...”  When famous American  actor  Philip  Seymour Hoffman died,  he  was just  in  the 
process of finishing the shooting of the first part of Hunger Games: Mockingjay (dir. Francis 
Lawrence,  2014). While pondering how to get the remaining scenes done, the studio was 
considering recreating him digitally. In the end, they decided not to, stating that it would be a 
dishonor to digitally replace the skills of such a brilliant actor,392 but it could have very well 
also been because the attempt was technologically unsuccessful, because of the reactions of 
the fans, or for yet other reasons. Nevertheless, the idea of a failed unused digital twin-avatar, 
being  left  abandoned  on  a  dusty  hard  drive  somewhere  in  the  labyrinth  of  Lionsgate 
Entertainment files, gave birth to the narrator of Belgian-American artist Cécile B. Evans’ 
video Hyperlinks or It didn’t Happen (2014). Opening with a strongly lit high resolution CGI 
head of the famous actor on an indifferently white background transitioning into electric blue 
ocean footage of swimming medusas (figure 11), the film is described by Evans herself as 
being  about  “lives  of  a  group  of  digital  beings,  or  digital  agents,  and  their  search  for 
meaning.”393
In the course of its non-linear structure, jumping from one image to another (the word 
“hyperlinks” in the title is not accidental, but must still be strongly distinguished from the 
purely textual “hypertext” logic and its theorizations, as the video itself attempts to embody 
contemporary internet formed – as we have already described through Hui – also by images 
and  objects),  the  video  thus  follows  not  only  “Phil’s”  struggle  with  the  nature  of  his 
392 Molly Freeman: 'Mockingjay' Director Refused to Use CGI to Recreate Philip Seymour Hoffman. Screen 
Rant. Accessible at WWW: <https://screenrant.com/hunger-games-mockingjay-philip-seymour-hoffman-no-
cgi/> [published 15. 11. 2014, accessed 23. 7. 2021].
393 Louisana Channel, Cécile B. Evans Interview: The Virtual is Real. Accessible at WWW: 
<https://vimeo.com/177369762> [publication date unknown, accessed 13. 5. 2021].
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relationship toward the “real” Philip Seymour Hoffman, but also other digital  personae: a 
spambot Agnes, living in that time on the Serpentine Galleries web page,394 a character of an 
Invisible  woman,  or  a  famous  singing  Japanese  hologram  Hatsune  Miku.395 Hyperlinks 
expresses, albeit from a more human-centered perspective, something very important in terms 
of what we try to claim here, as it ascribes agency to digital objects (understandable by what 
was developed in the previous chapter, 3.1.). The digital characters inhabiting the video are 
presented as complex technical objects; moreover, they embody the heavy materiality of such 
“objectness” exactly by not being reducible to any sum of images presented in the video itself. 
Because  most  of  the  characters  of  the  story  have  “real-life”  context  and  connotations, 
individual histories and more than “real” connections to places, people and happenings in the 
“physical” world (as it is with the footage of the North Korean dancers of whom we are told 
were probably executed for dancing to western song What a Feeling, after the video leaked). 
In this sense, Evans’ claim that “the virtual is real,” expressed in an interview for Louisiana 
channel,396 has a very similar connotation to what we have tried to lay out and what also 
stands as a central motif in numerous videos by Steyerl – digital images are objects (or even 
subjects) with material traction on the physical world and the feelings, deaths and political 
consequences they are connected to are incontestably real. And yet they typically exist in a 
twilight zone of human (in)visibility, exactly and only because they “take shape on a screen or 
hide in the back end of a computer program.”397 
The  video thus  efficiently  points  to  our  ignorance  of  their  agency  by bringing  in 
something we often conceive of as separate or even opposed to technology – feelings. Evans 
seems to be interested in lives of objects in general, as she also lets 3D models of everyday 
tools, such as a comb, a pair of scissors or a screwdriver, wavily dance in her video  How 
Happy a Thing can be (2014) to the sound of a song with emotional lyrics: “I gave you all the 
life I got. I gave you more than I could give.”  Hyperlinks can be seen as having a similar 
tendency to use digital technologies of editing and 3D modeling to speak about often hidden 
and unacknowledged agency of digital objects whose existence nevertheless influences and 
sometimes  even conditions  our own lives.  The video thus  attempts  to  create  a  feeling of 
compassion with its digital protagonists, of whom we are at the same time, unlike in a usual 
animated movie, repeatedly reminded that they are just  a “bad copy,” not having a body, 
394 Agnes, Net Art Anthology. Accessible at WWW: <https://anthology.rhizome.org/agnes> [publication date 
unknown, accessed 16. 4. 2021].
395 See: WWW <https://vocaloid.fandom.com/wiki/Hatsune_Miku> 
396 Louisana Channel, Cécile B. Evans Interview: The Virtual is Real…
397 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 1.
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being on a “hard drive” or a “server.” Their digitality is, interestingly enough, also underlined 
through  a water-connected  imagery,  as  the shot  with  medusas  from the beginning of  the 
video,  together  with  other  underwater  or  water-themed  footage,  keep  re-appearing  when 
hologram girl Miku dances in a wooden room (figure 12) or as we encounter the invisible 
woman on a seashore (figure 13). 
Hyperlinks doesn’t try to explain why we should or should not think of digital beings 
in a certain way. It doesn’t criticize either the internet or us as its users. Instead, it  takes 
existing digital  objects,  it  fabricates  others and weaves their  stories together  in a fictional 
video,  giving  them  feelings  of  sadness,  happiness,  confusion,  or  mourning.  But  such 
emotional anthropomorphizing doesn’t serve to claim they need to have anything like human 
feelings,  but instead to make the spectator  feel some sort of empathy. By showing digital 
objects  as  agents  with  relationships  and emotions,  Evans  thus  makes  it  hard  to  continue 
perceiving them in terms of mere entertainment or utility  to a point from which the very 
distinction between an object  and a subject  also begins to be questioned,  heightening our 
sensitivity toward something we usually don’t view as needing this kind of attention. And as 
Bernard Stiegler says: “To pay attention is to take care.”398
398 Bernard Stiegler: Within the limits of capitalism, economizing means taking care. Ars Industrialis. Accessible 
at WWW: < https://arsindustrialis.org/node/2922> [publication date unknwon.; accessed 5. 7. 2021].
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3.2.4. Merging into a World Made of Images
Invisible people retreat into 3D animations…they reemerge as pixels…
 they merge into a world made of images.
– How Not to be Seen (2013)
When I say people, I mean the things that you have become more recently.
– Centre Jenny (2013)
Hyperlinks are notable for yet another reason – they disentangle the supposedly derivative 
relationship between a physical human person and her/his avatar. The video reverses the logic 
in which we usually speak about avatars, inspecting always how we relate to them, showing 
that Phil fears his own imperfection and lack of qualities in comparison to the actual Philip 
Seymour Hoffman, stating that he has “a certain wounded unfixable longing to be better for 
him” as he expresses an uneasily graspable impression of connection: “I  feel like I know 
him.”  The  destiny  of  a  3D  render  trying  to  connect  to  somebody  beyond  the  grave  is 
entangled also in a supposedly true story about a young man, claiming with shivering voice 
that his girlfriend keeps messaging him on Facebook months after she died in a three-car 
collision. And in yet another hyperlink, we encounter through the (virtual) mouth of Agnes 
the story of a celebrity avatar modeled for an online game, “freaking […] out” after realizing 
the people playing the game don’t want to “hang out with her but  become her.” When Phil 
suggests to ask the actual celebrity to do something, Agnes reminds him, that the celebrity in 
the game is “different” than the “real” celebrity, probably untouched by her fears, using her 
simply to gain money. These struggles can be, with a little imaginative leap, connected to 
Simondon’s  idea  of  technical  objects  “freeing”  themselves  from  their  original  supposed 
meaning, becoming something else, something unplanned that wasn’t “part of the design.”399
Similar exploration of avatars happens in Centre Jenny where, as unclear as the film 
intentionally is about itself, there is a group of seemingly post-human characters, at least as 
far as they keep referring to humans as to some other, previous form of existence. “We’ve 
evolved from animations and these animations actually evolved from humans,” says one of 
many girls  dressed in  peculiar  sweatshirts  in  the style  of  American  sorority  apparel,  and 
looking, like most of the characters in the film, arguably intoxicated with a sort of space-time-
399 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 103.
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warping kind of viral methamphetamine, giving the whole video, together with the costuming 
and rather extreme albeit rough and lo-fi usage of coloring and lights, a yet stronger feeling of 
unfolding on an alien machine-smoked dance floor in the late hours of an all-night-long party. 
Moreover,  most  of  the  female-performed  characters400 are  referred  to  as  “Jenny,” 
giving impression of some identity replication or stages of perfection in the development of a 
software  program,  bringing  itself  closer  to  the  “Centre”  in  an  education  group  actually 
referenced to as a “university.” Burrows and O’Sullivan also bring up Trecartin and Fitch in 
their book on Fictioning, stating that they “are producing avatars which experiment with the 
new temporalities and spatial relations produced by social media communication, advertising 
and transformations of work and leisure time,” being always “fluid and able to adapt to new 
and fast-moving digital cultures.” 401
If we would, perhaps with a slight venture, re-appropriate Hui, we can say that what 
we observe in  these and other  moving images  as well  as in  our mutual  interactions  with 
avatars in general, is a “double movement” of “datafication of persons” and “personification 
of data.” This seems to be a rather extreme claim, but our own identities are increasingly more 
connected with images that co-constitute them – something Steyerl was articulating in many 
of her earlier films, including November (2004), where she traces an image of her close friend 
who died fighting along female Kurdish militia. And this mutual interchangeability between 
physical  and virtual  existence402 is  expressed  also  in  How Not  to  be  Seen,  in  an  almost 
comedically literal image of pixels changing into human bodies  (figure 14), as well as by 
anonymous grey figures from architectural project visualizations filling the real shots of the 
decommissioned analogue resolution target (figure 15). 
400 In Trecartin’s and Fitch’s films, the notion of gender is radically – in Trecartin’s own words „fluid“ – and 
taking it in any way definitely would go directly against their logic.
401 David Burrows, Simon O‘Sullivan, Fictioning…, p. 394.
402 In a yet different way, this mutual relationship is explored also in the work of Czech artist Jakub Choma. In 
his project Gears of Life made for Jindřich Chalupecký Award 2020, he created a huge installation of diverse 
objects from wood and other types of materials, whose meaning first often seemed unclear to the visitor. In a 
video presented on the screen, Choma himself, or what can be seen as his fictionalized alter-ego, walks around 
with a lantern flashlight and metallic paint on the downer part of his face, dragging objects around, laying down, 
shining the light on details and punching holes into the thin artificial walls. It is only by seeing the video of 
character’s movement in space what makes it possible to realize actual handles hidden in the objects and notice 
trajectories and body imprints that led to such constellation. What is created is an uncanny sense of presence of 
the virtual figure in the very physical space of the gallery, allowing us to materialize feelings evoked through 




3.2.5. Entangled Fictions: Stories in Between
Phil: “Oh Agnes, I never said this narrative was linear.”
….
 Agnes: “No problem, everyone loses the plot.”
– Hyperlinks or It Didn’t Happen (2014)
The reappearance of the spam bot Agnes, commissioned originally for Serpentine gallery’s 
web page, in Hyperlinks – one of several intertwined threads stretched across Evans’ work – 
is a nice example of certain interconnectedness present in and allowed through the mutability 
and replicability of digital objects. If you visit Ryan Trecartin’s Vimeo account, you will find 
a series of clips, each followed by a caption “whether line clip” after a dash. Most of them 
show Trecartin dressed as a sort of Amish-looking character of somebody referred to as the 
“Neighbor girl”  (figure 16), multiplied with several similarly looking “cousins” and other 
protagonists, plotting different activities, leading dialogues, and performing various actions 
inside  of  the  house  and  on  adjacent  homestead-reminiscent  properties.  These  clips  are 
connected  to the most recent  video project Whether  Line  (2019),  again put together  with 
Lizzie Fitch, commissioned for Fondazione Prada in Milan. The gallery, where the first output 
of the whole project was presented in the form of a multimedia installation, states that Fitch 
and Trecartin “conceived the framework for a new movie as a haunted map: a location with 
its own will and a constellation of permanent built sets which include a large hobby-barn 
commissary, a lazy river, and a forest watchtower, occupied by a cast of characters who are 
simultaneously agents and subjects of the map.”403 This annotation captures nicely the core of 
the artists duo’s practice, developing narratives and film characters across time and space “to 
explore the notion of borders and boundaries—existential, psychosocial, and physical.”404 As 
the first output of the project was presented in 2019, it has already been in process since late 
2016.405 Working with extensive and mutable film sets which can assume different shapes to 
shift to diverse stages leading to numerous shots used in multiple movies (as they already did 
with a group of videos – Junior War, CENTRE JENNY, Comma Boat and Item Falls all shot 
in 2013 and presented primarily on the 55th Venice Biennale) they decided to push the method 
403 Web of Fondazione Prada, accessible at WWW: < https://www.fondazioneprada.org/project/lizzie-fitch-and-





even further.  Relocating  their  studio into the Ohio countryside,  where they now live and 
work, they began building diverse architectural features and spaces which continually become 
part of something they describe as simultaneously a film set and as an amusement park.
Being asked in an interview for Artnet, whether what they are building becomes part 
of their work, Fitch said: “we’ve been doing a lot more things that are just non-agenda-filled, 
in terms of a product. And even though maybe they’ll eventually be part of whatever this land 
becomes, it’s not like we’re building them for that reason.”406 This answer shows something 
important about the entangled relationship between a continuously developing fiction and its 
presentation in the form of digital moving images (whether showed as a video on the internet 
or a screening or as a part of a mixed media installation), as it doesn’t start and end with the  
shooting or a single release, but is being built, lived in, lived through and partly mediated by 
artists (and some of the actors) themselves,  blurring thus the very boundary between their 
own lives and the fiction(s) they create. The same goes for the complex relationship between, 
for example, the physical Ryan Trecartin, actually living in quite specific and nonstandard 
architecture (figure 17) designed as the home of the Neighbor girl and full of film props.
As much as the off-the-grid setting might look disconnected from the ultra-mediated 
world, the whole project takes shape as an extreme reality(–fiction) show, crossing many lines 
of the usual creative process of a single artwork. The digital image-fictions produced in such a 
way are necessarily entangled not only with actual physical spaces of human life, in which 
sense they can be said to be almost documentary, but as Trecartin and Fitch describe in one 
interview,407 some of the local  people have even naturally  entered the narrative,  reshaped 
many previous ideas and transformed the film(s). This approach to fictioning as a continuous 
knitting together  of stories with other agents and environments is  famously postulated by 
Donna Haraway408 and we could argue that despite the common notions of the diffracting 
effects of digital media, it is exactly their shape-ability that also allows for the creation of a 
way more entangled and fluid network of mutually interacting elements, the understanding of 
which is often enabled by online accessibility and the intense mediation of contemporary art.
Similar  long-term fiction  knitting  can  be  found also  in  the  Club  of  Opportunities 
(2017–ongoing) project by Czech artist Jakub Jansa, whose grand narrative unfolds in the 
course of an as of yet undefined number of exhibitions,  each of which “creates situations 
which hover between reality and fiction, where the narrative is gradually revealed through 
406 Scott Indrisek: ‘It’s Exciting to Be in a Swing State’: Why Artists Ryan Trecartin and Lizzie Fitch Moved to 
Ohio to Build a Rural Amusement Park. Artnet. Accessible at WWW: < https://news.artnet.com/art-world/ryan-
trecartin-lizzie-fitch-ohio-1523341> [published 23. 4. 2019, accessed 12. 5. 2021].
407 Ibid.
408 Donna Haraway, Staying with the trouble…
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video,  various  objects,  and ongoing live  action.”409  While  recycling  some of  the motifs, 
revolving so far predominantly around under-appreciation of celery and attached struggles of 
a  celery-human  hybrid,  each  exhibition  introduces  a  new  character  or  a  new  plot  twist, 
creating thus an intertwined structure of fictions that explores “the anatomy of mythology and 
storytelling”410 itself. 




3.3. Fictioning (with) Machines
[I]t has become clear that images are not objective or subjective rendition of a preexisting condition, 
or merely treacherous appearances. They are rather nodes of energy and matter that migrate across 
different supports, shaping and affecting people, landscapes, politics, and social systems.
– Hito Steyerl, Too Much World: Is the Internet Dead?
3.3.1. Magic Cuts
When  I  walked  out  of  the  cinema  after  seeing  Alita:  Battle  Angel (2019,  dir.  Robert 
Rodriguez), I couldn’t shed off a feeling of unreality. Without the need to get into the details 
of the (in this instance irrelevant) cyberpunk-style plot about a cyborg heroine with memory 
loss trying to uncover her past, the way the main character of Alita balanced on the verge of 
being a completely realistic human being and having uncanny manga-looking eyes made me 
think of the film way more than I probably otherwise would have. Alita is played by a human 
actress, Rosa Salazar, and her body as well as the rest of her face is left almost humanoid –  
but in its center, there is a pair of disturbingly big eyes, just “normal” enough to be somehow 
believable, but too CGI to ever be considered human. 
When thinking about why this resonated so strongly with me, I realized it was because 
it felt like marking a step over certain threshold and entering thereby a visual register in which 
we achieved such level of perfection, but even more importantly, such a “natural” relationship 
to CGI in terms of spectatorship,  that we don’t have to go for either a stylized image of 
admittedly animated movies or attempt at the most seamless realistic trickery in “real” film 
footage – the digital  image became such a mutable mixture  of “reality”  and “fiction,”  of 
shooting and digital modeling, that we can now mold them together as one pixel-clay.
Ryan Trecartin became quite visible in the art-world slightly after the break of the 
century for his work with what we could now perhaps retrospectively call “early Youtube 
video aesthetics.” Videos like A Family finds entertainment (2004) use extensive collages of 
images and text glued together with shrill transitions reminiscent of photo stories in 2000’s 
teenage girls’ magazines or older Power Point star or heart-shaped animations circulating in 
email  chains  before  the  advent  of  social  media.  Already  back  then,  Trecartin  was  using 
visuality closely connected to erstwhile technological development. In many ways, his work 
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remained consistent – but as it evolved along the contemporary digital media sphere, there 
seems to be an observable shift in the way the images communicate. While in the early 2000s 
the  internal  logic  resided  more  in  a  juxtapositional  “hypermediation”411 and  expressive, 
colorful,  and  sharp-edged  clashing  of  heterogenous  images,  in  later  videos,  the  friction 
changed into some kind of a continuous haul: the split screens don’t juxtapose or connect, but 
often show just two (slightly) different camera angles at once (figure 18), two and more shots 
overlap in one thick layered image  (figure 19), the normal hand-held cameras frenetically 
move around, combined with toxic green lighting of the night vision mode, actual green-
screen surfaces are used in the architecture of the set  (figure 20)… All swimming in thick 
layers of bitty chatter, colored by the occasional, repeated, slowed down, stretched sounds of 
a ringtone, while the voices are often autotuned beyond comprehensibility, and the uneasily 
understandable  speech bears  more affective  flows than information… None of  this  heavy 
weight of image and sound manipulation in Trecartin’s and Fitch’s movies is supposed to 
create a conflict, nor a directly legible meaning. And this is true also of many other digital 
moving images in contemporary art. While the intensity and quantity of images has never 
stopped increasing, even extremely heterogenous images, collages and cuts stopped working 
as clashes of meanings or contexts, and have dissolved into a much more interconnected and 
mutable material. 
Also here already discussed  Hyperlinks  or  it  didn’t  happen combines  diverse film 
shots, including classical film footage, with both 2D and 3D animation, often merging more 
types  of  images  (figure  21) into  one  or  layering  them  together,  some  functioning  as  a 
background  or  perhaps  a  desktop  for  others  (figure  22).  But  despite  displaying  multiple 
heterogenous images at once and following the “hyperlink” structure, the aim of the video is 
not to pit the images, objects and narratives against each other – instead, they appear to hold 
together with unexpected unity as they are interwoven with feelings of confusion, sadness and 
compassion, creating links across decades, colors, topics and contexts. 
Similarly, in How Not to be Seen, the green screens and resolution targets don’t serve 
to unmask a hidden reality, as much as to liquify it. As the video progresses, digital and “real” 
figures congregate on the Google Street view of the dessert with the real resolution target 
overlapped with both digital pixels and analogue resolution marks. Moreover, the whole scene 
at a certain moment zooms out to show it is being keyed onto a green screen in a studio, while 
at  the  same time  placing  a  Macbook menu bar  and icons  (among others,  of  a  dark  web 
browser Tor and a torrent client Transmission, used for peer-to-peer downloading) on the sky, 
411 Jay David Bolter, Richard Grusin, Remediation…
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morphing thus together with a computer screen. But this layering doesn’t want us to interpret 
the levels of (hyper)mediation, which it bends and blurs to such an extent that the task of 
interpretation is itself rendered impossible. Instead, it attempts to embody the present reality 
in which, at least in terms of its influence, the (dark) web does wander the “real” landscape no 
less than human bodies and where pixels can be more real than grains of sand, if, as Benjamin 
Bratton notes, “more humans hav[e] access to a cell phone than to toilets.”412
In an article for Flash Art magazine, Jarret Gregory describes the shooting of the four 
Trecartin’s  and Fitch’s movies  featured on the 55th Venice Biennale as follows:  “Filming 
takes place throughout the night; in the spring of 2013 the artists held eighteen shoots from 
approximately  8 pm until  sunrise  with three  to  five  cameras  active  at  a  time,  generating 
hundreds of hours of footage. Everyone on set was in costume […], thus eliminating any 
distinction between on and offstage. Each participant was miked and all of the input was fed 
through a PA system and auto-tuned in real time,  which encouraged experimentation and 
allowed for more extraneous material  to  be usable.”413 This  description  grasps  two major 
aspects of digital images and sounds: omnipresence and radical direct mutability. And these 
qualities, expressed nicely both in the form and the production process of Trecartin’s and 
Fitch’s  films,  can  perhaps  also  help  us  explain  why  digital  images  don’t  seem to  clash 
anymore: They are simply too interwoven, too open, too mergeable. When they meet, they 
don’t strike – they morph into each other (figure 23).
Contemporary post-production technologies of audio and video special effects, unified 
by digital code, thus seem to allow for creation of images that are increasingly more elastic 
and flowing – as they overlap, the sharp edges of clashing images melt together and gain 
voluminosity.  But  as  was  already  emphasized,  this  fluidity  must  be  understood  without 
reduction to mere seamless flow. As Hui mentions, computational data are a “flux,”414 but 
they also have “granularity,” which allows us to distinguish “a selected reality”  415 based on an 
“order of magnitude”416 we choose to take. Something similar can perhaps be said about the 
contemporary digital moving image, which spins into an ever-faster image-storms, but gives 
the impression of increasing smoothness in surfaces and visuality, submerging us within itself 
with growing ease. Trecartin’s and Fitch’s films are important since they make this paradox 
412 Benjamin Bratton: On Speculative Design. DIS. Accessible at WWW: 
<http://dismagazine.com/discussion/81971/on-speculative-design-benjamin-h-bratton/> [published 10. 2. 2016, 
accessed 6. 7. 2021].
413 Jarret Gregory: Networks of Influence. Flash Art. Accessible at WWW: < 
https://flash---art.com/article/networks-of-influence/> [published 3. 10. 2014, accessed 11. 7. 2021].
414 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 92.
415 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 30.
416 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 29.
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extremely tangible. Combining the “visual composition of reality television with the ubiquity 
of surveillance,” they produce a “surplus of audio and visual data that could be arranged into 
an endless number of narratives,”417 creating sticky coherence and hypnotic centripetality out 
of  multitudinous  diffracting  material.  This  is  only  enhanced  by  the  aforementioned 
interconnectedness of certain repeating motifs, costumes, phrases, and actors, which, as most 
of the videos are made accessible online, allows us to knit some of these links together and 
watch them grow into a vast many-directional fictional universe. 
When  trying  to  articulate  the  hyperstitional,  non-linear  qualities  of  computational 
technologies, Ccru consistently turned to the works of William S. Burroughs, whom we have 
mentioned earlier on. O’Sullivan and Burrows in their book on fictioning also refer to his 
“cut-up  technique,”418 which  was  intended  to  disrupt  the  dominant  (time)  order  by  the 
“cutting, folding and splicing of text,” not in order to create juxtapositions of the words, but to 
“fiction other realities from existing one.”419 As Burroughs himself is quoted by Ccru: “Cut 
the Word Lines with scissors or switchblades as preferred … The Word Lines keep you in 
time….”420 For this approach, he is often mentioned in conjunction with hypertext, but what is 
of more interest here is the productive make-believe logic which Ccru underlines, stating that 
“every act of writing is [possibly] a sorcerous operation,”421 as well as their appeal to treat 
even something supposedly so symbolic as written language as “its own kind of material to be 
manipulated”422 (which  has  a  particular  resonance  also  with  some  of  the  notions  about 
materiality  outlined  in  the  second chapter  of  this  thesis).  It  seems  that  similar  logic  can 
perhaps be applied to the usage of cut in the work of Trecartin and Fitch, as well as in other 
contemporary moving images – it doesn’t merely juxtapose two or even multiple elements, 
but, as Burrows and O’Sullivan observe, it functions as certain kind of “magical technology 
[…] transforming a given reality.”423 This  seems to be echoed also by Trecartin  himself, 
defining his approach as “spell-casting” or even a “kind of magic” – “an invention that than 
creates  reality.”424 As one of the characters  from  Whether  Line has it:  “I’ll  see it  when I 
believe it.”
417 Jarret Gregory: Networks of Influence…
418 Developed by Burroughs at the end of the 1950s and in early 1960s.
419 David Burrows, Simon O‘Sullivan, Fictioning…, p.
420 Ccru, Lemurian Time War…, p. 43.
421 Ccru, Lemurian Time War…, p. 36.
422 David Burrows, Simon O‘Sullivan, Fictioning…, p. 36
423 Ibid
424 Louisiana Channel, Ryan Trecartin Interview: Gender is Fluid. Video accessible at WWW: 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s_j1lpPFmIc&ab_channel=LouisianaChannel> [uploaded 5. 6. 2018, 
accessed 9. 3. 2021].
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3.3.2. Rendering Fictions 
Render: To cause to be or become, make.
 The process of making an image from a 2D or 3D model.
– Useful Terms for Hyperlinks425
 Animation is part of our evolutionary arc as a species; it’s still primitive – the seeds of a complicated 
relationship that we’re going to have with artificial intelligence.
– Ryan Trecartin
I’ve always confused the physical with the immaterial, at either one’s limit, I think.
– Ed Atkins
British artist Ed Atkins is widely known for his hyperrealistic CGI videos questioning the 
relationship  between bodies  and technology.  They usually  feature  a  white  male  character 
developed across  different  works  in  past  years,  sometimes  strangely changed in  terms of 
structure or size or disturbingly mutilated  (figure 24). In one interview, Atkins seems to be 
echoing our observations about both meaningfulness and feeling: “At a certain point I became 
less and less interested in producing meaning—but instead a kind of uncertainty. I was always 
more interested in how something feels, rather than what it means.”426 But the mutability and 
affective charge within his videos seem to be about yet something more. Earlier in the same 
interview, he claims he wants to make work of which he “does not necessarily know what it 
is.” This might first sound contradictory to producing something so technical and artificially 
“made” – unlike Trecartin’s videos,  a full  CGI doesn’t  seem to offer much space for the 
entering of chance or unexpected agency.427 But on the other hand, it connects quite well with 
the way we have spoken about digital objects so far.
425 The whole sheet accessible at WWW: <http://dismagazine.com/dystopia/74959/hyperlinks-or-it-didnt-
happen-cecile-b-evans/> [publication date unknown, accessed 10. 8. 2021].
426 Timo Feldhaus: Ed Atkins: “I Am Not an Authority on Who I Am.” SSENSE. Accessible at WWW: 
<https://www.ssense.com/ko-kr/editorial/art/i-am-not-an-authority-on-who-i-am> [publication date unknown, 
accessed 12. 8. 2021].
427 But we must mention that Trecartin in fact usually writes a very complex script and some of the scenes are 
obeying a well thought through structure.
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Yuk  Hui,  following  Simondon,  criticizes  the  classical  philosophical  concept  of 
hylomorphism, stating that the “separation of form and matter,”428 presupposes “an already 
individuated form that gives matter its essence,” 429 breaking thus apart at the same time also 
“theoria  from  praxis  and  poiesis.”430 But as  we have seen,  there is  no stable  given form 
shaping the matter of digital objects. Instead, any form seems to be actively producing always 
“something other than its intended effects in material terms.”431 This is commented on also by 
Jussi Parikka, who, following Deleuze and Guattari, suggests that hylomorphistic dualism is 
“haunting the linguistically modeled idea of meaning” while materiality necessarily includes 
also “asignifying elements.”432 This  problem becomes weirdly literal  when questioned not 
only concerning the broader category of digital objects in Hui’s understanding, but of actual 
3D digital objects/images.  Because as Hui further explains, digital objects often forcefully 
detach  themselves  from the  supposedly  original  thought  that  conceived  them and  “don’t 
exclusively follow the paths they were supposed to.”433 Moreover, they seem to be undergoing 
even more changes as they “reach the hands of their users,”434 producing “new images and 
aesthetics, which reenter the cycle of images.”435 As Steyerl also underlines: contemporary 
digital ontology is a “condition partly created by humans but also only partly controlled by 
them, indifferent to anything but movement, energy, rhythm and complication.“436 It simply 
seems that digital objects are less and less in “our” hands. 
In  Atkins’  two-channel  video  installation  Refuse.exe (2019),  we  see  a  group  of 
different  objects  consecutively  falling  –  bricks,  chains,  feathers,  tires,  an  anchor,  a  cat, 
mirrors, a piano, fish… They pass through the first screen and continue to fall down, entering 
the second screen in another room, until they crash, hitting the floor, adding up to a growing 
pile of junk. But if we watch long enough, we notice that the initially simple looking video is 
never really the same. It is created with a real-time 3D simulator Unreal Engine, used for 
high-end development  of video games.  If  we repeatedly  explained why digital  images  of 
contemporary moving image art are usually ungraspable through representational manners, in 
this case we have moved onto a level where such a statement becomes redundant to argue for.
428 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 59. 
429 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 13.
430 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 100. Emphasis in the original.
431 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 13.
432 Jussi Parikka, A Geology of Media…, p. 165.
433 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 103.
434 Ibid.
435 Ibid.
436 Hito Steyerl, Too Much World…, p. 18.
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Writer  and  game  designer  Gareth  Damian  Martin  observes  that  Refuse.exe has  a 
specific digital “materiality” to itself. In this context, he quotes an email conversation with 
Atkins who divulged that there is “somewhere,” out of the shot, still a fish “rotating in mid-
air,” explaining that whenever they tried to take it away, “the whole thing would crash”437 – 
the  seamless  virtuality  falling  apart.  This  “behind  the-virtual-curtain”  story  points  to  the 
complexity of a 3D modeled world, of which the 2D video we see on the screen is just a 
possible and directly changeable variation of “artificial” camera angles set in the software. 
But  the  inextricable  fish  holding  everything  together,  as  Martin  further  notes,  is  also 
expressing something about the “strange materiality” of digital objects appearing in the video, 
as they make slightly unrealistic movements or show deviations from physical laws of gravity 
– something usually understood as errors in “serious” game design. The almost “realness,” 
supported by real-time corresponding sounds of objects hitting the floor, is thus disrupted by 
objects’  behavior,  deliberately  set  a  little  “wrong.”  This  wrongness  was  a  direct  artistic 
intention (as Atkins acknowledges),438 until there was a pixel-fish disrupting the process – an 
error  even he  was not  counting  on.  The complexity  of  digital  objects’  existence  and the 
fragility of power we have over them could thus perhaps be nicely grasped in the words of 
one of the characters in Trecartin’s Comma Boat: “We are really walking a fine line – in fact, 
our line might be so fine that we might be seen as failing.” 
Digital  images  are  nowadays produced in  the increasingly  overlapping margins  of 
what we dare to consider real, fictional, believable or possible, making us question the status 
of reality and the behaviors of objects we interact with. With BCAAsystem, a collective I am a 
member  of,  we  had  an  interesting  experience  of  this  while  presenting  our  fictional 
documentary  Azero (2019). The video (installation) was made as a part of a larger project 
revolving around the former mining town of Veľký Krtíš in Southern Slovakia, and largely 
consisted of real “documentary,” pan shots of the actual abandoned coal mine, but smuggled 
realistic 3D models of remnants of an unspecified corporate complex into the landscape. The 
opening at local gallery was visited by many locals, some of whom were stunned, whispering 
confusedly, whether it actually “is there,” claiming they should soon go check how it looks.
In  one  interview,  Cécile  B.  Evans  talks  about  a  similar  (un)reality-(un)certainty 
connected to the installation of her video What the Heart Wants (2016), displayed at the 9th 
Berlin Biennale in a room flooded with approximately 35 centimeters of water resting on the 
surface of the floor, with the exception of a T-shaped pier in the middle. The artist describes 
437 Gareth Damian Martin: Ed Atkins. Refuse.exe. Cura,36, SS 2021. Accessible at WWW: 
<https://curamagazine.com/digital/ed-atkins-refuse-exe/> [publication date unknown, accessed 17. 7. 2021]
438 Gareth Damian Martin: Ed Atkins. Refuse.exe
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that because a surprising number of people stepped into the water, she couldn’t help herself 
but ask them. As she is quoted in  The Guardian:  “I looked for people who were wet up to 
their knees and I’d be like, ‘I’m so sorry to bother you but what can we do? Why did you do 
it?’ And most of them said, ‘Oh, I just didn’t think it was real’.”439 
This  example  nicely  shows  how  increasingly  permeable and  questionable  the 
separation  between the  real  and the fictional  becomes  for  the  viewers,  but  also how this 
arbitrariness is often echoed in the way artists think of digital images themselves in terms of 
the space “outside” of the video. Because, as we have repeatedly shown, the image is material 
and leaks out of any stable frame, (as if) understanding this, even works based primarily on 
digital moving images, when exhibited in physical galleries, often significantly shape also the 
surrounding space, strengthening the physical and sensual content of the video or expanding it 
with adjacent objects, sculptures, or other features. This is true of the works of Evans and 
very importantly of Steyerl, who often sculpts the space of her installations to enlarge the 
sensual world of the video. For Liquidity Inc. (2014), dealing with speculative finance through 
water imaginary, she created a literal wave from which the visitors watched the video (figure 
25). Additionally, she expanded the computer grid typical in 3D modeling softwares into a 
black space cut with glowing blue lines swallowing the viewer into the game-like world on 
the projection screen in  Factory of the Sun (2015) (figure 26). And Trecartin and Fitch put 
such emphasis on the installation (as much as their videos usually also get a one-channel cut 
viewable online) they call them “sculptural theatres.” Such tendencies cannot be read simply 
as an attempt to create more immersive experience in terms of a separate fictional world but 
point exactly to the extreme complexity of material existence of digital media per se, as they 
literally enter our bodies through various types of invisible and yet very real signal waves.
This mutual co-morphing of the digital and the physical can be similarly found in the 
work  of  already  mentioned  Joey  Holder,  who  creates  complex  installation  environments 
exactly  through  the  combination  of  3D-modeled  objects  and  physical  materials,  making 
spaces of grids and symbols which we usually consider flat and immaterial, and molding and 
bending the 3D matter as well as physical fake rocks (figure 27) or metal poles. Moreover, 
her recent project  Semelparous (2020), revolving around eels,  was literally  installed in an 
abandoned SPA (figure 28). The disappearing border between actual sculpting and digital 
sculpting  is  made  even  more  obvious  by  relatively  recent  advancements  in  3D  and  4D 
printing,  technologies  that  literally  bring into the world of  physical  matter  even formerly 
439 Phil Daoust: Severed ears and tear-drinking butterflies: enter the strange world of Cécile B Evans. The 
Guardian. Accessible at WWW: <https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2016/oct/20/cecile-b-evans-
sprung-a-leak-interview-tate-liverpool> [published 20. 10. 2016, accessed 18.6. 2021].
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digital objects originating in 3D modeling software programs – the objects now seem to be 
able to “free” themselves even across the physical-virtual border. The question is what they 
will mutate into.
Benjamin Bratton writes in his text  On Speculative Design, that modern design was 
concurrent with the emergence of new materials, processes and technologies – “new matter 
provided  for  a  new materialism.”440 As  he  further  explains,  today  we  confront  materials 
“potentially just as transformative. From biotechnology to the internet of things to artificial 
intelligence and robotics to networked additive manufacturing and replication,” suggesting 
that “this material palette provides for the recomposition of the world at scales previously 
unthinkable, turning living tissue into a plastic medium and imbuing inorganic machines and 
landscapes with new sorts of practical intelligence.”441 Connecting this approach to what was 
outlined  here  about  the  materiality  of  the  digital,  we  can  perhaps  say  that  designing  as 
speculative productive molding of matter, whether happening on screen or offscreen, operates 
within the same transmorphing fluidity, if not even, with a bit of hyperbole, within the very 
same matter. The idea of speculative design as performatively bringing forth something that is 
not (yet) possible in the “real” world,442 as well as doing so in a process happening between 
and with the mutual  contribution  of  not  only human but also technical  agents,  has grave 
consequences also for the specific importance of CGI fiction, giving it strange tangibility and 
real-world-shaping potential. As we have already argued more theoretically, the process of 
producing a digital 3D model does place something in the world – it exists for its viewers 
online, in a gallery, or in a game. But a 3D model is potent in yet another, way more literal  
way: it can actually be 3D-printed. And inversely – Czech artist and a friend of mine, Matyáš 
Maláč, recently showed at his solo exhibition, together with his paintings, a wooden piece 
hung on the wall, with a small outgrowing 3D-printed object of various shapes and colors, 
sticking out into the space on awry enlaced wires.  When I asked him about the process, he 
explained that the print, including the colors, was made out of a 3D scan of an actual mixture 
of banana and tomatoes that had been drying out for three weeks  (figure 29). The line we 
walk is very fine indeed. 
440 Benjamin Bratton: On Speculative Design…
441 Benjamin Bratton: On Speculative Design…
442 And in this sense, we mean not only Bratton’s perspective but partly also the one as famously expressed in  
Speculative Everything Speculative Everything: Design, Fiction, and Social Dreaming or the ideas of Bruce 
Sterling’s “design fiction.” Anthony Dunne, Fiona Raby. Speculative Everything: Design, Fiction, and Social 
Dreaming. Cambridge: MIT Press 2013.
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3.3.3. Mythotechnesis: Operational Images and Generative Machine Fictioning
Sometimes you build a kite and it evolves into 4Chan.443
 – Benjamin Bratton, On Speculative Design
“Remember your dreams before they remember you.”
 – Mark Trade (2016)
“Something new was happening in the world of images, something that the theoretical tools 
of visual studies and art history couldn’t account for: the machines were starting to see for 
themselves,” writes Trevor Paglen, noting that filmmaker and media artist Harun Farocki was 
among  the  first  to  notice  that  “image-making  machines  and  algorithms  were  poised  to 
inaugurate a new visual regime.”444 A regime in which images are not  “simply representing” 
anything,  but  actually  “’do’  things  in  the  world”  –  causing  human  eyes  to  become 
“anachronistic” in wide variety of fields, “from marketing to warfare.” Farocki himself coined 
the term “operational images” to describe such “machine fictioning,”445 in which images are 
produced by machines for other machines – something irreducible to any former category of 
imaging.
But Paglen importantly points out that since the early 2000s, images have become 
“more powerful, and the means through which they’re produced have become ever darker.”446 
Naming  for  example  quality  control  systems  in  manufacturing,  Automated  License  Plate 
Readers  (ALPR),  retail  motion  tracking  systems  in  supermarkets  and malls  or  automated 
pattern-recognition systems in military drones, he notes that “images are operating upon the 
world”447 way  beyond  the  level  captured  by  Farocki’s  Eye/Machine project  (2001-2003). 
Moreover, as he further shows, Farocki’s machinic vision as presented in the videos is not 
actually  composed  of  operational  images.  Instead,  it  consists  of  images  that  have  been 
443 Quoting this without full explanation given by Bratton would be too deliberate, hence here is his footnote 
explanation: “Alexander Graham Bell’s space frame kite becomes Buckminster Fuller’s geodesic dome becomes 
Archizoom's No-Stop City becomes Global Crossing's trans-Atlantic cabling becomes scatological, populist 
social media.” Benjamin Bratton: On Speculative Design… 
444 Trevor Paglen: Operational Images. E-flux Journal 59, 2014. Accessible at WWW: 
<https://www.e-flux.com/journal/59/61130/operational-images/> [publication date unknown, accessed 25. 7. 
2021].
445 David Burrows, Simon O‘Sullivan, Fictioning…, p. 7.




“configured by machines to be interpretable by humans,”448 as machines in fact don’t need 
“funny  animated  yellow  arrows  and  green  boxes  in  grainy  video  footage  to  calculate 
trajectories or recognize moving bodies and objects.”449 Such graphic marks are there only to 
“show  humans  how  a  machine  is  seeing.”450 As  Yuk  Hui  describes  in  detail  in  On the 
Existence  of  Digital  Objects,  websites  and  softwares  truly  became  more  “intelligent,” 
understanding not only the text but very importantly, also images we upload. But that does 
not at all mean that we understand theirs. This leads Paglen to an unsettling conclusion, that  
machinic images are not only illegible to us, but “overwhelmingly invisible, even as they’re 
ubiquitous  and  sculpting  physical  reality  in  ever  more  dramatic  ways.”451 As  he  writes: 
“We’ve  long known that  images  can  kill.  What’s  new is  that  nowadays,  they  have  their 
fingers on the trigger.” And as we already mentioned, this is not true only about warfare, but 
about  almost  every  aspect  of  contemporary  human  life,  as  well  as  its  concurrent  high 
frequency trading-based economic system. 
We  could  thus  rephrase  Spinoza’s  famed  aforementioned  claim  about  the  yet 
undiscovered  potentialities  of  human body and  conclude  that  we don’t  know yet  what  a 
(digital)  image  can  do.  Paglen’s  concern  therefore  is  that  artists  should,  despite  being 
uncertain about how, urgently attempt to “plunge even further into the darkness of a world 
whose  images  remain  invisible,  yet  control  us  in  ever-more  profound  ways.”452 Steyerl 
expresses a similar belief in an interview for Rhizome,453 stating that next time she will “see 
another 16mm film projector rattling away in a gallery,” she will “personally kidnap it and 
take the poor thing to a pensioners home,” adding that “today people use cellphones, Kinnect 
sensors and After Effects to deal with the present and shape it. And if artists do not expose 
themselves  to  the  workflow  and  economies  that  come  with  contemporary  means  of 
production, they become souvenir peddlers.”454
In her show Power Plants (2019) in Serpentine Galleries, she took herself up on her 
own  word.  The  exhibition  presented  videos  of  blooming  flowers  generated  by  neural 
networks to create machine-predicted plants – AI generated flowers fast-forwarded just 0,04 
seconds into the future (figure 30). Such speculative pre-blossoming elegantly embodies the 




452 Trevor Paglen: Operational Images…
453 Daniel Rourke: Artifacts: A Conversation Between hito Steyerl and Daniel Rourke. Rhizome. Accessible at 




whole logic of speculative financial  instruments, as explained in the first part of this text, 
exploring thereby the temporality, possibilities and mechanisms of contemporary productive 
machine  poetics,  or  what  we  could  perhaps  call,  following  Burrows  and  O’Sullivan,  a 
“mythotechnesis” – a fictioning in which “technology enters into discourse and life, through 
projections of the existing and future influence of machines.”455
But such machinic poetics of neural networks and machine learning is already largely 
co-shaping  our  dominant  visual  reality.  If  we  don’t  want  to  count  the  AI-generated 
“paintings”  sold  in  past  years  at  the  auctions  at  Christies’s,456 or  completely  convincing 
deepfake  photographs  of  non-existent,  machine-fictioned  humans  (figure  31),  animals, 
objects or environments,457 the so called “generative adversarial networks” (GAN),458 are used 
even for improving image compression, as in “up-scaling” of low-resolution 2-D textures in 
older video games. These processes of generative machine-imagi(ni)ng can be considered a 
radical example of “mythotechnesis,” as they create visual registers alien to human eyes (and 
we can recall the discussions about the disturbing qualities of Google Deep Dream images 
revealing  the presets  of  machinic  vision –  figure 32)  and eluding our  understanding,  but 
practically  reshaping  our  visual  experience  and  “culture,”  influencing  everyday  human 
cognition and perception.
But AI can generate not only images,  movements (as we have seen already in Ad 
Atkins’Refuse.exe), but also whole narratives as those set up (as the classical art-related term 
“created” becomes complicated in this case) by Ian Cheng. In projects such as his Emissaries 
(2015–2017),459 he  uses  a  video  game  motor  to  generate  a  landscape  filled  with  diverse 
features, but doesn’t limit them to a simple task of falling and lets them evolve infinitely with 
455 David Burrows, Simon O‘Sullivan, Fictioning…, p. 1.
456 Eileen Kinsella: The First AI-Generated Portrait Ever Sold at Auction Shatters Expectations, Fetching 
$432,500—43 Times Its Estimate. Artnet news. Accessible at WWW: < https://news.artnet.com/market/first-
ever-artificial-intelligence-portrait-painting-sells-at-christies-1379902> [published 25. 10. 2018, accessed 28. 7. 
2021].
457 There are of course logical concerns about the misuse of GAN-based synthesis, as it allows to create very 
realistic images of either in fact non-existent people or fake actual people’s appearance in diverse audiovisual 
materials. This lead for example California to pass the AB-602 bill banning the use of human image synthesis 
technologies to make fake pornography (Accessible at WWW: 
<https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB602>) or AB-730, which 
deals with the problem in context of political campaigns.
458 “Generative modeling involves using a model to generate new examples that plausibly come from an existing 
distribution of samples, such as generating new photographs that are similar but specifically different from a 
dataset of existing photographs.”Jason Brownlee, 18 Impressive Applications of Generative Adversarial 
Networks (GANs). Machine Learning Mastery. Accessible at WWW: 
https://machinelearningmastery.com/impressive-applications-of-generative-adversarial-networks/ [published 14. 
1. 2019, accessed 13. 8. 2021].
459 Emissary in the Squat of Gods, Emissary Forks At Perfection, Emissary Sunsets The Self.
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no human interaction, unleashing thereby a simulated world with a potentially never-ending 
narrative.
Moreover, AI seems to be effective also in fictioning structures speculating on the 
edge of the natural and the technical. Greek artist Marios Stamatis creates prints and video 
works  with  neural  networks,  feeding  the  machine  learning  process  with  images  of  both 
organic and artificial origin. As if fulfilling Hui’s observation that emergence of cybernetics 
caused  increased  questioning  of  “the  border  between  the  natural  and  the  artificial,”460 
Stamatis’s video installation  EXOEXO (2020), brings together plant structures and technical 
particles to let us watch the flow of their mutation through AI (figure 33), fictioning yet-non-
existent structures somewhere between nature and technics – Simondon’s technical objects 
becoming natural in yet another sense. But EXOEXO at the same time importantly extends the 
AI-generated  image-matter  outside  of  the  screen,  letting  it  grow  into  sculptural  shapes 
crawling around it and touching the morphing images onscreen (figure 34), confirming thus 
and adding thereby another layer to what was previously outlined about the relation between 
digital and physical space in contemporary moving image practice – it is a borderless “neural 
fluidity”461 traversing our between screens, bodies and brains.
As much as  we must  avoid any simple claims  about  AI itself  being  “creative”  in 
human sense (not to even mention the problematic nature of this category in human beings 
themselves) – wanting, for example, to become a singer as in Lawrence Lek’s CGI video 
Geomancer (2017)  –  we  must  understand  that  a significant  part  of  “our”  visual  register 
already is and continues to be increasingly (trans)formed by more-than-human imaging and 
imagining. And this imaging is not simple capturing, storing and copying. It is productive 
fictioning operating on scales for us hardly even imaginable. Such might also be the reason 
why so many artists mentioned herein question the very role of “meaning” as a functional 
way of addressing the world of contemporary digital flows – it is too fast and too dark to take 
a picture and put it into a photo album with a permanently fitting caption. 
In many ways, “our” world thus often seems to elude both language-based meaning 
and human(-centered) cognition.  And the (moving) images of contemporary art mentioned 
above  notice  this  –  they  don’t  speak  about contemporary  media  condition,  they  don’t 
dialectically reflect on it or criticize it. Instead, knowing they have already entered it, they 
460 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 54.
461 As is his work described in the exhibition text of a group show Beyond Nostalgia Hijack (2021), Curated by 
Konstantinos Giotis. The exhibition text accessible at WWW: 
<https://www.can-gallery.com/22-current-show/225-beyond-nostalgia-hijack> [publication date unknown, 
accessed 16. 7. 2021]
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chose to step forward and “go with the flow.” Because they are aware they cannot come up 
with any objective image but are tired of hoping there is still a possibility of a sparkle hidden 
in the endless rubbing of surfaces of negation. As one of the protagonists of Centre Jenny 
says: “I no longer look for meaning in things. It's not my responsibility.” What Jenny, as well 
as other digital beings woven into this thesis, seem to be looking for instead, is perhaps best 
understood as a certain “feeling” – an uncertain attempt to somehow get in touch, as Brian 
Massumi writes, with that which “cannot be experienced” and thus “cannot but be felt.”462 




4.  NEW WEAPONS
But if images start pouring across screens and invading subject and object matter, the major and quite 
overlooked consequence is that reality now widely consists of images; or rather, of things, 
constellations, and processes formerly evident as images. 
– Hito Steyerl, Too Much World: Is the Internet Dead?
If everything flows, there must be channels.
– Michel Serres, Birth of Physics
Man no longer needs a universalizing liberation, but a mediation. 
– Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects
“[H]ow can we be sure that what we have registered as existing really does exist?,”463 
asks Yuk Hui in his book on digital objects, bringing thus to our mind a similar query from 
the  end  of  the  very  first  chapter  of  this  thesis.  The  shape  of  this  rather  fundamental 
philosophical question seems to have changed drastically in the contemporary ultra-mediated 
world of digital moving images, which, as Steven Shaviro remarks, can no longer offer us any 
“certificate of presence” able to attest that what “[we] see has indeed [even ever] existed.”464 
And as much as “[e]very fictional narrative produces physical/material effects and affects,”465 
the way in which digital  fiction directly  fills  the “real”  world with images and sounds is 
unprecedented. 
Bernard Stiegler argues that many thinkers, Husserl among them, attempted to keep 
fiction  out  of  reality  by  establishing  “an  absolute  difference  between  perception  and 
imagination,” which would make clear that “what is perceived is in no case imagined.”466 
Perception  of the  “real”  world in  this  view “must  absolutely  not  be contaminated  by the 
persistent  fictions  produced by the imagination,”467 drawing a thick line between “life-as-
463 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 80.
464 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography. New York: Hill and Wang 1981, p. 87, 82, 
quoted in: Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, p. 16.
465 Delphi Carstens, Mer Roberts, Things That Knowledge Cannot Eat…, p. 223.




perception of the living present” and the realm of fiction or fantasy. As he concludes: “for 
Husserl, [life] does not tell us stories.”468
But Stiegler disagrees with such viewpoint and makes an exact opposite movement, 
suggesting that “lived reality is always a construct of the imagination and thus perceived only 
on  condition  of  being  fictional,  irreducibly  haunted  by  phantasms.”469 That  means  that 
perception  and  imagination  are  in  a  “transductive  relationship”470 and  there  can  be  “no 
perception outside imagination, and vice versa.”471 Consequently,  as he claims, life in fact 
does tell stories and is not opposed to fantasy – life “is  always  cinema,” “philosophy”472 or 
fiction. What he further argues is that such “intervention of the imagination at the heart of 
perception, is only made obvious by tertiary retention,”473 claiming that technical sounds and 
images made tangible something about our very consciousness which was always there (as 
Bergson already observed with consciousness itself being cinematic),474 only perhaps more 
hidden. As he strongly emphasizes, before the invention of film (and the same applies to the 
case of the phonograph for auditive memory) “such repetitions were strictly impossible,”475 
underlining thereby that the emergence of tertiary retentions meant crucial change for the very 
processes through which we make sense of the world as well as of human consciousness as 
such. 
But, as we have attempted to demonstrate throughout this thesis, contemporary digital 
media seem to bring a yet stronger conflux of perception and fiction, as digital objects and 
algorithms  started  not  only  to  register  but  to  alter  and  predict  retentions,  shifting  the 
imagination itself “from subject to algorithms and digital objects.”476 They suck our memories 
and recordings into the whirl, shaped by artificial intelligence not just in post-production, but 
often already in the very moment they are being captured,477 and even directly interfere in the 
world and our cognition (as both a mental and a physical process) with the images and sounds 
not tied to any previously existing indexical reality in the first place – the stories life tells us 
are  not  history  novels  but  fairy  tales  and  sci-fi,  piercing  us  with  signals  and  waves  of 
468 Ibid.
469 Ibid.
470 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 3…, p. 95.
471 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 3…, p. 16.
472 Ibid.
473 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 3…, p. 18.
474 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution. New York: The Modern Library 1944. 
475 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 3…, p. 21.
476 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 222.
477 Contemporary smartphone cameras function thanks to AI allowing them to calculate better focus and 
stabilization. Some of the brands even include smoothing filters in default settings – the most “causal” images 
we produce when we take a picture from a family celebration are already manipulated with artificial intelligence.
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machinic fictions operating “as close to the speed of light as possible.”478 It is thus also in this 
very  cognitive  sense  that  we  should  acknowledge  that  humans  “themselves  [have 
increasingly] became technical individuals.”479 So if we have repeatedly spoken about fiction 
having the most material effect possible, it has to be understood not only in relation to the 
physical world or even human social structures, but on the visceral level of changes in the 
very structure of our own cognition and perception.
In this context, Stiegler also interestingly suggests understanding consciousness itself 
as an open “post-production center,”480 directing the flows of retentions while creating what 
he calls “protentional possibilities”481 – anticipations, “including the speculative”482 ones. This 
would make the very processes of human remembering understandable as kind of a “montage, 
a  play  of  special  effects,  of  slowing  down,  accelerating,  etc.”483  Following  this  line  of 
thought, we can see the growing importance of what Hui describes through the concept of 
“tertiary protention,” demonstrating it with a very simple example of a home coffee machine 
offering us a cup upon our arrival before we even ask for it, already presupposing we would 
want it.484 The tricky part is that we actually do. This protentional logic also exactly echoes 
Avanessian’s  and  Malik’s  findings  about  the  changing  flow  of  time  produced  through 
speculative financial instruments and prehensive algorithmic processes described in the first 
chapter of this thesis.  But if tertiary retentions of images and sounds had such influence on 
human  consciousness,  how  does  it  react  to  the  expanding  swell  of  audiovisual  tertiary 
protentions? 
Such a question cannot, by its very nature, have any definitive answer, at least as of 
yet. But it is already clear that this human-machine co-evolution cuts deep enough for it not to 
be answerable on the level of a mere shift in habits. “[T]he understanding of technology is no 
longer a matter of a cultural critique of technology,”485 but of changing our conceptions of 
both  knowledge  and  culture  for  them  to  become  “adequate”  to  more-than-human  flows 
carrying them further.  As McKenzie Wark writes,  “updating” (in her own words) Fredric 
478 Nick Srnicek, Alex Williams, On Cunning Automata: Financial Acceleration at the Limits of the 
Dromological. In: Robin Mackay (ed.), Collapse VIII. Falmouth: Urbanomic 2014, p. 465.
479 Stiegler
480 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 3…, p. 28.
481 Ibid.
482 Ibid.
483 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 3…, p. 27.
484 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 240.
485 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 47.
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Jameson – it is “not the cultural logic of late capitalism but the algorithmic logic of early 
something else.”486
It is in similar sense that Simondon has already spoken of “ontogenesis,” underlining 
thereby that the entangled evolution of technics and humans must be understood procesually, 
in terms of becoming, but also ontologically. As Brian Massumi explains, such approach to 
technics was not much favored still in the 1990s: “[w]hat was considered to come into being 
[with the advent of new technologies] was less things than new social or cultural takes on 
them,”  applying often  “models  derived from linguistics  and rhetoric,”   keeping thus   the 
discussion  solely on the “human plane.”487 He thereby suggests a possible explanation for 
why Simondon’s On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects saw its English translation as 
late as in 2017488 – almost 60 years after it was originally published.
But  it  seems  increasingly  clear,  as  this  thesis  was  also  trying  to  show,  that 
technological changes we experience are not explainable simply through how we decided to 
look  at  the  machines,  nor  even  how  we  use  them  to  look  around.  What  we  must  also 
acknowledge is how machines look (back) at us, and how they look at each other when we 
don’t  watch.  Burrouws  and  O’Sullivan  therefore  also  turn  to  philosopher  N.  Katherine 
Hayles’ Simondon-influenced concept of “technogenesis” to show that “technical objects and 
humans  modify  each  other’s  development”  on  a  fundamental  level.489 This  mutual  co-
evolutionary  process,  as  they add,  involves  also a  “looping of  a  number of  machine  and 
human temporalities,  as  well  as  different  levels  of  embodied  cognition  such as  ‘attentive 
focus, unconscious perceptions and non-conscious cognition’.”490  
Our encounters with ubiquitous anticipatory technologies, producing the time-space of 
tertiary  protentions,  as  well  as  with other  non-representational  performative  fictions,  thus 
perhaps repeatedly fail to be grasped by tools of knowledge, casting us into the dark, because 
they in fact  elude the very time scale  of “conscious registration  and the (relatively  slow) 
process  of  narrative  comprehension  in  humans,”491 especially  compared  to  “the  speed  of 
Central Processing Unit in computers as well as the writing and installation of programmes 
486 McKenzie Wark, Sensoria…, p. 193
487 Arne De Boever, Alex Murray, Jon Roffe, Ashley Woodward (eds.), Gilbert Simondon. Being and 
Technology. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2012, p. 21.
488 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects. Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing 2017. 
At the time of the publication of Gilbert Simondon. Being and Technology (2012), they of course still refer to it 
as being “under way.”





and the compilation and searching of databases.”492 But what Hayles importantly mentions is 
that, on the human side, apart from the temporality of conscious comprehension, there is also 
a “(relatively fast) firing of neurons”493– a pre-conscious physical reaction to technical signals, 
images or sounds. It thus could be that the most vivid interaction, or rather, in Barad’s terms, 
“intra-action,” between humans and technics happens on a level which we are unable to see or 
conceptualize – in an opaque ever-shifting realm we sense but struggle to make sense of. As 
Steyerl has it: “Not seeing anything intelligible is the new normal.”494
So how can we even approach such intelligible intra-action? Steven Shaviro writes in 
Discognition, that “fictions and fabulations, whether articulated by human beings or by other 
entities, are also forms of indirect,  nonphenomenological access to nonconscious forms of 
sentience.”495 It is also in this sense that the “feeling” we kept mentioning along the way, is 
something more than simply a human emotion, however it, for us, always eventually grows 
into  one.  As  Shaviro  explains  elsewhere,  “to  feel  something  is  to  be  affected  by  that 
something.”496  Drawing heavily upon Whitehead’s understanding of “feeling” as a positive 
“prehension” – a relation or contact preceding any rational or cognitive registration – Shaviro 
explains  that  feeling  exists  on  diverse  scales,  “from the  ‘wavelengths  and  vibrations’  of 
subatomic physics to the finest subtleties of human subjective experience,”497 and as he adds, 
“[e]ven mechanistic (and quantum-mechanistic) interactions are feelings.”498As such, feeling 
conditions  any experience,  while  at  the same time happening before and sometimes even 
without us ever being aware of it. Moreover, such pre-cognitive and pre-rational intra-action, 
even on the most physical level, is always already “both ‘an act of perception’ and ‘an act of 
causation’.”499 As  we  have  repeatedly  expressed  in  various  ways  –  it  always  somehow 
changes us whether we choose to acknowledge it or not.
Shaviro  thus  concludes,  that  feeling,  as  ungraspable,  “non-functional  or  even 
dysfunctional”500 as it is, is therefore more a matter of aesthetics than any empirically based 
knowledge. It seems that many digital objects, as well as artists we met along the way, share 
this  belief,  albeit  in a less theoretical  manner,  as they in specific  ways resign the task of 
492 Ibid.
493 Ibid.
494 Hito Steyerl, Duty Free Art, London: Verso 2017, p. 47, quoted in: McKenzie Wark, Sensoria…, p. 50.
495 Steven Shaviro, Discognition. London: Repeater books 2016, p. 16.
496 Steven Shaviro, Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze and Aesthetics. Cambridge/London: MIT 2009, 
p. 58. [Inside quotes come from various places in Whitehead.]
497 Steven Shaviro, Without Criteria…, p. 58.
498 Steven Shaviro, Without Criteria…, p. 62.
499 Ibid.
500 Steven Shaviro, Discognition…, p. 17
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developing understanding and choose to rather address the viewer as well as to deal with 
contemporary digital world predominantly on such affective level. But as Shaviro underlines, 
again  following Whitehead,  the  pre-conscious  pre-individual  affects  are  at  the  same time 
crucial for the formation of the very structure of what we understand as a human subject in 
the first place,  as it actually  “synthesize[s] itself  out of […] feelings.”501 This is thus yet 
another sense in which (digital) fiction has to be understood as productive, as it becomes a 
vehicle  for  actual  transformation,  eluding any stable  framing and flowing freely  between 
agents involved in the digital milieu. But if the “between” is a space of such constant intra-
action, recently being filled with ever increasing flood of signals and images reshaping our 
very subjectivity, we must beware of who fishes in its opaque waters.
Because as Bernard Stiegler  notes,  it  is  exactly  through “mediums of cultural  and 
cognitive technologies” that capitalism “rest[s] upon the control of concepts and affects,”502 
explaining that  in the ultra-mediated world of “algorithmic governmentality,”503 we witness 
“exploitation  of  affects  via  calculability,”504 causing  “disruption”505 in  which  human 
knowledge is “liquidate[d]”506 and automated – something we arrived at repeatedly.  It is thus 
crucial  to  underline  that  no  matter  how  we  have  advocated  for  autonomous  agency  of 
technical beings to be recognized, we cannot forget that despite “freeing themselves” and 
always eluding complete domination, technical objects are at the same time on a fundamental 
level still (mis)used by other human beings to their own ends – they sometimes do whatever 
they  want,  but  their  fictions  can  still  benefit  some  and  hurt  others.  Stiegler  crucially 
emphasizes  that  just  as  technical  objects,  humans  also  individuate  and  nowadays  this 
individuation seems to be under serious threat of being “short-circuited,”507 as the processes of 
human-machine  development  is  now  controlled  by  economic  powers  and  subject  to  the 
constraints  of  “short-term profitability.”508 If,  as  he  explains  elsewhere,  aesthetics,  as  the 
major  realm  of  interaction  in  contemporary  world,  has  itself  become  “a  function  of  the 
machine,”509 it is thus crucial to what end this machine is being designed and what images it is 
taught to register and produce. Because as Stiegler further argues, in his typical double-edged 
501 Steven Shaviro, Without Criteria…, p. 14.
502 Bernard Stiegler, The Re-Enchantment of the World, The Value of Spirit Against Industrial Populism. 
London: Bloomsbury Academic 2014, p. 40. 
503 Bernard Stiegler, The Age of Disruption. Technology and Madness in Computational Capitalism. Cambridge: 
Polity Press 2019, p. 6.
504 Bernard Stiegler, The Age of Disruption…, p. 120.
505 Bernard Stiegler, The Age of Disruption, p. 8.
506 Bernard Stiegler, The Re-Enchantment of the World…, p. 33.
507 Bernard Stiegler, The Re-Enchantment of the World…, p. 41.
508 Bernard Stiegler, The Re-Enchantment of the World…, p. 83.
509 Bernard Stiegler, The Re-Enchantment of the World…, p. 58.
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“pharmacological”510 manner, “the technologies of the cultural and cognitive industries put to 
work in dissociated milieus as technologies of control […] are nevertheless technologies  of 
spirit,” explaining that if “properly socialized, these technologies would not be the causes of 
the  loss  of  individuation,  that  is,  forms  of  knowledge,  but  the  sources  of  new  types  of 
individuation or new forms of knowledge.”511
Despite making clear certain disagreement, especially in understanding of the human 
“spirit,” Bratton references Stiegler’s idea of the necessary creation of long-circuits between 
biological and artificial organs. At the end of his essay on speculative design, he criticizes that 
a  common  approach  to  solving  the  many  contemporary  problems,  whether  technical  or 
climatic, is for its complex imperceptible processes to be “drawn down” to the human scale, 
to become accessible to human “emotional comfort-zones.”512 But as we were also trying to 
show here, it is not a matter of rescaling the technics for the human, but of “developing a 
technological  culture”513 by  changing  the  human  itself  as  well  as  the  traditional 
conceptualizations we have of the “human” as such. Developing a digital culture is therefore 
not a matter of drawing down, but neither simply scaling up – it is a matter of (machine 
co-)fictioning designs and designing fictions exceeding “human phenomenology’s intuitive 
scales  of anatomically-embedded spatial  navigation and the temporalities  of organism life 
span.”514 And as Bratton importantly adds, certain technologies, as “high-resolution scanning 
and sensing,” very practically allow us to “perceive properties of physical matter at a scale 
and  precision  otherwise  inconceivable,”515 forcing  us  thereby  to  reconsider  many 
“metaphysical arguments about objects and ontology.”516
As we have seen, defining something as a digital object, whether within or outside of 
art, is thus not at all simply about it being born through zeros and ones. It is instead a matter  
of digital ontogenesis – of becoming-digital in one part or another, of stepping into a stream 
and being taken by the heavy fluids, changing into something else while yet remaining aware 
of being a drop in the ocean. In this sense it is a slippery path that is being taken by 3D 
models or moving images, as well as by “real” things and bodies, a process of sucking in and 
productively spitting out something very physical – human, natural, floral or machinic. It is 
hopefully  now clear  that  what we mean by digital  images,  objects  or beings goes deeper 
510 Being possibly both a poison and a remedy.
511 Bernard Stiegler, The Re-Enchantment of the World…, p. 38.
512 Benjamin Bratton: On Speculative Design…
513 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 58.
514 Benjamin Bratton: On Speculative Design…




beyond any specific set of digital production tools or one category or an artistic medium. Yet 
the tools themselves remain crucial, in terms of who dares to explore their potential and join 
their  forces. Moving images of contemporary art produced, for example,  with the help of 
high-end  development  software  such  as  Unreal  Engine  or  Unity  are  important  for  this 
struggle, as they perform certain retooling of such software, producing fictions outside of the 
claws of mere profit-oriented ends, while actively exploring and “broadening and deepening,” 
in Simondonian sense, the space of human-machine creative communication laying at its core.
Film theorist David Rodowick answers the title of his book What Philosophy Wants 
from Images:  “to renew itself conceptually through deep engagement with novel forms of 
aesthetic experience.”517 Albeit this thesis does not agree with the places wherein he searches 
for them (most of them being artworks operating strongly within the logic of analogue film – 
a  remediation  or  “archival”  tendency  Hito  Steyerl  criticized  so  indiscriminately),  and 
maintains serious doubts about how deep we can actually engage with anything nowadays, the 
main claim still seems highly agreeable, as such images as those we have encountered here 
truly  fill  perception  with  something  we  often  cannot  conceptualize  but  which  yet  leaves 
physical “aesthetic” bite marks on our neural and cognitive capacities.
So if we live in a world increasingly structured by the logic of the “pre-” while at the 
same time being always “post-”  something,  we perhaps need to  turn to  what  happens in 
“between” – a processual ontogenesis we are already part of, on the most material, physical, 
cognitive  level.  Because  the  protentional  logic  of  algorithms  is  still  being  co-constituted 
between humans and machines, both on the level of invention and advances, and through the 
intra-action with human agents on the user-end. As Armen Avanessian points out: “Even if 
industry continues to be based on conditions of material exploitation, its central operator is 
computation, etymologically a perpetual process of calculating and thinking together (com-
putare).”518 This seems to correspond also to the way media theorist Yves Citton suggests to 
speak not of, so often discussed, attention economy in the contemporary digital world, but 
instead of “attention ecology”519 – a process in which attention is not a question of individual 
agents,  but  of  “attending  together”  which  preconditions  any  individuation.520 As  Wark 
concludes: “[t]he feelings I have of a self are cut from the flow of transindividual affect that 
may be the main thing media are actually for and about.”521 Despite the need to avoid at any 
517 David Norman Rodowick, What Philosophy Wants from Images. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 
2017, p. 6.
518 Armen Avanessian, Miamification. Berlin: Sternberg Press 2017, p. 27.
519 Yves Citton, The Ecology of Attention. Cambridge: Polity Press 2017.




cost what Donna Haraway calls “a comic faith in technofixes,”522 there thus seems to be at 
least some area where we can perhaps, as Deleuze has it, “look for new weapons.”523 
If  we  return  to  the  opening  argument  of  this  chapter,  Stiegler  writes  that  media 
networks  and  the  programming  industries  “exploit”  the  above-described  inherent 
“fictionalizing tendency” of human consciousness “by systematizing the specific resources of 
audiovisual technics.”524 Today, most fictions are intra-actions between human and technics. 
But it matters more how they are produced and how actively we enter this mutual process. 
What we thus perhaps need is a digital fiction escaping such systematization; just as Deleuze 
asserted that (for a body) “the way to escape judgment is to make yourself a body without  
organs… to define the body in its becoming, in its intensity, as the power to affect or to be 
affected,”525 we  must  in  turn  also  find  the  digital  in  its  becomings.  The  moving  images 
mentioned  in  this  thesis  rarely  help  us  understand,  if  only  because  they  can’t  claim  any 
knowledge  for  themselves.  But  they  make  us  feel.  They  help  us  establish  contact  with 
technical beings and their temporalities, while not being  directly subordinated to individual 
profit-generation  (acknowledging  that  any  absolute  withdrawal  is  illusory)  or  customer-
gaining ends. As such, they can relatively freely mold and bend boundaries of media technical 
possibilities and aesthetic sensitivity, nurturing thus our ability to evolve alongside technical 
objects – giving the “post-production center” of human consciousness continuous updates it 
needs  to  deal  with  images  to  come.  What  seems  to  be  produced  in  such  ontogenetic 
mythotechnesis is thus perhaps nothing less than the “missing people”526 – the subjectivities to 
arise from human-machine fictioning.
Hui observes that digitalization created “a new sensibility”527 – an algorithmic, or in 
Shaviro’s terms, “free-floating sensibility”528 pulsating with alien rhythm even beneath our 
own skin. We are “changing into” something while something else is “growing out of [us].”529 
But if we don’t listen enough to the machinic murmur, it might be a process leading us toward 
an increasing incapacity to deal with them, with ourselves, and with the world as such. As this 
thesis  was  trying  to  show,  moving  images  of  contemporary  art,  interacting  through, 
522 Donna Haraway, Staying with the trouble…, p. 3.
523 Gilles Deleuze, Postscript on the Societies of Control…, p. 4.
524 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 3…, p. 9. 
525 Gilles Deleuze, To Have Done With Judgment. In: Essays Critical and Clinical, London: Verso 1998, p. 131.
526 David Burrows, Simon O‘Sullivan, Fictioning…, p. 17.
527 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects…, p. 38.
528 Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect…, p. 2.
529 Ccru: A short prehistory of CCRU. Accessible at WWW: < http://www.ccru.net/id(entity)/ccruhistory.htm> 
[publication date unknown, accessed 25 4. 2018].
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channeling, bringing forth or directly becoming digital object-beings, produce a rather rare 
experimental shared space for us to encounter and develop diverse “feelings” with and toward 
the (digital) world and offer thereby a platform for a much needed redefinition of our relation 
to technics as well as how to even understand what human subject is becoming, being ever-
more-tightly  ingrown into  the shifting  technical  landscape.  And as  dark and fluid  as  this 
landscape might  seem, we must keep trying to submerge ourselves in it  intentionally  and 
sharpen our senses toward its  inaccessible  depths. Because we cannot choose whether we 
want to float in the realm of fictioning digital objects. But if we engage it, we might still have 
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Figure 5 – Depiction of underwater genetic sequencing processes in Joey Holder’s Ophiux 
(2016)
Figure 6 – Still from Hito Steyerl’s How Not to be Seen (2013), referencing the now 
anachronistic meme format and aesthetics
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Figure 7 – Frame from a sequence zooming in from the depicted totality of earth down to a 
single calibration pixel located on its surface, from How Not to be Seen (2013)
Figure 8 – Still from How Not to be Seen (2013) demonstrating the video’s mingling of 3D 
animations, rendered architectural design plans, camera footage, et al.
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Figure 9 – A blend of digital models of resolution targets, 3D renderings of the physical 
(desert) space surrounding the calibration target, green screen techniques, and an Apple 
desktop background from How Not to be Seen (2016)
Figure 10 – Still depicting the spiraling effusion of pixels escaping from an iPhone in How 
Not to be Seen (2016)
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Figure 11 – Still from the opening sequence of Hyperlinks or It didn’t Happen (2014), 
showing Evan’s adaptation of Lionsgate’s discarded digital recreation of the late Philip 
Seymour Hoffman 
Figure 12 – The dancing hologram of Hatsune Miku, as it appears and reappears throughout 
Hyperlinks or It didn’t Happen (2014)
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Figure 13 – The Invisible woman from Hyperlinks or It didn’t Happen (2014)




Figure 15 – Depiction of an “artifact” from a 3D design of an architectural visualization 
walking across the resolution target and into (or within) the shot from a camera, How Not to 
be Seen (2013)
Figure 16 – The rural character designated “Neighbor girl” who plays a role in Ryan 
Trecartin’s project Whether Line (2019) 
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Figure 17 – Trecartin’s actual living space, which doubles as a virtual home for his characters
Figure 18 – The juxtaposition of two slightly varied camera angles in Mark Trade (2016)
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Figure 19 – A demonstration of another of Trecartin’s layering techniques, in which two 
scenes or frames are visually merged (from Center Jenny, 2013)
Figure 20 – Still from Center Jenny (2013) showing the jarring placement of non-utilized 
green screens as elements of the film set
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Figure 21 – Here holographic Miku reappears in Hyperlinks or It didn’t Happen (2014), 
merging screens and animations with shots and overlays
Figure 22 – The interplay of camera shots, desktop backgrounds, images, and animation in 
Hyperlinks or It didn’t Happen (2014)
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Figure 23 – The complex morphing and interaction between images and scenes in Item Falls 
(2013)




Figure 25 – The wave of the viewing platform, from which people watch the video 
element of Liquidity Inc. (2014), Steyerl’s watery depiction of speculative finance
Figure 26 – The physical installation space for Steyerl’s Factory of the Sun (2015), 
designed to engulf viewers in a 3D modeling software’s blank space
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Figure 27 – Holder’s intricately fabricated installation environment for Adcredo – The 
Deep Belief Network (2018), which integrates physical fake rock and virtual designs
          Figure 28 – Joey Holder’s Semelparous (2020), installed in an abandoned spa
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Figure 29 – Matyáš Maláč, On Dust, (3D print, steel, flax, wood, 2021), 3D printed scan of 
rotten fruit, from his recent exhibition Love Your Data –The Life of a Paranormie
Figure 30 – Hito Steyerl’s Power Plants (2019) installation, comprising of 
videos showing the bloom of flowers as rendered by machine learning
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Figure 31 – StyleGAN’s generation of a non-existent person, 
processed by portrait analysis 
Figure 32 – Landscape image generated by Google 
Deep Dream, showing presets of machinic vision
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Figure 33 –  Still from Marios Stamatis’ EXOEXO (2020) installation, which shows the 
flowing mutations of plant structures and technical objects
Figure 34 – A photo from EXOEXO (2020), 
showing the extension of the AI-generated 
image-matter into the gallery physical space
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